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Database replication is traditionally envisaged as a way of increasing fault-tolerance
and availability. It is advantageous to replicate the data when transaction workload
is predominantly read-only. However, updating replicated data within a transactional
framework is a complex affair due to failures and race conditions among conflicting
transactions. This thesis investigates various mechanisms for the management of repli-
cas in a large distributed system, formalizing and reasoning about the behavior of such
systems using Event-B. We begin by studying current approaches for the management
of replicated data and explore the use of broadcast primitives for processing transac-
tions. Subsequently, we outline how a refinement based approach can be used for the
development of a reliable replicated database system that ensures atomic commitment
of distributed transactions using ordered broadcasts.
Event-B is a formal technique that consists of describing rigorously the problem in an
abstract model, introducing solutions or design details in refinement steps to obtain
more concrete specifications, and verifying that the proposed solutions are correct. This
technique requires the discharge of proof obligations for consistency checking and refine-
ment checking. The B tools provide significant automated proof support for generation
of the proof obligations and discharging them. The majority of the proof obligations are
proved by the automatic prover of the tools. However, some complex proof obligations
require interaction with the interactive prover. These proof obligations also help discover
new system invariants. The proof obligations and the invariants help us to understand
the complexity of the problem and the correctness of the solutions. They also provide
a clear insight into the system and enhance our understanding of why a design decision
should work.
The objective of the research is to demonstrate a technique for the incremental con-
struction of formal models of distributed systems and reasoning about them, to develop
the technique for the discovery of gluing invariants due to prover failure to automati-
cally discharge a proof obligation and to develop guidelines for verification of distributed
algorithms using the technique of abstraction and refinement.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Various modern day distributed transactional information systems based on distributed
databases are large and fairly complex due to their underlying mechanisms for transac-
tion support. These systems, classified as business critical systems, take advantage of
data distribution and are expected to exhibit high degrees of dependability. Any failure
in these systems may lead to financial losses in addition to the potential loss of the trust
of customers. Formal rigorous reasoning about the algorithms and mechanisms beneath
such systems is required to precisely understand the behavior of such systems at the
design level.
1.1.1 Data Replication
Due to the rapid advances in communication technology, the last decade has witnessed
the development of several complex distributed information systems for banks, stock
exchanges, electronic commerce, and airline/rail reservation, to name a few. The emer-
gence of such applications has opened up new opportunities for integrating advances
in database systems with the advances in the communication technology. In such sys-
tems, it is not uncommon to store a copy of a database (replication) or to store part of
the database (fragmentation) at several sites for fault-tolerance and efficiency. A dis-
tributed database system can be thought of as a collection of several sites where data is
distributed across these sites. These sites communicate by exchange of messages and co-
operate with each other for the successful completion of global computation which may
read or write to the data at several sites. With respect to the data distribution, from a
user perspective, a distributed database should behave like a centralized database. This
view of distributed databases implies that the user should be able to query the database
without worrying about the distribution of the data. With respect to the updates, this
1
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view of a distributed database requires that the transactions must be executed as an
atomic action regardless of fragmentation and replication [105].
Replication improves availability in a distributed database system [53]. A replicated
database system can be defined as a distributed system where copies of the database
are kept across several sites. Data access in a replicated database can be done within
a transactional framework. It is advantageous to replicate the data if the transaction
workload is predominantly read only. However, during updates, the issue of keeping
the replicas in a consistent state arises due to race conditions among conflicting update
transactions. The strong consistency criterion in the replicated database requires that
the database remains in a consistent state despite transaction failures. The possible
causes of transaction failures include bad data input, time outs, temporary unavailability
of data at a site and detected deadlocks.
In addition to providing fault-tolerance due to failures, one of the important issues to
be addressed in the design of replica control protocols is consistency. The One-Copy
Equivalence [19, 97] criteria states that a replicated database is in a mutually consistent
state only if all copies of data objects logically have the same value. The One-Copy
Serializability [19] is the highest correctness criterion for replica control protocols. It
is achieved by coupling the consistency criteria of one-copy equivalence and providing
serializable execution of transactions. In order to achieve this correctness criterion,
it is required that interleaved execution of transactions on replicas be equivalent to
serial execution of those transactions on one-copy of a database. One copy equivalence
and serial execution together provide one-copy serializability which is supported in a
read anywhere write everywhere approach [118]. Though serializability is the highest
correctness criteria, it is too restrictive in practice. Various degrees of isolation to
address this problem have been studied in [63].
1.1.2 Broadcast Primitives
A distributed system is a collection of distinct sites that are spatially separated and
cooperate with each other towards the completion of a distributed computation. The
design and verification of distributed applications is a complex issue due to the fact
that the communication primitives available in these system are too weak. The inherent
limitation of these systems is that there does not exist a system wide common global
clock and they do not share common memory. Due to these limitations the up-to-
date state of the entire system is not available to any process or site. These systems
communicate with each other by exchange of messages which are delivered after arbitrary
time delays [121]. This problem can be dealt with by relying on group communication or
broadcast primitives that provide higher ordering guarantees on the delivery of messages.
The implementations of these group communication primitives has also been investigated
for different distributed systems such as Isis [21], Totem [94], Trans [91], Amoeba [128]
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and Transis [10]. The protocols in these systems use varying broadcast primitives and
address group maintenance, fault-tolerance and consistency services. Several approaches
have been proposed for the management of replicated data using group communication
primitives [9, 55, 63, 98, 100, 115, 125]. The transaction mechanism in the management
of replicated data is also considered in [9, 14, 98, 114].
There exist several broadcast protocols based on varying group communication primi-
tives that satisfy different higher ordering guarantees for the messages [38, 52, 125]. The
weakest among them is reliable broadcast. A reliable broadcast eventually delivers the
messages to all participating sites and imposes no restriction on the order in which the
messages are delivered to those sites. Stronger variants of a reliable broadcast impose
additional requirements on the order in which messages are delivered such as FIFO order,
local order, causal order, total order and total causal order1. A causal order broadcast is
a reliable broadcast that preserves the causality among the messages and the messages
are delivered to the processes respecting the causality among the messages. The notion
of causality is based on the causal precedence relation (→) defined by Lamport [75].
A causal order broadcast combines the properties of both FIFO and local order. A
total order broadcast is a reliable broadcast that satisfies the total order requirement
and requires that all processes eventually deliver the same sequence of messages [52]
irrespective of their sender(s). Similarly, a total causal order broadcast combines the
properties of both total and causal order and requires that the messages are delivered
to the processes respecting both total and causal order.
The introduction of transactions based on group communication primitives represents
an important step towards extending the power and generality of group communication
for design and implementation of reliable fault-tolerant distributed computing applica-
tions [114]. In a replicated database, users interact with the database using transactions.
A read-only transaction may read the data locally at the site of submission, while an
update transaction needs to access data at several sites. If a replicated database uses
a reliable broadcast without ordering guarantees, the operations of conflicting update
transactions may arrive at different sites in different orders due to race conditions2. This
may lead to the formation of deadlocks among conflicting transactions involving several
sites. The blocking of the update transactions at a site is usually resolved by aborting
the transactions by timeouts. This problem can be addressed effectively by processing
transactions over a stronger notion of reliable broadcast protocol that provides higher
order guarantees on message delivery [9, 125]. The abortion of conflicting transactions
can be avoided by using a total order broadcast which delivers and executes the con-
flicting operations at all sites in the same order, thus ensuring a serial execution of
conflicting update transactions at replicas. Similarly, a causal order broadcast captures
conflict as causality and the transactions executing conflicting operations are executed
1The informal specifications of various ordering properties are given in Chapter 2.
2The race conditions on the conflicting update transactions are explained in Section 3.2 in Chapter 3.
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at all sites in the same order. Processing update transactions over a total causal order
broadcast not only delivers the operations in a total order at the participating sites, but
also preserves the causal precedence relationship among the update transactions.
1.2 Why use Formal Methods for Data Replication ?
Database replication is traditionally envisaged as a way of increasing fault-tolerance and
availability. There exists a vast literature on the management of replicated data [53] deal-
ing with various aspects such as fault-tolerance, consistency, performance and scalability.
Despite the abundance of work in this area, little work has been implemented in com-
mercial products. One of the important reasons is that most replica control mechanisms
are complex, under-specified and difficult to reason about. As a result many commercial
products take a pragmatic approach for data replication which allows the replicas to
be in inconsistent states [61, 63], tolerates inconsistency among the replicas due to lazy
replication [101] and leaves solving inconsistencies to the user [124]. Group communi-
cation has been proposed as a powerful mechanism for the management of replicated
databases. The existing work on the development of formal specifications of group com-
munications services, ordering and reliability properties is often complicated, difficult to
understand and sometime ambiguous [34, 42, 96]. Application of formal methods to this
problem to provide clear specifications and formal verification of the critical properties
is rare. It is desirable that the models of distributed systems be precise and reasonably
compact, and one expects that all the aspects of the system must be considered in the
proofs.
The dependability of distributed systems is an important design criterion for developing
new distributed services or updating existing ones. In principle, the dependability of a
system is the ability to avoid service failures that are more frequent and more severe than
is acceptable. The dependability of the system encompasses the following attributes [13];
the readiness for service (avialability), the continuity of service (reliability), absence of
catastrophic consequences on the users and environment (safety), absence of improper
system alterations (integrity), and ability to undergo modifications and repairs (main-
tainability). Reliability refers to both resilience of a system to various type of failures
and its capability to recover from them [97]. A resilient system is tolerant of failures and
can continue to provide the service even when failure occurs. A recoverable database
system is one that can get to a consistent state by moving back to a previous consis-
tent state (backward recovery) or moving forward to a new consistent state (forward
recovery). One of the approaches for dealing with the failures in a distributed system
is exception handling. The coordinated atomic action (CA action) [137] concept is a
unified scheme for coordinating complex concurrent activities and supporting error re-
covery between multiple interacting components in a distributed object system. The
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problem of exception handling in distributed systems where exceptions may be raised
simultaneously in different processing nodes is addressed in [138].
These issues related to dependability must be addressed in the design, architecture and
component infrastructure of a system. It is not possible to simply add a fault-tolerance
module later on to make the system fault-tolerant [57]. A system can be designed
to be fault-tolerant by ensuring that exhibits well defined behavior which facilitates
the actions suitable for recovery. For example, in replicated data updates, the effect
of an update transaction must not be visible until it commits at all sites and a replica
should receive the updates in the same order they were sent. Formal Methods provides a
systematic approach to the development of complex systems. They provide a framework
for specification of the system under development and verification of desirable properties.
Advantages and disadvantages of formal methods in industrial practice and the degree
of formalism to use is considered in [54, 58, 112]. Until now, formal methods were
considered suitable for design and development of safety critical and mission critical
system such as train systems [3, 4], embedded controllers for railways [26], and a steam
boiler [30]. Currently, computer science researchers are collaborating to enhance and
develop the verification technologies that demonstrate high reliability and productivity in
software development. One such long term research project, called the verified software
grand challenge [135], is targeted towards developing a roadmap for integrating tools and
techniques for verification and demonstrating the feasibility of applying formal methods
to large scale industrial software development.
This thesis investigates various mechanisms for the management of replicas in a large
distributed system, formalizing and reasoning about the behavior of such systems. Our
approach to modelling and formal reasoning about fault-tolerant distributed transactions
for replicated databases is based on Event-B [92].
1.3 Related Work
There exists a vast literature in the area of transactional information systems [134],
distributed algorithms [85, 87], concurrency control [19], distributed databases [32] and
group communication [38]. There also exists a plethora of algorithms and protocols
covering several aspects of database transactions, replication and distributed databases
showing the complexity of the problem. However, the application of formal methods for
providing precise specifications of the problem, their solutions and proof of correctness
is still an important issue. Some formal methods have been applied to the problems in
this area and we outline some of that work.
I/O Automata, a formal method, was originally developed to describe and reason about
distributed systems [47, 86]. The I/O automation model is a labelled transition system
consisting of sets of states which also include the set of initial states, a set of actions and
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a set of transitions. The operations of I/O automation are described by its executions
and traces. Executions in the I/O automation are alternating sequences of states and
actions, while the traces are sequences of input and output actions occurring in the ac-
tions. One automation implements another if its traces are also traces of the other. The
proof method supported in this method for reasoning about the system involves invari-
ant assertions. An invariant assertion is defined as a property of the state of a system
that is true in all executions. Most notably, the work done so far using I/O Automata
has been carried out by hand [42, 47]. Some of the significant work done using I/O
Automata includes modelling and verification of sequentially consistent shared object
systems in a distributed network [41]. In order to keep the replicated data in a consis-
tent state, a combination of total order multicast and point to point communication is
used. In [40], I/O automata are used to express lazy database replication. The authors
present an algorithm for lazy database replication and prove the correctness properties
relating to performance and fault-tolerance. In [42, 104] the specification for group com-
munication primitives is presented using I/O automata under different conditions such
as partitioning among the group and dynamic view oriented group communication. A
series of invariants relating state variables and reachable states are proved using the
method of induction.
Temporal Logic of Actions(TLA) [72, 78] is a method for specifying and reasoning about
concurrent algorithms. In TLA, a system is specified by a formula [77]. Temporal logic
formula contain variables to represent quantities that change with time and constants
to represent the quantities that do not change with time. A TLA formula is defined on
system behavior. A system satisfies a formula if the formula is true for every behavior
corresponding to a possible execution of the system. TLA+ is a language for writing
a TLA specification which includes the operators for defining data structures for large
specifications. TLA+ specifications are supported by tools such as TLC, a model checker
and simulator and SANY, a parser and semantic analyzer for specifications. The major
work carried out using TLA includes formalizing the Byzantine Generals problem and
providing a proof of correctness of the solution [79], the remote procedure call and
memory specification problem [88] and distributed algorithms like lazy caching [70].
The Z notation [123, 136] has also been applied to develop formal specification of a
database system. Z is a formal specification notation based on set theory and first order
predicate logic to express model-based specifications. A notion of schema is central to Z
specifications. A system specification in Z consists of state variables, initialization, and
a set of operations on state variables. The invariants are expressed on state variables
to represent the conditions which must always be satisfied. There exist a number of
industrial-level tools for formatting, type-checking and aiding proofs in Z. In [11, 12],
Z is used to formally specify a database system to illustrate transaction decomposition.
In the Z specifications, they outline the necessary steps to obtain transaction decom-
position to increase concurrency and reason about interleaving with other transactions.
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The necessary properties are added in the form of invariants and they provide proof of
correctness by hand to show that invariants are preserved by the specifications.
In [67, 68], an approach for modelling long running transactions using the NT/PV
model is presented. In NT/PV, a long running transaction is modelled by a set of sub-
transactions, a partial order among sub-transactions, inputs and outputs. A transaction
is said to execute correctly if it begins execution in a state which satisfies its input
conditions, executes its sub-transactions consistently in a partial order and terminates
by leaving the database in a state which satisfies its output conditions.
In [130], a set theoretic model is proposed to verify ordering properties of a multicast
protocol. Three types of ordering properties, local order, causal order and total order
are considered. Formal results are presented that define a set of circumstances under
which a total order satisfies the causal relationship among the messages. Formal results
in the form of theorems are provided and they can be applied to a system to prove the
ordering properties on messages in that system.
A refinement based approach to developing distributed systems in Event-B is outlined
in [24]. The correspondence between the action-based formalism and the abstract B
machines is outlined in this work. The action system formalism [15] is a state-based
approach to distributed computing. An action system models a reactive system with
guarded actions on state variables. In [24], the author outlines how the reactive refine-
ment and decomposition of action systems can be applied to abstract machines and how
this approach is related to step-wise refinement in Event-B. The refinement approach
has been applied to the development of a secure communication system [25]. The aim
was to carry out a development from initial abstract specifications of security services
to a detailed design in the refinement steps. The authors have also demonstrated an
effective way to combine B and CSP specifications.
In [22] important contributions are made towards development of a refinement rule which
allows actions to be introduced in a refinement step and a decomposition rule which
allows a system model to be decomposed into parallel subsystems. Use of refinement and
decomposition rules in the development of telecommunications systems is outlined in [23].
Other important work carried out using the refinement approach includes the Mondex
purse system in Event-B [31], verification of the IEEE 1394 tree protocol distributed
algorithm [7], development of a train system [4], rigorous development of fault-tolerant
agent systems [71] and modelling web based systems in B [110]. The case study on
Mondex illustrates modelling strategies and the guidelines to achieve a high degree of
automatic proofs.
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1.4 Our Contributions
In this thesis, we present a model driven approach using Event-B for the construction
of formal models of distributed transactions and broadcast protocols for a replicated
database system. We outline how a refinement based approach can be used for the de-
velopment of a reliable replicated database system that ensures atomic commitment of
update transactions using broadcast primitives. Our approach of specification and veri-
fication is based on the technique of abstraction and refinement. This formal technique,
supported in Event-B, consists of describing rigorously the problem in the abstract model
and introducing the solution or design details in refinement steps. Through the refine-
ment we verify that the detailed design of a system in the refinement conforms to the
initial abstract specifications. We have used the industrial level B tool Click’n’Prove [6]
for the generation of proof obligations and discharge them using the automatic and
interactive prover.
In our approach, we model abstract behavior of a distributed algorithm in the abstract
model and propose the solutions in the refinement step using concrete variables. The B
tool generates proof obligations relating abstract and concrete variables for refinement
checking. In order to discharge these proof obligations we need to add a series of new
gluing invariants to the model. These gluing invariants demonstrate the relationship of
abstract and concrete variables. The discovery of these new gluing invariant provides a
clear insight to the system and support precise reasoning about why a specific solution
proposed in the refinement is a correct solution of abstract problem. The aim of the
work presented in the thesis is outlined below.
– To demonstrate the application of a technique for incremental construction of
formal models of distributed systems and to reason about them.
– To develop the technique for the discovery of gluing invariants due to prover failures
to automatically discharge a proof obligation.
– To investigate the applicability of ordered broadcasts for processing transactions
in a replicated database.
– To develop guidelines for formal design of distributed transactional systems by
means of abstraction and refinement.
1.5 Chapter Outline
The thesis is organized into eight chapters. The summary of each chapter is outlined
below.
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– In Chapter 2, an overview of replicated data updates and the related problems is
presented. Subsequently, informal specifications of various ordered broadcast are
discussed. Later in the chapter, we address the notion of logical time. A back-
ground of logical clocks, such as Lamport’s clock and the vector clock is presented.
The subtle issues related to the consistency of logical clocks are also addressed.
At the end of the chapter, an overview of an approach to formal development of
distributed systems using Event-B is outlined.
– In Chapter 3, we present a formal approach to modelling and analyzing a dis-
tributed transaction mechanism for replicated databases using Event-B. In our
abstract model, an update transaction modifies the abstract one-copy database
through a single atomic event. In the refinement, an update transaction consists
of a collection of interleaved events updating each replica separately. The transac-
tion mechanism on the replicated database is designed to provide the illusion of an
atomic update of a one-copy database. Through the refinement proofs, we verify
that the design of the replicated database preserves the one-copy equivalence con-
sistency criterion despite transaction failures at a site. The various events in the
refinement are triggered within the framework of the two phase commit protocol.
The system allows the sites to abort a transaction independently and keeps the
replicated databases in a consistent state. A series of invariants discovered while
discharging the proofs is also presented which provides a clear insight into why
our model of the replicated database preserves consistency despite transactions
aborting at a site.
In the subsequent refinement steps, we introduce explicit messaging among the
sites and demonstrate how various messages are exchanged among the sites within
the framework of two phase commit protocol. A notion of a reliable broadcast is
adopted in our model to represent communication among the sites. We also present
the specification of TimeOut operation that aborts a transaction by timeouts.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present incremental development of stronger variants of reliable
broadcast protocol and in Chapter 7 (Section 7.2.3) we outline how the stronger
notion of broadcast can be used to define an abstract ordering on the transactions.
– In Chapter 4, abstract specifications of causal order broadcast are presented. The
causal order on the messages is defined by combining the properties of both FIFO
and local order. We also outline how an abstract causal order is constructed by the
sender. In the refinement we introduce the notion of vector clocks. The abstract
causal order in the abstract model is replaced by the vector clock rules. In this
process we also discover some interesting invariants which define the relationship
between abstract causal order and the vector clock rules. This formal study pre-
cisely reasons about how an abstract causal order on the messages can correctly
be implemented by a system of vector clocks.
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– In Chapter 5, we present an incremental development of a system of total order
broadcast. The key issues with respect to the total order, such as how to build
a total order on the messages and what information is necessary for defining a
total order, are also addressed. In this development we first present the abstract
specifications of the total order broadcast. Subsequently, in the refinement steps,
we introduce a sequencer based approach to implement the total order.
– In Chapter 6, after establishing the invariants for a system of causal order broad-
cast and total order broadcast, we present a formal development of a system of
total causal order broadcast which satisfies both a total and a causal order on the
message delivery. In the refinements we outline how the abstract total order and
causal order can correctly be implemented by a vector clock system. In the further
refinements we also outline how the requirement of the generation of a sequence
number can be eliminated by employing the vector clocks. The various invariants
relating abstract total order, causal order, sequence numbers and vector clocks are
also given.
– In Chapter 7, the liveness issues related to the model of distributed transactions
are addressed. We briefly outline the construction of the proof obligations to
ensure enabledness preservation and non-divergence. Lastly, we present the general
guidelines for formal development of a distributed system using Event-B.
– In Chapter 8, we present our conclusions, compare our approach with other related
work and outline future work.
Chapter 2
Background
The term distributed system has been defined and characterized in number of ways in
various contexts in the past couple of years.
– Ozsu and Valduriez [97] define a distributed system as a collection of autonomous
processing elements (not necessarily homogenous) that are connected by a computer
network and that cooperate in performing their assigned tasks.
– Tanenbaum and Van Steen [129] give a loose characterization of a distributed
system as a collection of independent computers that appears to its user as a single
coherent system.
– Singhal and Shivratri [121] describe a distributed system as a system consisting of
several computers that do not share memory or a clock; communicate by exchange
of messages; and each computer has its own memory and runs its own operating
system
– Korth, Silberschatz and Sudershan [119] define a distributed database system
as a system consisting of loosely coupled sites that share no physical component;
database systems that run on each site are independent of each other; and a trans-
action may access the data at one or more sites.
– Gray and Reuter [50] define a distributed database system as a database system
that provides transparent access to replicated and partitioned data.
We take a collective view of these definitions.
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2.1 Preliminaries
2.1.1 A Database Transaction
A database transaction can be defined as a collection of actions that make consistent
transformations of database state while preserving system consistency [97]. A database
transaction is a unit of work which contains operations performing reads, writes or
updates to a data object. A typical database transaction is said to have ACID (atomicity,
consistency, isolation, durability) properties. The atomicity property requires either all
or none of the operations of the transaction are executed. The transaction commits
only when all of the operations are done, otherwise it aborts. The consistency property
requires that the execution of a transaction must leave the database in a consistent
state. The isolation property requires that following a schedule in which the execution
of multiple transactions is interleaved has same effect as if they were executed in some
serial order. This also implies that incomplete transaction updates are not visible to
concurrent transactions. The durability condition requires that once the transaction
commits, all of its effects survive system failures and results are permanent.
2.1.2 Long Running Transactions and Compensations
A long running transaction may be defined as a transaction which takes longer time to
complete execution [45] than traditional ACID transactions. In traditional database sys-
tems, an execution is serializable if it is equivalent to a serial execution. The traditional
notion of serializability as a correctness criterion is too restrictive and a bottleneck for
long running transactions [60, 68]. In order to avoid this bottleneck different kinds of
extended transaction models such as nested transactions [95], SAGA [46], cooperative
transactions [68] are suggested which use a relaxed notion of serializability. Compensa-
tion has been proposed as a mechanism for handling failures in long running transactions.
If any activity needs to be rolled back, a compensatory action is taken to semantically
undo the effect of the committed transactions. The transactions that are executed to
semantically undo the effects of a committed transaction are called compensating trans-
actions.
A formal approach for modelling compensation in business processes can be found in [28].
StAC [27] is a formal language developed for the design of component based enterprize
systems which exclusively deals with compensation. Though compensation is an im-
portant concept used for handling failures during long business activities, compensating
transactions are not enough to meet all the requirements of modern business-to-business
interaction. Some of these requirements may be found in [51].
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2.1.3 Distributed Transactions
In a distributed database system, a given transaction is submitted at one site, but it
can access data at other sites as well [97, 105]. A distributed transaction (global trans-
action) can be defined as a transaction accessing data located at other sites as well.
Each site maintains transaction coordinator, transaction manager and lock manager
processes. The coordinated actions of all of these processes ensures execution of a dis-
tributed transaction. A transaction coordinator is responsible for starting the execution
of transactions that originate at the site. The coordinator is also responsible for dis-
tributing sub-transactions at appropriate sites for execution. The coordinator monitors
and coordinates the termination of each global transaction that originates at that site,
which may result in the transaction being committed at all sites or aborted at all sites.
The role of transaction manager is to maintain a log for recovery purposes and partici-
pate in coordinating the concurrent execution of the transactions executing at that site.
The role of lock manager is to receive lock requests from the transaction manager and
lock/unlock the data items at that site.
The transactions in a distributed system may be processed over broadcast protocols [8,
56, 64, 65, 99, 102]. Broadcast protocols that provide ordering guarantees have been
proposed as a mechanism to propagate updates to the replicas in a distributed database.
The broadcast protocols also provide serialization to updates at all sites [9, 62, 106].
2.1.4 Updating Distributed Data
The transparency requirement of distributed data requires that the user must view the
distributed data as a centralized database. The issue of fragmentation and replication
should be addressed at the system level. In the case of the update of replicas, it is
necessary to keep the replicas logically in a identical state. Failing to do that may
lead the database into an inconsistent state. There exist two approaches for updating
replicas. In synchronous replication, all the copies of replicas must be updated before an
update transaction commits, while in asynchronous replication, the replicas are updated
in a progressive manner and a transaction may view different values of replicas. Voting
and read one write all (ROWA) [53, 97, 105] are two important techniques for replica
management that ensure all replicas are in identical state.
In the voting technique, a transaction writes to a majority of replicas before it commits.
This ensures that a read-only transaction reads the correct value even though it may
observe the different values for the same data. In ROWA, a read-only transaction reads
one copy, but a write is performed to all copies before a transaction commits. This tech-
nique is suitable when the transaction workload is predominantly read-only. However,
ROWA suffers from an important drawback. If a single copy of the replica is unavailable
then update transactions cannot commit. An alternative to ROWA, which addresses
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this problem, is called Read One Write All Available (ROWA-A). In this protocol, all
available copies of the replica are updated when the update transaction commits. The
copies which were unavailable need to enforce the write when they are available. A
review of different variants of ROWA may be found in [53].
2.2 Failures in Distributed Databases
A robust design of a reliable replicated database system needs to identify the type of
failures a system may suffer. There are four types of failure called transaction failures,
site failures, media failures and communication link failures [97, 121].
Transaction Failures : These failures may occur for several reasons. The possible
causes of transaction failures are bad data input, timeouts, race conditions or a formation
of a deadlock. Most deadlock detection protocols require one of the transactions to abort
if a deadlock occurs. The usual approach used to deal with transaction failures is to abort
the transaction. Log based recovery techniques and shadow paging are two important
techniques to facilitate database recovery due to failures.
Site Failures : The main reasons for site failures are hardware failures, processor or
memory failures or failures of system software. Site failures in distributed systems result
in the inaccessibility of resources located on that site. This failure may interrupt any
distributed transaction executions that are accessing the resources located at this site.
Media Failures : These failures occur due to the failure of secondary storage devices
(e.g., disk failure) containing the whole or part of the database. The reason for these
failures varies from errors in the operating system and hardware faults, to faults in a disk
controller. In the event of media failures, the data at that site becomes inaccessible and
this may cause rollback of the transactions attempting to read or write to data objects.
Communication Link Failures : Communication link failures include errors caused
in messaging, improperly ordered messages, loss or duplication of messages or a total
failure of communication links. Failure of communication links may also divide the
distributed system into several disjoint partitions, called network partitioning.
2.2.1 Commit Protocols
In distributed databases a transaction may be processed at various sites. A higher
number of components in a distributed system implies a higher probability of component
failure during execution of a distributed transaction. In order to maintain the global
atomicity of a transaction, it is required that a distributed transaction commit at all
sites or at none of the sites. Gray addressed the issue of ensuring global atomicity despite
failures in [49]. Commit protocols provide a framework to ensure global atomicity in the
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presence of failures. The application of commit protocols for distributed transaction
management in Oracle, a commercial database management system, is discussed in [48].
The two phase commit protocol [49] is a basic protocol which provides fault-tolerance for
distributed transactions. This ensures global atomicity through the exchange of messages
among the participating and coordinating sites. This protocol ensures global atomicity
in the presence of transaction failures as every site writes an appropriate record to its
log and can take suitable action in case of recovery. A major limitation of this protocol
is that it is blocking because, in the case of coordinator site failures, participants wait
for its recovery.
2.2.2 Variants of Two Phase Commit Protocol
Many variants of the two phase commit protocol have been proposed to improve its
performance [81, 93, 122]. The presumed commit protocol is optimized to handle general
update transactions while the presumed abort optimizes read-only transactions. Levi and
others presented an optimistic two phase nonblocking commit protocol [81] in which locks
acquired on data objects at a site are released when the site is ready to commit. In the
case of an abort of a distributed transaction, a compensating transaction is executed at
that site to undo the updates. A three phase commit protocol [122] is a nonblocking
commit protocol where failures are restricted to site failures only. All variants of the
two phase commit protocol assume that mechanisms, such as, maintaining the database
log and local recovery, are present locally at each site. There also exist a number
of communication paradigms in which commit protocols may be implemented. In a
centralized two phase commit protocol no messages are exchanged among participating
sites. The exchange of messages takes place only between the coordinator site and
the cohorts. In a nested two phase commit protocol cohorts may exchange messages
among themselves. A distributed two phase commit eliminates the second phase as the
coordinator and cohorts exchange messages through broadcasting.
2.3 Message Ordering Properties
In this section we outline the informal specifications of the message ordering properties
for a broadcast system.
2.3.1 Reliable Broadcast
The concept of a reliable broadcast is central to ordered broadcasts. Various definitions
of the ordering properties have been discussed in [17, 21, 38, 126]. In [52], Hadzilacos
and Toueg say that a reliable broadcast satisfies the following properties :
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– Validity : If a correct1 process broadcasts a message m then the sender eventually
delivers m.
– Agreement : All correct processes deliver the same set of messages, i.e., if a process
delivers a message m then all correct processes eventually deliver m.
– Integrity : For any message m, every correct process delivers m at most once and
only if m was previously broadcast by sender(m).
A reliable broadcast is defined in terms of two primitives called broadcast and deliver. A
reliable broadcast imposes no restriction on the order in which messages are delivered to
the processes. However, many applications require a stronger notion of reliable broadcast
that provides ordering guarantees on message delivery. A reliable broadcast can be used
to deliver messages to processes following a fifo order, local order, causal order, total
order or a total causal order, providing ordering guarantees on the message delivery. An
informal specification of these ordering properties is given below.
2.3.2 FIFO Order
If a particular process broadcasts a message M1 before it broadcasts a message M2, then
each recipient process delivers M1 before M2.
A fifo broadcast is defined as a reliable broadcast that delivers the messages in fifo order.
As shown in Fig. 2.1, process P1 first broadcasts M1 followed by M2. The fifo order is
said to be preserved by the system if all processes deliver M1 before delivering M2. The
delayed message M1, shown as a dotted line, violates the fifo order.
M2M1
P3
P2
P1
Figure 2.1: FIFO order
1A correct process is defined as a non failed process [52, 107]. A process may fail due to crash failure,
omission failures or Byzantine failure. It also assumes a reliable communication network i.e., there is no
loss, generation or garbling of messages in the communication network [107].
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M2
M1
P3
P2
P1
Figure 2.2: Local order
2.3.3 Local Order
If a process delivers M1 before broadcasting the message M2, then each recipient process
delivers M1 before M2.
As shown in Fig. 2.2, process P2 delivers M1 before it broadcasts M2. The local order
is said to be preserved by the system if all processes deliver M1 before delivering M2.
The delayed message M1, shown as a dotted line, violates the local order.
2.3.4 Causal Order
If the broadcast of a message M1 causally precedes the broadcast of a message M2, then
no correct process delivers M2 unless it has previously delivered M1.
The notion of capturing causality in a distributed system was first formalized by Lamport
in [75] and further extended in [76]. It is based on the notion of the happened before
relationship that captures the causal relationships among the events. The execution of a
process in a distributed system can be characterized by the sequences of the events and
these events can be either internal events ormessage events. An internal event represents
a computation milestone achieved in a process, whereas message events signify exchange
of messages among the processes. The message send and message receive are message
events respectively occurring at a process sending a message and receiving a message.
The happened before relation(→) [75] between any two events of a distributed compu-
tation is defined as a → b, where event a happened before b. Events a and b are either
of following,
– a, b are internal events of the same process such that a, b ∈ Pi and a happened
before b.
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– a, b are message events of different processes such that a ∈ Pi, b ∈ Pj , where a
is a message send event occurring at process Pi and b is a message receive event
occurring at Pj while sending a message m from process Pi to Pj .
The happened before relation (→) can be extended to the causal precedence (or precedes)
relationship to define a global causal ordering on the messages. A message mi precedes
mj if the message send event send(mi) at process Pi happened before the message send
event send(mj) at a process Pj . A message mi causally precedes mj if either of following
holds,
– the broadcast event of mi causally precedes the broadcast of mj .
– the receive event of mi causally precedes the broadcast of mj .
The happened before relation is transitive i.e. if event a happened before b and b hap-
pened before c then a is said to have happened before c.
a→ b ∧ b→ c⇒ a→ c
Not all events in a system are causally related. Event a causally affects event b only
if a → b. The events which do not causally affect other events are characterized as
concurrent events. Both causally related events and concurrent events can be defined
using this relation. The two events a and b are causally related if either a → b or b
→ a. Two events a and b are concurrent (a ‖ b) if a 9 b and b 9 a. The causally
related events and concurrent events may be defined as follows.
Causally Related Events : a → b ∨ b → a
Concurrent Events(a ‖ b) : ¬ (a → b) ∧ ¬ (b → a)
Therefore for any two events a and b there exist three possibilities i.e., either a → b
or b → a or a ‖ b.
Parallel Messages
The two messages M1 and M2 are defined as parallel messages (M1 ‖ M2) when no
partial ordering exist among them i.e., ¬ (M1 → M2) ∧ ¬ (M2 → M1) holds.
The causal order is defined by combining the properties of both fifo and local order [52].
A causal order broadcast is a reliable broadcast that satisfies the causal order require-
ment. A causal order broadcast delivers messages respecting their causal precedence.
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However, if the broadcast of any two messages is not related by causal precedence (par-
allel messages), then it does not impose any requirement on the order in which they can
be delivered. As shown in the Fig. 2.3, the broadcast of messages M1 and M2 are not
related by a causal precedence relationship and the causal order broadcast delivers them
to the processes in arbitrary order.
M2
M1
P3
P2
P1
Figure 2.3: Broadcast not related by causal precedence
2.3.5 Total Order
If two processes P1 and P2 both deliver the messages M1 and M2 then P1 delivers M1
before M2 if and only if P2 delivers M1 before M2.
A total order broadcast2 is a reliable broadcast that satisfies the total order requirement.
The agreement and total order requirements of a total order broadcast imply that all
correct processes eventually deliver the same sequence of messages [52]. Since a total
order defines an arbitrary ordering on the delivery of messages, it does not satisfy causal
relations. The two cases given below illustrate the relationship between causal order
and total order.
In the first case, as shown in Fig. 2.4, all messages are delivered conforming to both
the causal and the total order. The broadcast of a message M1 causally precedes the
broadcast of M2 and each recipient process delivers M1 before delivering M2. Similarly,
the broadcast of message M2 causally precedes broadcast of M3 and each recipient
process delivers M2 before delivering M3. Therefore, the system delivers the messages
respecting the causal order. It can also be noticed that since all processes deliver the
messages in the same sequence, i.e., M1, M2 followed by M3, the delivery order also
conforms to the total order.
2The total order broadcast is also known as atomic broadcast. Both of the terms are used interchange-
ably. The former is preferred over the later as the term atomic suggests the agreement property rather
than total order.
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M3M2
M1
P3
P2
P1
Figure 2.4: Total Order and a Causal Order
M3M2
M1
P3
P2
P1
Figure 2.5: Total Order but not a Causal Order
In the second case, as shown in Fig. 2.5, a broadcast satisfies a total order on the
messages, but does not preserve the causal relationships among them. All processes
deliver the same sequence of messages, i.e., each process delivers M1 followed by M3,
and lastly M2. Thus the delivery order conforms to the total order property. However,
the delivery order does not respect the causal order for the following reason. Since the
broadcast of M2 causally precedes the broadcast of M3, each recipient should deliver M2
before delivering M3. It can be noticed that each process delivers M3 before delivering
M2, violating the causal order.
2.3.6 Total Causal Order
A total causal order broadcast3 is a reliable broadcast that satisfies both causal and
total order. A total causal order broadcast is the strongest variant of a reliable broadcast
which has been used as an important mechanism to address fault-tolerance in distributed
systems [74, 116]. An example of a total causal order broadcast is illustrated in the
Fig. 2.4.
3A reliable broadcast that satisfies both causal and total order is also known as a causal atomic
broadcast.
Chapter 2 Background 21
2.4 Logical Clocks
A distributed system is a collection of computers that are spatially separated. A dis-
tributed computation is composed of a finite set of processes where the actions of a
process can be modelled as a collection of events produced by a process during its life
cycle. The concept of temporal ordering of events is integral to the design and devel-
opment of these systems. The causal precedence relation is an important concept for
reasoning, analyzing and drawing inferences about distributed computations. Knowl-
edge of the causal relationship among various events occurring at different processes
helps designers solve a variety of problems related to distributed computation, such as
ensuring fairness of a distributed mutual exclusion algorithm, maintaining consistency
in replicated databases and distributed deadlock detection algorithms. Such knowledge
is also useful in constructing a consistent state for resuming execution in distributed
debugging, building a checkpoint for distributed recovery and detecting inconsistencies
in replicated databases [109].
In distributed systems no built-in mechanism for a system wide clock exists and a causal
precedence relation cannot be captured accurately. Logical clocks have been proposed as
a viable solution to address this problem. Due to the absence of a common global clock
and shared memory, the various processes in distributed systems communicate with
each other by exchange of messages. More precisely, during a distributed computation,
the processes produce and receive the messages from the cooperating processes. These
messages are delivered after arbitrary delays. A class of problems related to such message
passing systems may be solved by defining global ordering on the messages. Logical
clocks such as Lamport clocks [75] and vector clocks [43, 90] provide a mechanism to
ensure globally ordered delivery of the messages. The causal ordering of messages was
proposed and discussed in [20, 75] and the protocols proposed in [21, 113] use logical
clocks to maintain the causal order of messages. A critical review of logical clocks can
be found in [18, 109]. Vector clocks were used by other researchers in [21, 69, 89, 133]
to design and develop distributed systems.
2.4.1 Lamport’s Clocks
In Lamport’s logical clock system [75], a clock is defined as a function which assigns a
number to an event. For every process Pi there exists a clock Ci which essentially maps
an event to an integer. Suppose the set EPi defines the sequence of events produced by
a process Pi as,
EPi = { ei1 , ei2 , ei3 , ei4 .... ein }
The clock function Ci may be defined as follows,
Ci : EPi → N , where N is a set of natural numbers.
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The logical clock present at every process takes monotonically increasing values and
assigns a number to every event, called a timestamp of that event. Formally, a clock Ci
present at a process Pi assigns a timestamp Ci(a) to an event a where a ∈ EPi. The
correctness criterion for this clock may be defined as follows.
– For any two internal events a and b occurring in a process Pi, a→ b⇒ Ci(a)<Ci(b).
– If a and b are message sent and message receive events of a message m occurring
in the processes Pi and Pj respectively then Ci(a) < Cj(b).
In this system every message is also timestamped before sending it to a recipient process.
This timestamp is equal to the timestamp of the message sent event of that message
at the sender’s process. The correctness criterion outlined above can be guaranteed by
following two implementation rules.
– The clock Ci at process Pi is incremented between two successive internal events
as follows.
Ci = Ci + d, where ( d=1).
– If a and b are message sent and message receive events of a message m occurring
in the processes Pi and Pj respectively, then the message m is time-stamped as
Cm:=Ci (a). The Ci(a) is obtained by applying the previous rule. The timestamp
Cj of a recipient process of the message is updated as below.
Cj := Max ( Cj ,Cm + d ), where (d =1).
Consistency of Lamport Clocks
Raynal and Singhal introduced the notion of the consistency of logical clocks in [109].
Let E1 and E2 be any two events generated by a process(es). A logical clock is consistent
if the following criteria is satisfied.
E1 → E2 ⇒ C(E1) < C(E2).
A logical clock is strongly consistent if following criteria is satisfied.
E1 → E2 ⇔ C(E1) < C(E2)
Lamport clocks are consistent due to their monotonically increasing values. However, the
limitation of Lamports clocks is that they are not strongly consistent. By comparing
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the timestamp of any two events, which occurred in different processes, it cannot be
guaranteed whether these events are casually related or not, i.e.,
Ci(a) < Cj(b); a→ b.
Consider Fig. 2.6 where occurrences of the internal and message events happening in
a set of processes are shown. The scalar timestamps of various events are also shown
in the diagram. Consider the message M1 sent from process P1 to P2. The message
sent event E11 in a process P1 happened before message receive event E21 in a process
P2. The timestamp of these two events assigned by the logical clock system are 1 and 2
respectively. Since these events are casually related, it satisfies the following consistency
criterion defined over message events.
E11 → E21 ⇒ TS (E11) < TS (E21)
Similarly, consider events E21 and E31 occurring in process P2 and P3 respectively.
The timestamp generated by the Lamport clock system for these events are 2 and 1
respectively. Since these events are not causally related, it can not be determined if one
happened before another. Therefore, Lamport clocks are not strongly consistent. i.e.,
TS(E31) < TS(E21); E31 → E21
The reason for this behavior is that the process does not keep information about whether
advancement in the clock happened due to a internal event or a message event. Clocks
(2)
E11 E12
E31
(4)
E13
E32
(2)
(3)
E23
(4)
M
M M
E22E21
(2)
P1
P2
21
3
(1)
P3
Message EventsInternal Events
(1)
Figure 2.6: Lamport Clock
Chapter 2 Background 24
at each process advance independently due to occurrences of events at that process. De-
spite this shortcoming, Lamport’s clock have been found suitable to solve some classical
distributed computing problems, such as, distributed mutual exclusion [75]. However,
the main advantage of Lamport’s clock is that upon receipt of any message a process
updates its logical time (clock) to more than the time of the previously known event at
the sender process.
The advancement of a Lamport clock is shown in the Fig. 2.6. Time stamps for the events
are obtained by applying the implementation rules. The same rules can be applied to
obtain the timestamp of events in a broadcast system. The advancement due to Lamport
clock in a broadcast system is given in Fig. 2.7.
[2] [4] [5]
M M
P2
1 2
E E E
E E E
[2] [3]
22 23EE21E
1211
31 32 33
13
[6][1] [4]
[6]
3M
P3
P1
Figure 2.7: Lamport Clock : Broadcast System
2.4.2 Vector Clocks
One of the major limitations of Lamport clocks is that they are not strongly consistent
which means that by comparing the timestamp of two events it can not be decided
whether the events are casually related. This problem was addressed in the vector
clocks proposed by Fidge and Mattern in [43] and [90]. The vector clock overcomes the
limitation of Lamport clocks and the timestamps generated by the vector clock system
may be compared to decide the causal order of occurrence of two events.
In a system of vector clocks, every process maintains a vector of size N to represent
the logical time at that process, where N is equal to the total number of processes in
that system. Let each process Pi maintain a vector clock VTi. VTi can be defined as a
function which assigns to every event a vector called, a vector timestamp.
Suppose set EPi defines the sequence of events produced by process Pi then a clock
function VTi may be defined as follows,
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EPi = { Ei1 ,Ei2 , Ei3 , Ei4 ........Ein }
VTi : EPi → V, where V is set of vector of integers of size N.
On occurrence of an event, a process uses the following two rules to update their clocks.
1. On occurrence of an internal event, process Pi updates its own time (the i
th entry
of the vector) by updating VTi(i) as follows :
VTi(i) := VTi(i) + 1
If the event is of sending a message M from process Pi to Pj then a message
timestamp VTM is generated as follows :
VTM (k) :=VTi(k) , ∀ k ∈ ( 1..N ).
2. If the event is of receiving a messageM from process Pi to Pj , the recipient process
Pj updates its vector clock VTj as follows :
VTj(k) := Max (VTj(k) ,VTM (k)), ∀ k ∈ ( 1..N ), k 6=j
Process VTj updates its own clock VTj(j) as follows :
VTj(j) := VTj(j) + 1
As mentioned in the first implementation rule, on occurrence of an internal event, a
process Pi updates its own time VTi(i). Therefore, VTi(i) represents a local logical time
at process Pi. The entry VTi(j) ( i6=j ) represents the process Pi’s latest knowledge of
time at process Pj .
Consistency of Vector Clocks
A system of vector clocks is strongly consistent. In a system of vector clocks, vector
timestamps of two events may be compared to find if these two events are casually
related. Rules for comparing the timestamp of two events were proposed in [90] and these
properties were further investigated by Raynal and Singhal in [109]. They proposed the
following criterion to compare the vector timestamp of two events.
Let the vector timestamp of events a and b be VTa and VTb respectively. The following
holds.
VTa = VTb ⇔ ∀i · VTa(i)= VTb(i)
VTa 6= VTb ⇔ ∃i · VTa(i) 6= VTb(i)
Similarly, the following relations compare timestamps to show if there exists a casual
order among the events or if they are concurrent.
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VTa < VTb ⇔ ∀i · VTa(i)≤ VTb(i) and ∃k · VTa(k)< VTb(k)
VTa ‖ VTb ⇔ ¬(VTa < VTb) ∧ ¬ (VTb < VTa)
In the case that two events a and b occurred in the same process Pi, their causality order
satisfies the following property.
a → b ⇔ VTi(a) < VTi (b)
Similarly, if the events a and b occurred in process Pi and Pj respectively, their causality
order satisfies following property.
a → b ⇔ V Ti(a) < V Tj (b)
a ‖ b ⇔ ¬ (V Ti(a) < V Tj(b)) ∧ ¬ (V Tj(b) < V Ti(a))
This also implies that after comparing the timestamp of two events occurring in different
processes we can determine if they causally affect each other or they are concurrent.
Advancement of Vector Clock : An Example
The advancement of the vector clock is illustrated in the Fig. 2.8. Let VT1, VT2 and
VT3 be vector clocks present at processes P1, P2 and P3 respectively.
E11
E23
M3
E32E31
E13
M2
E22
E12
E21
M1
P1
P2
P3
[100] [200] [320]
[120] [132]
[002][001]
[110]
Internal Events Message Events
Figure 2.8: Vector Clocks
The event E11 in process P1 which is a message send event of sending a message M1 to
process P2. Similarly, the event E21 is a message receive event occurring due to receipt
of a message M1 at process P2.
Chapter 2 Background 27
– Since E11 is the first event produced by process P1, it updates its clock VT1
following the first implementation rule of vector clock as VT1(1):= VT1(1)+1.
Therefore, the vector timestamp of event E11 is generated as VT1(E11):=[100].
– The message M1 is timestamped as VTM :=VT1(E11)=[100].
– Upon receipt of message M1, the clock at process P2 is updated as
VT2(k) := Max (VT2(k) ,VTM1(k)), ∀ k ∈ ( 1..N ), k 6= 2
The clock VT2(2) is updated as VT2(2) := VT2(2)+1 according to second imple-
mentation rule. Therefore, the process P2 assigns a vector timestamp to event E21
as VT2(E21):= [110].
The event E12 happened after the occurrence of themessage sent event E11 in the process
P1. Process P1 generates the vector timestamp for event E12 by advancing the clock
VT1 as VT1(1) := VT1(1)+1=2. Therefore, the timestamp of event E12 is generated as
VT1(E12):=[200].
Similarly, consider a message M2 sent from a process P2 to a process P1. The event E22
in a process P2 and the event E13 in a process P1 are the outcome of the message sent
and the message receive events of a message M2. The timestamp for message send and
message receive events of M2 are generated as follows.
– The timestamp for E22 is generated by advancing the clock VT2 as VT2(2):=
VT2(2)+1=2. Therefore, the timestamp of eventE22 is generated asVT2(E22):=[120].
– The message M2 is timestamped as VTM2 :=VT2(E22)=[120].
– Upon receipt of message M2, the clock at process P1 is updated as,
VT1(k) := Max (VT1(k),VTM2(k)), ∀k ∈ ( 1..N ), k 6=1.
The VT1(1) is updated as VT1(1) := VT1(1)+1=3. Therefore, the process P1
assigns a vector timestamp to event E13 as VT1(E13):= [320].
Event E31 is the first event occurring in the process P3. It is assigned the vector times-
tamp [001] following the first rule. The timestamp for the messageM3 and its associated
events E32 and E23 are assigned as [002],[002] and [132] respectively by the vector clock
system as outlined above.
2.5 Event-B
Event-B [2, 7, 92] is a formal technique consisting of describing the problem, introduc-
ing solutions or details in refinement steps to obtain more concrete specifications and
verifying that proposed solutions are correct. Event-B, a variant of B [1], was designed
for developing distributed systems.
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2.5.1 Modelling Approach in Event-B
A specific development in this approach is made of a series of further refined models. In
Event-B, a system is modelled in terms of an abstract state space using variables with
set theoretic types and the events that modify state variables. The events consist of
guarded actions occurring spontaneously rather then being invoked. At each refinement
step, new variables may be introduced and abstract variables may be removed. Each
model is made of static properties (invariants) and dynamic properties (events). A
list of state variables is modified by a finite list of events. The events are guarded by
predicates and these guards may be strengthened at each refinement step. The invariants
are properties that must be satisfied by the variables and maintained by the activation
of events.
We have used the Click’n’Prove [6] B tool for proof management which provides an
environment for the generation of proof obligations for consistency checking and refine-
ment checking. This tool also provides an automatic and an interactive prover. The
majority of the proof obligations are proved by the automatic prover. However, some of
the complex proof obligations need to be proved interactively.
2.5.1.1 An Event-B System
The notions of abstract machine and refinement are central to an Event-B system.
An abstract machine consists of sets, constants and variable clauses modelled as set
theoretic constructs. The invariants and properties are defined as first order predicates.
The event system is defined by its state and contains a number of events. The state of
the system is defined by the variables. The constants and variables are constrained by
the conditions defined in the properties and invariant clauses. Each event in the abstract
model is composed of a guard and an action. The events are modelled using generalized
substitution which includes constructs like assignment (x:= E(x)) and guarded statement
(WHEN G THEN S END). A typical abstract machine is outlined in the Fig. 2.9.
MACHINE M
SETS S1,S2,S3...
CONSTANTS C
PROPERTIES P
VARIABLES v1,v2,v3...
INVARIANTS I
INITIALISATION init
EVENTS
E1 ∼= WHEN G1 THEN S1 END ;
E2 ∼= WHEN G2 THEN S2 END ;
.......
END
Figure 2.9: Event-B Machine
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In the guarded statement (WHEN G THEN S END), the guard (G) of the event is ex-
pressed as a first order predicate. The actions of an event are specified as simultaneous
assignments of state variables using substitution statements (S ). Events occur spon-
taneously whenever their guard holds (true) and they are executed atomically. After
building a model of a system as an abstract machine, it must be proved that a system
is consistent with respect to the invariant properties of the system. The consistency of
the machine is shown by proving that each event of the system preserves the invariant.
2.5.1.2 Gluing Invariants
In an incremental development approach for system modelling we begin with an abstract
definition of the problem. The system is built in several stages by gradually introducing
the details in the refinement steps. An abstract machine can be refined by adding
new events and by adding or removing variables. A refined system state must relate
to the abstract one by an abstraction relation. This abstraction relation is defined
by an invariant known as the gluing invariant. This invariant defines the relationship
between abstract state variables and concrete (refined) state variables. More precisely,
if a statement S that acts on variable x, is refined by another statement T that acts on
variable y under invariants I then we write S ⊑I T. The invariant I is called the gluing
invariant and it defines the relationships between x and y. Each event of the abstract
model is refined to one or more corresponding concrete events. A concrete event is said
to refine a corresponding abstract one, if it is obtained by strengthening the guards
of the abstract one and the gluing invariant is preserved by the joined actions of both
events.
Replacing the abstract variable by the concrete variable in the refinement results in proof
obligations that are generated by the B tools. These proof obligations are associated
with the events in the refinement. The B tool helps to factorize large and complex
proof obligations into simpler proof obligations. In most cases the majority of the proof
obligations are proved by the automatic prover. However, in some cases we need to prove
them by interaction. The B tools also remembers the proved and unproved proofs in
the form of a proof tree. In some cases, in order to prove the unproved proof obligations
we may have to add gluing invariants to the model. In these cases the unproved proof
obligations guide us to construct the gluing invariants. The addition of new gluing
invariants can result in the generation of further proof obligations which may require
the addition of new gluing invariants. After several stages of invariant strengthening we
expect to arrive at a set of invariants which is sufficient to discharge all proof obligations.
In our case studies given in the Chapter 3, 4, 5 and 6, we outline the construction of the
invariants by inspection of the proof obligations, generated by the B Tool. A model is
said to be consistent with respect to a discovered invariant, only if the invariant holds
on the initial state given by initialization clause of B machine, and the activation of
Chapter 2 Background 30
each event preserves the invariant. An invariant constructed incorrectly may discharge
the some of the proof obligations. However, the additional proof obligations generated
by the B Tool associated with other events and initialization, cannot be discharged. In
the modelling guidelines presented in Section 7.3 of Chapter 7, we addressed the issue
of the prover’s failure to discharge a proof obligation and recommend model checking to
precisely understand what is wrong with the newly constructed invariant.
The addition of an appropriate invariant is a key to proving the correctness of the
refinement. In this approach not only do proof obligations and the interactive prover
together guide the construction of new gluing invariants, but it also has the consequence
that the form of gluing invariants closely matches the form of proof obligations, thereby,
making the mechanical proof much easier and in many cases completely automatic.
Consistency and Refinement Checking
Informally, safety properties express that something bad will not happen during sys-
tem execution. With regards to the safety properties, the existing tools generate proof
obligations for following.
1. Consistency Checking : Consistency of a machine is established by proving that
the actions associated with each event modifies the variables in such a way that
the invariants are preserved under the hypothesis that the invariants hold initially
and the guards are true. The existing B tools generate proof obligations for con-
sistency checking. By discharging these proof obligations we ensure that machine
is consistent with respect to the invariants.
2. Refinement Checking : The refinement of a machine consists of refining its state
and events. The gluing invariants relate the state of the refinement, represented by
the concrete variables, to the abstract state, represented by the abstract variables.
An event in the abstraction may be refined by one or more events, and the tool
generates the proof obligations to ensure that gluing invariants are preserved by
actions of the events in the refinement.
Discharging the proof obligations generated due to consistency checking means that
actions of the events do not violate the invariants. Discharging the proof obligations due
to the refinement checking implies that each reachable concrete state is also reachable
in the abstraction.
Non-Divergence and Enabledness Preservation
It is sometimes useful to state that the model of the system under development is
non-divergent and enabledness preserving. The issues relating to these properties are
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currently being addressed in the new generation of Event-B tools being developed [44,
92]. These properties are informally defined below.
1. Non-Divergence : In an incremental development approach using Event-B, new
events and the variables can be introduced in the refinement steps. Each new
event of the refinement refines a skip event in the abstraction and defines actions
on the new variables. Proving the non-divergence requires us to prove that the new
events do not take control forever. This constraint requires proof of a condition on a
variant. A variant clause contains a positive integer expression and every new event
introduced in the refinement should decrease the value of this expression. This
mechanism guarantees that new events cannot diverge, since the variant expression
cannot be decreased indefinitely.
2. Enabledness Preservation : By enabledness preservation, we mean that whenever
some event (or group of events) is enabled at the abstract level then the corre-
sponding event (or group of events) is eventually enabled at the concrete level.
This property can be proved by stating that the guards of abstract event implies
the disjunction of the guards of the refined events and the disjunction of the guards
of new events.
The non-divergence and enabledness preservation properties with respect to our model
of transactions are further addressed in the Chapter 7.
2.5.2 Event-B Notation
The Event-B notations are based on set theoretic notation and most of it is self-
explanatory. However, the frequently used notations in our models are outlined here
to increase the readability of the thesis. The Event-B notations are broadly classified as
relational notation (Table 2.1) and function notation (Table 2.2).
Relational Notations
The relation is the most important structure used in Event-B specifications to maintain
the relationship between two sets. Some of the important relational notations and their
meaning is given in following table.
Let A and B be two sets. The notation (↔) defines the set of relations between A and
B as :
A↔ B = P(A×B)
where × is cartesian product of A and B. A mapping of element a ∈ A and b ∈ B in a
relation R ∈ A ↔ B is written as a 7→ b. The domain of a relation R ∈A ↔ B is the
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Notations Meaning
7→ mapping
dom(R) domain of relation R
ran(R) range of relation R
 domain restriction
 range restriction
− domain anti-restriction
− overidden operator
R[A] relational image of R over set A
Table 2.1: Relational Notations
set of elements of A that R relates to some elements in B. The domain of R or source
set of R can be defined as :
dom(R) = {a|a ∈ A ∧ ∃b.(b ∈ B ∧ a 7→ b ∈ R)}
Similarly, the range of relation R ∈ A ↔ B is defined as set of elements in B related to
some element in A. The range of relation R may be defined as :
ran(R) = {b|b ∈ B ∧ ∃a.(a ∈ A ∧ a 7→ b ∈ R)}
A relation R ∈ A↔ B can be projected on a domain U ⊆ A called domain restriction()
defined as :
U R = {a 7→ b | a 7→ b ∈ R ∧ a ∈ U}
Domain anti-restriction (U − R) is defined as :
U −R = {a 7→ b | a 7→ b ∈ R ∧ a /∈ U}
Similarly range restriction() is the projection of R whose second element is in V ⊆ B.
The range restriction is defined as :
R  V = {a 7→ b | a 7→ b ∈ R ∧ b ∈ V }
The relational image R[U] where U⊆A is defined as :
R[U ] = {b | a 7→ b ∈ R ∧ a ∈ U}
The relational inverse (R−1) of a relation R is defined as :
R−1 = {b 7→ a | a 7→ b ∈ R}
If R0 ∈ A ↔ B and R1 ∈ A ↔ B are relations defined on sets A and B, the relational
over-ride operator (R0 − R1) replaces certain mappings in relation R0 by those in
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relation R1.
R0 −R1 = (dom(R1) −R0) ∪R1
Function Notations
Event-B extensively uses the notion of functions. A function is a relation having some
special properties. A partial function from set A to B (A 7→ B) is a relation which
relates an element in A to at most one element in B. A partial function f ∈ A 7→ B
satisfies the following :
∀(a, b1, b2).(a ∈ A ∧ b1 ∈ B ∧ b2 ∈ B ⇒ (a 7→ b1 ∈ f ∧ a 7→ b2 ∈ f)⇒ b1 = b2))
Similarly a total function f ∈ A → B is a partial function where dom(f)=A. Given f ∈
A 7→ B and a ∈ dom(f), f(a) represents the unique value that a is mapped to by f.
An injective function never maps two different elements of the source set to the same
element of the target set. Injective functions may be of two types, partial injection or
total injection. A partial injection from set A to B (A 7֌ B) may be defined as :
A 7֌B = {f |f ∈ A 7→B ∧ f−1 ∈ B 7→A}
A total injection is a partial injective function which is also a total function defined as
A֌B = (A 7֌B) ∩ (A→B)
Some of the important function notations and their meaning is given in Table 2.2. A
more detailed explanation of these operations may be found in [1, 117].
Notations Meaning
7→ partial function
→ total function
7֌ partial injection
֌ total injection
Table 2.2: Function Notations
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we outlined the different issues related to replicated data updates, fault-
tolerance, consistency and failures in a distributed database system. Capturing the
causal precedence relation among the different events occurring in distributed systems
is a key to the success of distributed computation. The concept of logical clocks addresses
this problem. Logical clocks such as the Lamport clock and vector clock can be used
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to solve a variety of problems relating to distributed mutual exclusion, consistency in
replicated databases, distributed debugging, checkpointing and failure recovery. In a
system of Lamport clocks, a clock at a process is represented by an integer value. The
advantage of Lamport clocks is that messages piggyback less information but they suffer
from the disadvantage that they are not strongly consistent. In vector clocks, a clock at a
process is represented by a vector of integers whose size equals the number of processes in
the system. The advantage of vector clocks over Lamport clocks is that they are strongly
consistent. However, they suffer from the disadvantage that all messages piggyback a
vector and message overheads are likely to increase. An approach to the reduction of
vector timestamp has been addressed in [16, 120].
Finally, we have outlined our approach to modelling and reasoning about distributed
system using Event-B. Event-B [2, 7, 92] is a formal technique consisting of describing
a problem, rigorously introducing the solutions or design details in refinement steps
to obtain more concrete specifications and verifying that the proposed solutions are
correct. The approach to specifying the system and verification is based on the technique
of abstraction and refinement. There exist several industrial level tools to support B
development such as Click’n’Prove [6], Atelier B [127], and the B-Toolkit [33] which
provide an environment for generation of proof obligations for consistency checking and
refinement checking. Recently, a new generation RODIN B tool [5] has been developed
which provides specific support for Event-B development. Applications of the B method
to develop models of distributed systems include modelling a web based systems [110],
a secure communication system [25], verification of one-copy equivalence criterion in a
distributed database system [142], verification of the IEEE 1394 tree protocol distributed
algorithm [7], a Mondex Purse [31]. The general modelling approach for distributed
systems may be found in [24].
Chapter 3
Distributed Transactions
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we formally develop an abstract model of transactions in Event-B for a
one-copy database. The notion of a replicated database is introduced in the refinement
of the abstract model. The replica control mechanism considered in the refinement
allows both update and read-only transactions to be submitted at any site. In our
abstract model, an update transaction modifies the abstract one-copy database through
a single atomic event. In the refinement, an update transaction consists of a collection
of interleaved events updating each replica separately. The transaction mechanism on
the replicated database is designed to provide the illusion of an atomic update of a one-
copy database. Through our refinement proof we verify that this is indeed the case. A
read-only transaction reads the values from a replica locally at the site of submission.
Transaction failure is represented by sites aborting transactions. A site may decide
to abort an update transaction due to race conditions among conflicting transactions.
We address the one-copy equivalence consistency criterion through this refinement. By
verifying the refinement, we verify that the design of the replicated database confirms
to the one-copy database abstraction despite transaction failures at a site.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes the sys-
tem model informally, Section 3.3 presents an abstract Event-B model of transactions
considering the database as single logical entity, Section 3.4 presents a refinement of
the abstract Event-B model introducing details of the replicated database, Section 3.5
presents some properties of system given as gluing invariants detailing the relationship
between the single copy and the replicated database, Section 3.6 presents another refine-
ment where explicit messaging is introduced. In this refinement, we show how a reliable
broadcast can be used to ensure transaction execution. In Section 3.7 we address site
failures and transaction abortion using a timeout and finally Section 3.8 concludes the
chapter.
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3.2 System Model
In this section, we present an informal model of a replicated database. Our system model
consists of a set of sites and data objects. Users interact with the database by starting
transactions. We consider the case of full replication and assume all data objects are
updateable. The read anywhere write everywhere [19, 97] replica control mechanism is
considered for updating replicas. A transaction is considered as a sequence of read/write
operations executed atomically, i.e., a transaction will either commit or abort the effect
of all database operations.
3.2.1 Transaction Types
Let the sequence of read/write operations issued by the transaction Ti be defined by a
set of objects objectset(Ti) where objectset(Ti) 6= ∅. Let the set writeset(Ti) represent
the set of objects to be updated such that writeset(Ti) ⊆ objectset(Ti). The following
types of transactions are considered for this model of a replicated database.
– Read-Only Transactions : These transactions are submitted locally to the site
and commit after reading the requested data object locally. A transaction Ti is
defined as a read-only transaction if writeset(Ti)= ∅.
– Update Transactions : These transactions update the requested data objects.
The effects of update transactions are global, thus when committed, all replicas
of data objects maintained at all sites must be updated. In case of abort, none of
the sites update the data object. A transaction Ti is a update transaction if its
writeset(Ti) 6= ∅.
– Conflicting Update Transactions : Two update transactions Ti and Tj are in
conflict if the sequence of operations issued by Ti and Tj are defined on sets of
objects, i.e., objectset(Ti) ∩ objectset(Tj) 6= ∅.
In order to meet the strong consistency requirement where each transaction reads the
correct value of a replica, conflicting transactions need to be executed in isolation. We
consider the case of general isolation [39], where the sequence of operations issued by
conflicting transactions are executed in isolation at all participating sites. In our model,
we ensure this property by not issuing a transaction at a site if there is a conflicting
transaction that is active at that site. In our model the transactions are executed within
the framework of the two phase commit protocol [48, 49] as follows.
– A read-only transaction Ti is executed locally at the initiating site of Ti (also
called the coordinator site of Ti) by acquiring locks on the data object defined by
objectset(Ti).
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– An update transaction Ti is executed by broadcasting its operations to the par-
ticipating sites. On delivery, a participating site Sj initiates a sub-transaction Tij
by acquiring locks on objectset(Ti). If the objects are currently locked by another
transaction, Tij is blocked.
– The coordinator site of Ti waits for the commit/abort vote messages from all
participating sites. A global commit message is broadcast by the coordinator site
of Ti only if it receives local commit messages from all participating sites and a
global abort message is broadcast if there is at least one vote-abort message from
participating sites.
3.2.2 Race Conditions
In a replicated database that uses a reliable broadcast, conflicting operations of the
transactions may arrive at different sites in different orders. Since operations of update
transactions are executed by sending update messages to all participating sites, every
participating site obtains a lock on the requested data object and retains the lock until
the transaction globally commits using a two phase commit. This may lead to the
blocking of conflicting transactions and the sites may abort one or more of the conflicting
transaction by timeouts. For example, consider two conflicting update transactions Ti
and Tj initiated at site Si and Sj respectively. Both of the transactions may be blocked
in the following scenario :
– Si starts transaction Ti and acquires locks on objectset(Ti) at site Si. Site Si
broadcasts an update messages for Ti to participating sites. Similarly, another site
Sj starts a transaction Tj , acquires locks on objectset(Tj) at site Sj and broadcasts
an update messages for Tj to participating sites.
– The site Si delivers an update message for Tj from Sj and Sj delivers an update
message for Ti from Si. The Tj is blocked at Si as Si waits for vote-commit from
Sj for Ti. Similarly, Ti is blocked at Sj waiting for vote-commit from Si for Tj .
In order to recover from the above scenario where two conflicting transactions are
blocked, either or both transactions may be aborted by the sites. This problem can
be removed by assuming a stronger notion of reliable broadcast that provides higher
order guarantees on message delivery [9, 125]. The abortion of the conflicting trans-
action can be avoided by using a total order broadcast which delivers and executes the
conflicting operations at all sites in the same order. Similarly, a causal order broadcast
captures conflict as causality and transactions executing conflicting operations are exe-
cuted at all sites in the same order. Processing update transactions over a total causal
order broadcast not only delivers the operations in a total order at the participating site,
but the causal precedence relationship among the update transaction is also preserved.
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3.3 Abstract Model of Transactions in Event-B
The abstract data model of transactions is given in Fig. 3.1 as a B machine. The abstract
model maintains a notion of a central or one-copy database. The abstract database is
modelled as a total function from objects to values :
database ∈ OBJECT→ VALUE
In practice a database will be partial, but for simplicity we avoid dealing with the errors
caused by trying to read undefined objects and instead focus on errors caused by sites
failing to commit a transaction. An individual transaction will involve a set of objects
readset ⊆ OBJECT. It will read from a partial projection of the database (pdb) on to
readset, i.e.,
pdb = readset  database
If it is an update transaction it will write to a subset of readset and the new values of
the objects to be written may depend on the existing values of the objects in readset.
Let the set of objects to be written be writeset where writeset ⊆ readset. So we model
an update to a database as function that takes a partial database (representing the
current values of the objects in readset) and yields a partial database (representing the
new values of the objects in writeset).
MACHINE          Replica1 
DEFINITIONS    PartialDB  == ( OBJECT    VALUE ) ; 
                 UPDATE  ==  (PartialDB    PartialDB ) ; 
                      ValidUpdate (update,readset) == ( dom(update)= readset   VALUE 
                                                                                      ran(update)   readset   VALUE )   
SETS             TRANSACTION;  OBJECT; VALUE;   
                           TRANSSTATUS={COMMIT,ABORT,PENDING} 
VARIABLES     trans, transstatus, database, transeffect, transobject 
 
INVARIANT         trans     (TRANSACTION) 
               transstatus    trans   TRANSSTATUS 
              database   OBJECT   VALUE 
               transeffect   trans   UPDATE 
              transobject   trans    1 (OBJECT)   
                  	 t.(t  trans 
  ValidUpdate (transeffect(t), transobject(t)) )  
 
INITIALISATION        trans :=                             || transstatus :=   
                                 || transeffect :=  {}          || transobject :={}  
                                 || database :   OBJECT   VALUE 
                        
 
 
Figure 3.1: Abstract Model of Transactions in Event-B
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A transaction is a read-only transaction if its writeset = ∅. Thus, for a read-only
transaction, its update function maps a partial database defined over readset to an
empty set. The update function is defined as below,
UPDATE , PartialDB 7→ PartialDB
where PartialDB , OBJECT 7→ VALUE
An update function update maps a partial database (pdb1 ) where pdb1 = readset 
database to another partial database (pdb2 ) where dom(pdb2) = writeset. The update
function update ∈ UPDATE updates the database as follows,
database := database − update(pdb1)
As shown above, a database is written by reading the values from a partial database
(pdb1 ) defined over readset. The data objects to be updated in the database are defined
as update(pdb1) which represent the computation associated with the transaction. We
say that an update update ∈ UPDATE is valid with respect to a set of objects readset
whenever,
dom(update) = readset→ V ALUE
ran(update) ⊆ readset 7→ V ALUE
A brief description of our abstract data model of transactions in Fig. 3.1 is given below.
– TRANSACTION, SITE, OBJECT and VALUE are defined as a deferred sets. The
TRANSSTATUS is an enumerated set containing values COMMIT,ABORT and
PENDING. These values are used to represent the global status of transactions.
– The database is represented by a variable database as a total function from OB-
JECT to VALUE. A mapping, (o 7→ v) ∈ database, indicates that object o has
value v in the database.
– The variable trans represents the set of started transactions. The variable transsta-
tus maps each started transaction to TRANSSTATUS.
– The variable transobject is a total function which maps a transaction to a set
of objects. The set transobject(t) represents the set of data objects read by a
transaction t. The set of objects written to by t will be a subset of transobject(t).
– The variable transeffect is a total function which maps each transaction to an
object update function UPDATE as previously described.
– A transaction t is a read-only transaction if ran(transeffect(t)) = {∅}, i.e., each
partial database is mapped to the empty partial database.
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– The invariant t ∈ trans ⇒ ValidUpdate(transeffect(t),transobject(t)) indicates that
all updates must be valid.
3.3.1 Starting a Transaction
The event StartTran(tt), given in Fig 3.2, models starting a new transaction tt. The
updates and objects are event parameters constrained by the guard of the event. The
guard given in the WHERE statement ensures that tt is fresh. The action of the event
sets the variables transobject(tt) and transeffect(tt) so that transobject(tt) is a non empty
set of objects and transeffect(tt) is some valid update on the objects. A transaction tt
is considered as read-only if ran(transeffect(tt)) is an empty set and it is considered an
update transaction if ran(transeffect(tt)) contains at least one mapping of the form (o
7→ v). The action of the event also sets the status of transaction tt to PENDING.
3.3.2 Commitment and Abortion of Update Transactions
The event CommitWriteTran(tt) models commitment of an update transaction. As a
consequence of the occurrence of this event, the abstract database is updated with the
StartTran( tt   TRANSACTION )     
         ANY            updates , objects            
         WHERE                tt   trans 

 updates    UPDATE   

 objects     1 (OBJECT) 

 ValidUpdate (updates,objects) 
         THEN      trans := trans   {tt}      
           ||   transstatus(tt) := PENDING 
                 ||      transobject(tt) := objects   
           ||  transeffect(tt) := updates 
         END ; 
 
CommitWriteTran( tt   TRANSACTION)    
    ANY     pdb                               
         WHERE            tt    trans  

 transstatus(tt) =PENDING  

 ran(transeffect(tt))   { } 

 pdb =  transobject(tt) 	  database  
        THEN     transstatus(tt) := COMMIT  
           ||     database  := database 
  transeffect(tt)(pdb) 
       END; 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Events of Abstract Transaction Model- I
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effects of the transaction and its status is set to commit. The B specification of this
event is given in Fig 3.2.
The event AbortWriteTran(tt) models an abort of an update transaction. As a conse-
quence of the occurrence of this event, the transaction status is set to abort and its
effects are not written to the database. The Event-B specification of this event is given
in Fig 3.3.
3.3.3 Commitment of Read-Only Transactions
The event ReadTran(tt), given in Fig 3.3, models commitment of a read-only transac-
tion tt. A pending read-only transaction tt commits after reading the objects from the
abstract database defined by variable transobject(tt). A read-only transaction commits
by returning the values of the objects as a partial database.
 
AbortWriteTran( tt    TRANSACTION)    
         WHEN    tt    trans  

 transstatus(tt) = PENDING  

 ran(transeffect(tt))   { } 
   THEN        transstatus(tt) := ABORT 
    END; 
 
val   ReadTran (tt   TRANSACTION )     
                  WHEN            tt    trans   

 transstatus(tt) = PENDING  

 ran(transeffect(tt))= { } 
                   THEN             val := transobject(tt)    database     
                ||      transstatus(tt) := COMMIT 
                   END; 
Figure 3.3: Events of Abstract Transaction Model- II
3.4 Refinements of the Transactional Model
3.4.1 Overview of the Refinement Chain
In the Section 3.3 we outlined the abstract model of transactions. An overview of the
refinement chain is outlined below.
L1 This level consists of the abstract model of transactions. In the abstract model,
an update transaction modifies the abstract one-copy database in a single atomic
event. This level is presented in Section 3.3.
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L2 We introduce the notion of replicated databases in this refinement. In this refine-
ment, an update transaction consists of a collection of interleaved events updating
each replica separately. The transaction mechanism on the replicated database
is designed to provide the illusion of an atomic update of a one-copy database.
Through our refinement proof we verify that this is indeed the case. This level is
presented in Section 3.4.2.
L3 In this refinement we outline the simplification of the event of Global Commit.
This is shown by strengthening the guards of CommitWriteTran event. This level
is presented in Section 3.4.5.
L4 In this refinement we introduce the notion of messages. The various messages,
corresponding to the two phase commit protocol, are introduced in this refinement
that illustrates the integration of our transaction model with a broadcast system.
The sites are assumed to communicate using a reliable broadcast. This refinement
is given in Section 3.6.
L5 In this refinement we introduce the notion of site failures. We address the issue
of participating site failures and show that a replicated database remains in a
consistent state even in the presence of site failures. This refinement is outlined in
Section 3.7.
3.4.2 First Refinement : Introducing the Replicated Databases
The initial part of the first refinement of the abstract model is given in Fig. 3.4. The
Event-B specification of events of the refinement is introduced later in this section.
The abstract Event-B model of transactions maintains a notion of an abstract central
database. The variable database represents a central database in this model. In the re-
finement, the notion of replicated database is introduced. The abstract variable database
is replaced by a concrete variable replica in the refinement. It may be noted that in the
abstract model given in Fig. 3.2, an update transaction performs updates on an abstract
central database, whereas, in the refined model, an update transaction updates replicas
at each site separately. Similarly, a read-only transaction reads the data from the replica
at the site of submission of that transaction. A brief description of the refinement is
given below.
– The new variables coordinator, replica, activetrans,freeobject and sitetranstatus are
introduced in the refinement. The variable coordinator is defined as a total function
from trans to SITE. A mapping of form (t 7→s) ∈ coordinator implies that site s is
the coordinator site for transaction t.
– Each site maintains a replica of the database. The variable replica is initialized to
have the same value of each data object at each site. A mapping (s 7→(o 7→v)) ∈
replica indicates that site s currently has value v for object o.
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REFINEMENT     Replica2 
REFINES               Replica1 
 
SETS                     SITE ;  
      SITETRANSSTATUS={commit,abort,precommit,pending} 
 
VARIABLES         trans, transstatus, activetrans, coordinator, sitetransstatus, 
                              transeffect, transobject, freeobject, replica 
 
INVARIANT         activetrans    SITE   trans   
        coordinator     trans   SITE    
                              sitetransstatus    trans   (SITE   SITETRANSSTATUS) 
                              replica    SITE   ( OBJECT   VALUE)  
        freeobject    SITE   OBJECT 
 
INITIALISATION     trans := 

     || transstatus :=         || activetrans :=    
                           ||  coordinator  :=    || sitetransstatus  :=       ||  transeffect := {}    
     ||  transobject  := {}   || freeobject  := SITE    OBJECT 
                           ||    ANY  data  WHERE  data    OBJECT   VALUE  
                                THEN  replica :=  SITE    {data}  END 
 
 Figure 3.4: Initial part of Refinement
– Variable activetrans keeps a record of transactions running at various sites, i.e., it
is in the state precommit or pending. A mapping (s 7→t) ∈ activetrans indicates
that site s is running transaction t. The variable freeobject keeps a record of objects
at various sites which are free, i.e., those objects which are not locked by any active
transaction.
– The variable sitetransstatus maintains the status of all started transactions at
various sites. A mapping of form (t 7→ (s 7→ commit))∈ sitetransstatus indicates
that t has committed at site s.
– The new events such as IssueWriteTran, BeginSubTran, SiteAbortTx, SiteCom-
mitTx, ExeAbortDecision and ExeCommitDecision are introduced in operations.
3.4.3 Events of Update Transaction
In this refinement, various events of an update transaction are triggered within the
framework of two phase commit protocol. An informal logical ordering of the occurrence
of various events of the refinement for an update transaction is outlined in Fig. 3.5.
– The events StartTran(tt) and IssueWriteTran(tt) occur at the coordinating site
of tt. Once a transaction is started at the coordinator, the coordinator sends
update messages to the participating sites. The update messages are delivered
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to all sites, including the coordinator, in an arbitrary order. Upon delivery of an
update message at the coordinator site, the coordinator site issues a transaction at
the coordinator. The event IssueWriteTran(tt) models the issuance of an update
transaction at the coordinator.
– Upon delivery of an update message, a participating site starts a sub-transaction
at that site. The event BeginSubTran(tt,ss) models starting a sub-transaction of
tt at site ss. The site may independently decide to either commit or abort tt. The
events SiteCommitTx(tt,ss) and SiteAbortTx(tt,ss) are events of the commitment
or abortion of an update transaction tt at the participating site ss. Participating
sites communicate their decision to the coordinator of tt by sending either a Vote-
Commit or Vote-Abort message.
– Upon receipt of Vote-Commit/Abort messages, the coordinator site triggers either
the event AbortWriteTran(tt) or CommitWriteTran(tt). The event CommitWrite-
Tran(tt) occurs when the coordinator site receives Vote-Commit message from
all participating sites, whereas, the delivery of just one Vote-Abort message from
any participating site triggers the AbortWriteTran(tt) event. The coordinating
site communicates its decision by broadcasting a commit/abort decision message
through a global commit or global abort message. Upon receipt of a global com-
mit/abort decision message from the coordinator, a participating site ss decides
to abort or commit tt by triggering either ExeAbortDecision(ss,tt) or ExeCommit-
Decision(ss,tt) event.
3.4.4 Starting and Issuing a Transaction
Submission of a transaction tt is modelled by the event StartTran(tt). The event Is-
sueWriteTran(tt) models the issuing of an update transaction at the coordinator from
a set of started transactions, which are not in conflict with other issued transactions
Participating Sites
Global Commit/Abort Decision Message
Coordinator
Vote−Commit/Abort  Message
Update Request Message
AbortWriteTran
CommitWriteTran
IssueWriteTran
StartTran
BeginSubTran
 SiteAbortTx
SiteCommitTx
ExeAbortDecision
ExeCommitDecision
Figure 3.5: Events of Update Transaction
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at the coordinator site. The guard of IssueWriteTran(tt) ensures that a transaction tt
is issued by the coordinator when all active transactions tz, running at the coordinator
site of tt, are not in conflict with tt, i.e.,
tz ∈ trans ∧ (coordinator(tt) 7→ tz ) ∈ activetrans
⇒ transobject(tt) ∩ transobject (tz ) = ∅
The Event-B specification for the events StartTran(tt) and IssueWriteTran(tt) of the
refinement are given in Fig 3.6.
3.4.5 Commitment and Abortion of Update Transactions
Refined specifications for the commit and abort events of update transaction tt are given
in Fig. 3.7 and Fig 3.8. An update transaction tt globally commits only if all partici-
pating sites are ready to commit it, i.e., it has status pre-committed at all sites. As a
StartTran(tt)                                                                                             
  ANY      ss, updates, objects    
  WHERE    ss   SITE  

 tt   trans  

 updates   UPDATE   

 objects    1 (OBJECT) 

 ValidUpdate (updates,objects) 
  THEN         trans := trans   {tt}       
     ||   transstatus(tt) := PENDING   
                      ||    transobject(tt) := objects    
     ||   transeffect(tt) := updates 
                     ||   coordinator(tt) := ss 
                     ||    sitetransstatus(tt)  := {coordinator(tt)   pending} 
  END; 
 
IssueWriteTran(tt)     
         WHEN     tt   trans   

 (coordinator(tt)   tt)    activetrans   

 sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) = pending 

 ran(transeffect(tt))  { }   

 transobject(tt) 	  freeobject[{coordinator(tt)}] 

 
 tz.(tz   trans   (coordinator(tt)   tz)   activetrans  
                            transobject(tt)   transobject(tz) =   ) 
  THEN      activetrans := activetrans   {coordinator(tt)  tt} 
                  ||   sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) := precommit 
                   ||   freeobject := freeobject - {coordinator(tt)}   transobject(tt) 
END; 
 
Figure 3.6: Refinement : Coordinator Site Events-I
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consequence of the occurrence of the commit event at the coordinator, the replica main-
tained at the coordinator site is updated with the transaction effects, data objects held
for transaction tt are declared free and the status of the transaction at the coordinator
site is set to commit. The AbortWriteTran(tt) event given in Fig. 3.8 ensures that an
update will abort if it has aborted at some participating site.
CommitWriteTran(tt)       
       ANY              pdb        
       WHERE    tt  trans   
           pdb =  transobject(tt)   replica(coordinator(tt)) 
           ran(transeffect(tt))  { }   
           (coordinator(tt)   tt)   activetrans 
                transstatus(tt) = PENDING  
            s.( s   SITE   sitetransstatus(tt)(s) = precommit ) 
                 (s,o) 	 (s   SITE   o   OBJECT   o  transobject(tt)   (s   o) 
  freeobject) 
                 s.(s    SITE   (s   tt)  activetrans) 
       THEN      transstatus(tt) := COMMIT     
     ||  activetrans := activetrans -{coordinator(tt)  tt} 
                   ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)):= commit     
                    ||  freeobject := freeobject   {coordinator(tt)}   transobject(tt) 
                    ||   replica(coordinator(tt))  :=  replica(coordinator(tt))   transeffect(tt)(pdb)  
       END; 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Refinement : Coordinator Site Events - II
Further Refinement of Commit Event
The event CommitWriteTran(tt) can be further refined under the following observations.
– o ∈ transobject(t) ∧ sitetransstatus(t)(s) = precommit ⇒ (s 7→ o) 6∈ freeobject
– sitetransstatus(t)(s) = precommit ⇒ (s 7→t) ∈ activetrans
– o ∈ transobject(t) ∧ (s 7→t) ∈ activetrans ⇒ (s 7→ o) 6∈ freeobject
These observations can be included as invariants in a further refinement allowing the
guards of the CommitWriteTran(tt) event to be simplified. The simplified guards for
the refined CommitWriteTran(tt) are given below.
[ tt ∈ trans
∧ ran(transeffect(tt)) 6= {∅}
∧ transstatus(tt)= PENDING
∧ ∀s.( s ∈ SITE ∧ sitetransstatus(tt)(s)= precommit) ]
Chapter 3 Distributed Transactions 47
3.4.6 Read-Only Transactions
The specifications of executing a read-only transaction is given in Fig. 3.8. A pending
read-only transaction tt returns the value of objects in the set transobject(tt) from the
replica at its coordinator. The necessary conditions for occurrence of this event are as
follows.
transstatus(tt) = PENDING
∧ ran(transeffect(tt) = {∅}
∧ transobject(tt) ⊆ freeobject[{ss}]
As a consequence of the occurrence of this event, transaction tt reads the objects from
the replica at site ss as,
val := transobject(tt)  replica(ss)
It may be noted that in the abstract model given in Fig 3.3, a read-only transaction
reads the objects from abstract database as,
val := transobject(tt) database
AbortWriteTran(tt)        
       WHEN         tt  trans  
        ran(transeffect(tt)) { }   
        (coordinator(tt)   tt)   activetrans 
                      transstatus(tt)=PENDING   
         s. (s  SITE   sitetransstatus(tt)(s)= abort) 
       THEN          transstatus(tt) := ABORT        
      ||  activetrans := activetrans -{coordinator(tt) tt} 
           ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)):= abort 
           ||  freeobject := freeobject   {coordinator(tt)}   transobject(tt) 
       END; 
 
val 	  ReadTran(tt,ss) 
    
        WHEN          tt  trans   
        transstatus(tt)=PENDING   
        transobject(tt)   freeobject[{ss}] 
                      ss = coordinator(tt)  
        ran(transeffect(tt)) = { }    
       THEN           val := transobject(tt)   replica(ss)   
     ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := commit  
                ||  transstatus(tt):=COMMIT              
        END; 
 
Figure 3.8: Refinement : Coordinator Site Events - III
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In refinement checking, we need the following invariant to show that the refinement is
valid.
(ss 7→ oo) ∈ freeobject⇒ database(oo) = replica(ss)(oo)
This is explained further in section 3.5.
3.4.7 Starting a Sub-Transaction
In our model we assume full replication, i.e., each data object is replicated at all sites.
A global update transaction can be submitted to any one site, called the coordinator
site for that transaction. However, it accesses and updates the data at other sites, called
participating sites. Upon submission of an update transaction, the coordinating site of
the transaction broadcasts all operations of the transaction to the participating sites
by an update message. Upon receiving the update message at a participating site, the
transaction manager at that site creates a sub-transaction. The activity of a global
update transaction at a given site is referred as a sub-transaction.
The BeginSubTran(tt,ss) event models starting a sub-transaction of tt at participating
site ss. The specification of this event is given in Fig. 3.9. The following guard of
BeginSubTran(tt) ensures that a sub-transaction of tt is started at site ss when no
active transaction tz running at ss is in conflict with tt :
(ss 7→ tz) ∈ activetrans⇒ transobject(tt) ∩ transobject(tz) = ∅
A sub-transaction at a participating site is started when it has precommitted at the
coordinator site of tt. Also, a sub-transaction at a participating site may be started if
the coordinator has already decided to globally abort it. The coordinator may decide
to globally abort an update transaction if it has received any one vote-abort message
from any participating site. In such cases, the rest of the sites go ahead with starting a
sub-transaction when they deliver an update message and the abort of sub-transaction
at that site will take place when it delivers global-abort message from the coordinator.
Therefore, we add following as a guard to the event BeginSubTran.
sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) ∈ {precommit, abort}
The guard ss /∈ dom(sitetransstatus(tt)) prevents starting a sub-transaction again at
the site ss. As a consequence of the occurrence of this event, transaction tt becomes
active at site ss and the sitetransstatus of tt at ss is set to pending.
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BeginSubTran(tt,ss)   
WHEN           tt    trans    
     sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt))   { precommit , abort } 
                (ss  tt)  activetrans    
     ss   coordinator(tt)    
     ran(transeffect(tt)) { } 
                transobject(tt)   freeobject[{ss}]   
     ss 	  dom(sitetransstatus(tt)) 
                
 tz.(tz   trans   (ss   tz)   activetrans  
        transobject(tt)   transobject(tz) =  ) 
THEN        activetrans := activetrans   {ss  tt}               
                   ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := pending 
               || freeobject := freeobject - {ss}   transobject(tt) 
END; 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Refinement : Participating Site Events -I
SiteCommitTx(tt,ss)   
 WHEN         (ss  tt)    activetrans    
      sitetransstatus(tt)(ss)= pending 
                   ss   coordinator(tt)     
      ran(transeffect(tt)) { }       
   THEN           sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := precommit 
   END; 
 
SiteAbortTx(tt,ss)  
 WHEN          (ss  tt)  activetrans  
     sitetransstatus(tt)(ss)= pending 
                 ss   coordinator(tt)    
     ran(transeffect(tt)) { }      
THEN           sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := abort    
                    || freeobject := freeobject   {ss}  transobject(tt) 
                || activetrans := activetrans -{ss   tt} 
END; 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Refinement : Participating Site Events -II
3.4.8 Pre-Commitment and Abortion of Sub-transaction
A participating site ss can independently decide to either pre-commit or abort a sub-
transaction. The events SiteCommitTx(tt,ss) and SiteAbortTx(tt,ss), given in Fig. 3.10,
model pre-committing or aborting a sub-transaction of tt at ss. Pre-committing a trans-
action at a participating site is considered as a commit guarantee given to the coordinator
by a participating site. In the case of abort, a site sets all objects of transaction tt free
and a related sub-transaction is removed from list of active transactions at that site.
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3.4.9 Completing the Global Commit/Abort
We have already seen how the refined CommitWriteTran(tt) and AbortWriteTran(tt)
events model the global commit or abort decision. The events ExeCommitDecision(tt,ss)
and ExeAbortDecision(tt,ss) given in Fig. 3.11 model the commit and abort of tt at
participating site ss once a global abort or commit decision has been taken by the
coordinating site. In the case of global commit, each site updates its replica separately.
ExeAbortDecision(ss,tt)    
WHEN           tt  trans   
       (ss  tt)   activetrans     
                 ss   coordinator(tt)  
      ran(transeffect(tt)) { } 

sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) = abort 
 sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) = precommit 
THEN         sitetransstatus(tt)(ss):= abort    
   ||  activetrans := activetrans -{ss   tt} 
              ||  freeobject := freeobject   {ss}   transobject(tt) 
END; 
 
ExeCommitDecision(ss,tt)      
       ANY             pdb      
WHERE        tt    trans    
  (ss  tt)   activetrans    
  ss   coordinator(tt)  
  ran(transeffect(tt))   { } 
  pdb =  transobject(tt) 	  replica(ss)   
  sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) = commit 
  sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) = precommit 
THEN        sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := commit 
                    ||   activetrans := activetrans -{ss   tt}      
               ||  freeobject := freeobject   {ss}   transobject(tt) 
                    ||  replica(ss)  :=  replica(ss) 
  transeffect(tt)(pdb)  
END; 
 
Figure 3.11: Refinement : Participating Site Events -III
3.5 Gluing Invariants
The one-copy equivalence consistency criterion requires us to prove that our refinement
(replicated database) is a valid refinement of the abstract transaction model (abstract
central database). We have replaced the abstract variable database in the abstract model
by the variable replica in the refinement.
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RT/ST Read/StartTran IWT IssueWriteTran CWT CommitWriteTran
AWT AbortWriteTran BST BeginSubTran SAT SiteAbortTx
SCT SiteCommitTX ECD ExeCommitDecision EAD ExeAbortDecision
Table 3.1: Events Code
Initially, the only proof obligation that could not be proved using the prover involves
the relationship between database and replica. This proof obligation associated with the
event ReadTran is given below.
ReadTran(PO1)

transstatus(tt) = PENDING ∧
ran(transeffect(tt) = {φ} ∧
oo ∈ transobject(tt) ∧
coordinator(tt) 7→ oo ∈ freeobject ∧
⇒
replica(coordinator(tt))(oo) = database(oo)


This proof obligation states that for a given read-only transaction whose transaction
objects are free at its coordinator site then the value of those objects at the replica
at the coordinator site is same as that in the abstract database. This observation is
generalized in to order to construct a gluing invariant, such that, if any data object is
in the free list at any site then it represents the value of that data object in the abstract
database. Therefore, we added the gluing invariant given as Inv-1 in Fig. 3.12.
The name of various events of our model and their corresponding event code are given
in Table 3.1.
                         Invariants                    Required By 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
/*Inv-1*/          (ss   oo)    freeobject   database(oo) = replica(ss)(oo)           RT,CWT 
 
 
Figure 3.12: Gluing Invariants-I
The invariant Inv-1 means that a free object oo at site ss represents the value of oo in
the abstract database. We have omitted the quantification over all identifiers (ss,oo,tt
etc.) to avoid clutter. When invariant Inv-1 is added to the refined machine, the B
tool generates further proof obligations associated with several other events. One of
the important proof obligations associated with the AbortWriteTran event is outlined
below.
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AbortWriteTran(PO2)

transstatus(tt) = PENDING ∧
ran(transeffect(tt) 6= {φ}
coordinator(tt) 7→ tt ∈ activetrans ∧
oo ∈ transobject(tt) ∧
⇒
replica(coordinator(tt))(oo) = database(oo)


This proof obligation states that if a pending transaction is active at its coordinator
site then all objects of the transaction in the abstract database have same value in the
replica at the coordinator. Thus, in order to discharge this proof obligation we construct
an invariant given as Inv-2 in the Fig. 3.13.
In order to discharge the proof obligations generated due to the addition of Inv-1 we
add a set of invariants given in Fig. 3.13. A brief description of these invariants is given
in the following :
- Inv-2 : If a transaction t is active at its coordinator then all transaction objects
o ∈ transobject(t) in the abstract database have the same value in the replica at
the coordinator.
- Inv-3 : If two conflicting transactions t1 and t2 are active at a site s, they must
represent the same transaction, i.e., t1=t2 . This also implies that two different
conflicting transactions can not be active at the same time at the same site s.
     Invariants              Required By 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
/*Inv-2*/     (coordinator(t)    t)    activetrans       AWT,CWT,EAD,ECD 
     o  transobject(t)      
     database(o) = replica(coordinator(t))(o)   
/*Inv-3*/  (s    t1)    activetrans           ST,IWT,BST 
      (s    t2)    activetrans       
                      transobject(t1)   transobject(t2)      
     t1=t2    
 
Figure 3.13: Gluing Invariants -II
After addition of Inv-2, a new proof obligation associated with the events CommitWrite-
Tran and SiteCommitTx is generated. This proof obligation requires us to prove that if
a committed update transaction is still active at a participating site then the value of all
updateable objects in the abstract database is equal to the values given by transeffect
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function of that transaction. A simplified form of the proof obligation is outlined below.
ExeCommitDecision(PO3)

sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) = commit ∧
ss 6= coordinator(tt) ∧
ran(transeffect(tt) 6= {φ} ∧
oo ∈ transobject(tt) ∧
ss 7→ tt ∈ activetrans ∧
oo ∈ dom(transeffect(tt)(transobject(tt)  replica(ss)))
⇒
transeffect(tt)(transobject(tt)  replica(ss))(oo) = database(oo)


In order to discharge the proof obligation PO3, we construct an invariant given as Inv-4.
A brief description of the invariant Inv-4 is outlined below.
- Inv-4 : For a committed transaction t which is active at one of the site s, the new
values of objects defined by transeffect(t) reflects the value of those objects in the
abstract database.
     Invariants              Required By 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
/*Inv-4*/  transstatus(t)= COMMIT          CWT,AWT,ECD,SCT 
      (s   t)   activetrans                                          
      o    dom(transeffect(t)(transobject(t)   replica(s))) 
                     database(o) = transeffect(t)(transobject(t)   replica(s))(o) 
 
Figure 3.14: Gluing Invariants -III
Further, due to the addition of the invariant Inv-4 a new proof obligation is generated.
The simplified form of this proof obligation is outlined below.
CommitWriteTran(PO4)

transstatus(tt) = COMMIT ∧
ss 6= coordinator(tt) ∧
ran(transeffect(tt) 6= {φ} ∧
oo ∈ transobject(tt) ∧
ss 7→ tt ∈ activetrans ∧
oo /∈ dom(transeffect(tt)(transobject(tt)  replica(ss)))
⇒
replica(ss)(oo) = database(oo)


Chapter 3 Distributed Transactions 54
This proof obligation associated with the event CommitWriteTran requires us to prove
that for a committed update transaction, which is still active at a participating site, the
value of all non updateable objects of that transaction at that site is equal to that in
the abstract database. In order to discharge the proof obligation PO4 we construct and
add the Inv-5 to the refined model.
Following a similar approach, in order to preserve the invariants in Fig. 3.14, we have
to prove another set of invariants given in Fig. 3.15. The brief description of invariants
in Fig. 3.15 are given below.
- Inv-5 : For a committed transaction t which is still active at a participating site s,
the value of any read-only objects of t is the same in replica(s) as in the database.
- Inv-6,7 : If a transaction t commits or aborts globally, it must have either com-
mitted or aborted locally at its coordinator.
                    Invariants                 Required By 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
/*Inv-5*/  transstatus(t)= COMMIT             CWT,AWT,BST,ECD 
                      o    transobject(t)          SAT,SCT 
      (s   t)    activetrans      
                      o    dom(transeffect(t)(transobject(t)   replica(s)))              
                   database(o) = replica(s)(o) 
/*Inv-6*/  transstatus(t)=ABORT                                                   AWT,EAD,ECD,ST 
                       sitetransstatus(t)(coordinator(t))= abort 
/*Inv-7*/ transstatus(t)= COMMIT                                                CWT,AWT,EAD,ECD,ST 
                      sitetransstatus(t)(coordinator(t))= commit           
 
 
 
Figure 3.15: Gluing Invariants -IV
Another important proof obligation associated with ExeCommitDesicion and ExeAbort-
Decision generated due to the addition of Inv-5 requires us to prove that if a transaction
that is either pending or aborted state and still active at a site ss, then all transaction
objects oo in the abstract database have the same value in the replica at that site. A
simplified form of this proof obligation is given below.
ExeCommitDecision(PO5)

sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) = pending ∧
ss 7→ oo /∈ freeobject ∧
ran(transeffect(tt) 6= {φ} ∧
oo ∈ transobject(tt) ∧
ss 7→ tt ∈ activetrans ∧
⇒
replica(ss)(oo) = database(oo)


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ExeAbortDecision(PO6)

sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) = abort ∧
ss 7→ oo /∈ freeobject ∧
ran(transeffect(tt) 6= {φ} ∧
oo ∈ transobject(tt) ∧
ss 7→ tt ∈ activetrans ∧
⇒
replica(ss)(oo) = database(oo)


In order to discharge the proof obligations PO5 and PO6 we construct and add Inv-8
to our model and discharge the proof obligations.
Similarly, due to the addition of Inv-8 new proof obligations associated with the event
IssueWriteTran are generated. A simplified form of these proof obligations is outlined
below.
IssueWriteTran(PO7)

transstatus(tt) = COMMIT ∧
ss = coordinator(tt) ∧
ss 7→ oo ∈ freeobject ∧
ran(transeffect(tt) 6= {φ} ∧
oo ∈ transobject(tt) ∧
⇒
(ss 7→ tt) /∈ activetrans


PO7 states that if an update transaction that has committed and all transaction objects
at the coordinator are in the free object list then it is not active at the coordinator site.
IssueWriteTran(PO8)

transstatus(tt) = ABORT ∧
ss = coordinator(tt) ∧
ss 7→ oo ∈ freeobject ∧
ran(transeffect(tt) 6= {φ} ∧
oo ∈ transobject(tt) ∧
⇒
(ss 7→ tt) /∈ activetrans


Similarly, PO8 states that if an update transaction that has aborted and all transac-
tion objects at the coordinator are in the free object list then it is not active at the
coordinator.
In order to discharge proof obligations PO7 and PO8 we add invariant Inv-9 to the
refined model. This invariant states that an update transaction not pending at the
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                         Invariants                   Required By 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
/*Inv-8*/   transstatus(t)   COMMIT         CWT,AWT,EAD, 
                           (s  t)   activetrans           ECD,RT 
                        o    transobject(t)  
      database(o )= replica(s)(o)             
/*Inv-9*/  transstatus(t)   PENDING         ST,IWT, SAT,SCT 
      ran(transeffect(t))  { }    
                 (coordinator(t)   t)    activetrans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.16: Gluing Invariants -V
coordinator site, is also not active at the coordinator site. Recall that a transaction
which is not pending implies that either it has committed or aborted. Finally the B tool
generates more proof obligations to preserve Gluing Invariant-IV which in turn requires
Gluing Invariants-V in Fig. 3.16. The brief description of Gluing Invariants-V is given
below.
- Inv-8 : For a transaction t which has not globally committed and is still active
at some site s, then for all objects o ∈ transobject(t), the value of object o at
replica(s) is the same as its value in abstract database. Since this refers to the
situations where a transaction is not committed, it also involves the situations
where the transaction global status is either PENDING or ABORT.
- Inv-9 : An update transaction whose global status is not PENDING must not be
active at its coordinator site. This refers to situations where the global status of
an update transaction is either COMMIT or ABORT.
We observe that at every stage new proof obligations are generated by the B tool due to
the addition of new invariants. In this process, at every stage, we also discover further
invariants to be expressed in our model. After five iterations of invariant strengthen-
ing, we arrive at an invariant that is sufficient to discharge all proof obligations. By
discharging the proof obligations we ensure that our refinement is a valid refinement of
the abstract specification.
3.6 Processing Transactions over a Reliable Broadcast
As outlined in the previous sections, our abstract model of a transaction maintains a
notion of the central database. In the refinement we introduce the notion of a replicated
database by replacing the abstract variable database by a concrete variable replica.
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In this section, a further refinement of this model, given as replica4, is outlined which
explicitly models messaging among the sites illustrating the integration of the transaction
model with a reliable broadcast.
3.6.1 Introducing Messaging in the Transactional Model
In this section, we outline how various messages of the protocol are represented in the
refinement replica4. The new variables update, voteabort, votecommit, globalabort and
globalcommit are introduced in this refinement to represent the respective messages.
These variables are typed as follows :
update ⊆MESSAGE ∧ update ∈ dom(sender)
voteabort ⊆MESSAGE ∧ voteabort ∈ dom(sender)
votecommit ⊆MESSAGE ∧ votecommit ∈ dom(sender)
globalabort ⊆MESSAGE ∧ globalabort ∈ dom(sender)
globalcommit ⊆MESSAGE ∧ globalcommit ∈ dom(sender)
A message mm ∈ update indicates that mm is an update message. Similarly, a message
in the set voteabort, votecommit, globalabort or globalcommit, respectively, indicates that
it is either a vote abort/commit or global abort/commit message. We also introduce
following new variables to relate a message to the transaction as follows :
tranupdate ∈ update֌ trans
tranvoteabort ∈ voteabort 7→ trans
tranvotecommit ∈ votecommit 7→ trans
tranglobalabort ∈ globalabort֌ trans
tranglobalcommit ∈ globalcommit֌ trans
A mapping of the form (mm 7→ tt) ∈ tranupdate indicates that a message mm is an
update message for an update transaction tt. A tranupdate is a total injective function
which indicates that there is only one update message for each update transaction and
vice-versa. tranvoteabort is defined as a total function which indicates that each message
mm ∈ voteabort is related to exactly one update transaction. However, for an update
transaction there will be several votecommit or voteabort messages. The variables tran-
globalabort and tranglobalcommit are defined as a total injective function indicating that
a message is related to exactly one transaction and each update transaction is related
to exactly one globalabort or globalcommit message. The reason for modelling variables
tranupdate, tranglobalabort and tranglobalcommit as total injective functions is that the
respective messages are sent by the coordinating site only once for a given transaction.
The variables sender, deliver and completed are also introduced in this refinement to
model sending a message, the delivery of a message and the completion of an update
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transaction as follows :
sender ∈MESSAGE 7→ SITE
deliver ∈ SITE↔MESSAGE
completed ∈ trans↔ SITE
A mapping of the form (mm 7→ ss) ∈ sender indicates that the site ss is the sender
of message mm. Similarly, a mapping (ss 7→ mm ) ∈ deliver indicates that a site ss
has delivered mm. The completion of a transaction is modelled by a variable completed,
where a mapping (tt 7→ ss) ∈ completed indicates that a transaction tt completed its
execution at site ss.
3.6.2 The Events of Message Send and Delivery
In this refinement we introduce two new events given as SendUpdate and Deliver. The
event SendUpdate models the broadcast of an update message for an update transaction.
The event Deliver models the delivery of a message at a site. The specifications of these
events are outlined in the Fig. 3.17.
SendUpdate(ss    SITE , mm    MESSAGE ,tt   TRANSACTION)                                                  
  WHEN      mm   dom(sender)   

 tt    trans  

 sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) = pending    

 ss = coordinator(tt) 

 tt   ran(tranupdate) 

 ran(transeffect(tt)   { } 
  THEN       sender := sender     {mm   ss}     
     ||    update := update     {mm} 
                      ||    transupdate := transupdate     {mm   tt}      
  END; 
 
Deliver(ss    SITE , mm    MESSAGE)   
         WHEN     mm    dom(sender)   

 (ss   mm)    deliver    
  THEN      deliver := deliver   {ss   mm}                   
            END; 
 
Figure 3.17: The New events : A Reliable Broadcast
As shown in the specifications, the coordinator site ss of an update transaction tt broad-
casts an update message mm after the submission of the transaction tt at the site ss.
The guard tt ∈ trans indicates that a transaction tt has started. Similarly, the guard
tt /∈ ran(tranupdate) indicates that an update message corresponding to the transaction
tt has not been sent. The variable update and tranupdate are updated accordingly to
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indicate that mm is an update message and that update message mm is also related
to the transaction tt. The event Deliver models the delivery of a message mm to the
site ss. The guard of this event ensures that a message is delivered to a site only once.
Since delivery of message does not have any other conditions specified in the guard, as
required for the delivery of ordered broadcasts, the Deliver event models delivery of a
message using a reliable broadcast.
IssueWriteTran(tt   TRANSACTION )   
  ANY     mm  
        WHERE  mm    update 

  tt    trans   
 (mm    tt)    tranupdate 

 (coordinator(tt)   mm)     deliver   

 (coordinator(tt)   tt)    activetrans   

 sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt))= pending 

 ran(transeffect(tt))  { }   

 transobject(tt)   freeobject[{coordinator(tt)}] 

 	 tz.(tz    trans 
  (coordinator(tt)   tz)  activetrans  
                            transobject(tt)   transobject(tz) =   ) 
  THEN      activetrans := activetrans   {coordinator(tt)  tt} 
                  ||   sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)):= precommit 
                 ||   freeobject := freeobject - {coordinator(tt)}   transobject(tt) 
END; 
 
BeginSubTran ( tt  TRANSACTION ,ss  SITE)  
  ANY     mm  
        WHERE  mm   update 

  tt   trans   
 (mm    tt)   tranupdate 
     

  (ss   mm)    deliver  

 (ss  tt)  activetrans    

 ss  dom(sitetransstatus(tt)) 
    

  ss   coordinator(tt)    
    

  ran(transeffect(tt)){ } 
               

  transobject(tt)   freeobject[{ss}]       
               

   tz.(tz   trans   (ss   tz)   activetrans  
                                        ﬀ  transobject(tt) ﬁ  transobject(tz) =  ) 
 THEN          activetrans := activetrans ﬂ  {ss  tt}               
                    ||   sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := pending 
                ||  freeobject := freeobject - {ss}   transobject(tt) 
END; 
 
 
Figure 3.18: Events IssueWriteTran and BeginSubTran : A Reliable Broadcast
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3.6.3 Starting a Sub-transaction
The specifications of IssueWriteTran and BeginSubTran events in this refinement are
given in the Fig. 3.18. The event IssueWriteTran models issuing a started transaction
upon delivery of an update message at the coordinating site if it is not in conflict with
other active transactions at the coordinator. The guards of this refinement assume that a
started transaction is issued only when an update message is delivered to the coordinator
site. It may be noted that in our model of reliable broadcast, a message is eventually
delivered to all sites, including the sender. Also, as outlined in the specifications of
BeginSubTran event, a sub-transaction of tt starts at a site ss upon delivery of an
update message mm corresponding to the transaction tt.
It can be noticed in the specifications of the event BeginSubTran that the following
guard is removed.
sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) ∈ {precommit, pending}
The reason is that it is not possible for a participating site to determine the transaction
state at the coordinating site when an update message is delivered to a participating
site. The removal of the guard generates a new proof obligation PO9 shown below.
BeginSubTran(PO9)

ss ∈ SITE
tt ∈ trans
mm ∈ update
mm 7→ tt ∈ tranupdate
ss 7→ mm ∈ deliver
ss 7→ tt /∈ activetrans
ss /∈ dom(sitetransstatus(tt))
ss 6= coordinator(tt)
transobject(tt) ⊆ freeobject[{ss}]
⇒
sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt) ∈ {precommit, abort}


In order to discharge the proof obligation PO9, we construct an invariant Inv-10 given
in Fig. 3.191 and add it to the refinement. This invariant is sufficient to discharge the
proof obligation PO9.
Inv-10 states that when an update message m related to the transaction t is delivered
to a participating site s and if site s has not already started a sub-transaction then the
status of transaction t at the coordinator is either precommit or abort.
1For the explanation of codes, see Table 3.1 in Section 3.5
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                         Invariants                    Required By 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
/*Inv-10*/   m    update   t    trans   s     SITE        BST 
                           (m  t)   tranupdate             
                           (s   m )   deliver   
                        s    dom(sitetransstatus(t)) 
                             s   coordinator(t) 
      sitetransstatus(t)(coordinator(t)) 	  {precommit , abort}      
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.19: Gluing Invariants -VI
3.6.4 Local Commit/Abort
The events of commit/abort of a sub-transaction at a participating site in the refine-
ment are given in the Fig. 3.20 as SiteCommitTx and SiteAbortTx. As outlined in the
specifications of SiteCommitTx event, a participating site ss may decide to pre-commit
a transaction tt if it is active at ss. At the time of pre-commit of tt, the participating
site also sends a votecommit message mm. The variable tranvotecommit is also updated
to indicate that the mm is a votecommit message related to the transaction tt. It may
be recalled that both the events SiteCommitTx and SiteAbortTx occur as a consequence
of occurrence of event BeginSubTran. Also, as shown in the specifications of the Site-
AbortTx event that a site ss may decide to abort a transaction tt if it is active at ss. It
does so by sending a voteabort message mm. The variable tranvoteabort is also updated
to indicate that mm is a voteabort message related to the transaction tt.
Instead of presenting all events in similar detail we will briefly outline other events of
this refinement. A global abort/commit event occurs at the coordinator site when a
coordinator delivers voteabort/votecommit messages from the participating sites. The
coordinator then decides to commit or abort a transaction globally and informs the
participating sites by sending globalabort or globalcommit messages. Upon delivery of
either of these message, a participating site either aborts or commits a transaction at
that site. The events ExeAbortDecision and ExeCommitDecision model the abort and
commit of an active transaction tt at a participating site ss. The detailed specifications
of this refinement is given third refinement in Appendix-A.
In this model ordering on the messages is not dealt with explicitly. A transaction may
deadlock due to race conditions in a replicated database. It is our assumption that
ordered delivery of messages may be used to prevent deadlock arising due to two si-
multaneous update requests on the same objects from two different sites. A formal
development of ordering of messages for fault tolerant transactions and their implemen-
tation with logical clock is developed in later chapters.
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SiteCommitTx(tt TRANSACTION,ss SITE)   
  ANY     mm  
        WHERE  mm   MESSAGE 
 mm   dom(sender) 

  tt   trans 
           

   (ss  tt)    activetrans    
        sitetransstatus(tt)(ss)= pending 
                     ss   coordinator(tt)     
        ran(transeffect(tt)){ }        
    THEN          sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := precommit 
                      || votecommit := votecommit 	  {mm} 
     || tranvotecommit := tranvotecommit 	  {mm   tt } 
     || sender := sender  	  {mm   ss } 
    END; 
 
SiteAbortTx(tt TRANSACTION,ss SITE)  
  ANY     mm  
        WHERE  mm   MESSAGE 
 mm   dom(sender) 

  tt   trans 
           
    (ss  tt) activetrans  
       sitetransstatus(tt)(ss)= pending 
                   ss   coordinator(tt)    
       ran(transeffect(tt)){ }   
 THEN           sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := abort    
                     ||  freeobject := freeobject   {ss}  transobject(tt) 
                ||  activetrans := activetrans -{ss   tt} 
     || voteabort := voteabort   {mm} 
     || tranvoteabort := tranvoteabort   {mm   tt } 
    || sender := sender    {mm   ss } 
     || completed := completed    {tt   ss } 
END; 
 
 
 
Figure 3.20: Refined Local Commit and Local Abort events : A Reliable Broadcast
3.7 Site Failures and Abortion by Time-Outs
Our model of a distributed transaction ensures global atomicity despite transaction
failures and preserves the one-copy equivalence consistency criterion. In this section,
we address the issue of participating site failures and show that a replicated database
remains in a consistent state even in the presence of site failures2.
A simple refinement is outlined to illustrate that this model preserves the consistency
of the database when transactions are aborted due to timeouts and site failures. In this
2We assume that a site fails by crash and does not resume operation.
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refinement, we explicitly model site failures and assume that a failed participating site
does not communicate with the coordinating site. If the coordinator does not receive a
communication from a participating site then the coordinator aborts a global transaction
by timeout and sends a global abort message to the participating sites. To model the
site failures we introduce new variables oksite and failedsite typed as follows :
oksite ⊆ SITE
failedsite ⊆ SITE
oksite ∩ failedsite = φ
The variables oksite and failedsite are initialized as follows.
oksite := SITE, failedsite := φ
A new event SiteFailure(ss) is introduced in the refinement to model failure of a site.
The specification of this event is given in Fig. 3.21. As shown in the specifications, an
oksite may fail and becomes unavailable.
SiteFailure(ss   SITE)      
        WHEN         ss   oksite       
        THEN         failedsite := failedsite    {ss} 
       ||  oksite := oksite – {ss}         
                 END; 
 
 Figure 3.21: Event Site Failure
Since we assume the failure of a site by crash, the non-availability of a failed site during
the rest of computation is also assumed. Also, we do not consider site failures due to
omission, malicious or Byzantine faults3. In our model of a transaction, we also assume
that the coordinating site of a transaction does not fail during a transaction execution.
The failure of sites is restricted to participating site failures due to crash. Since, in the
present work we do not deal with the database recovery, we assume that a coordinator
will recover successfully from the failure when it will resume operations. However, we
plan to address the issue of recovery of the coordinator in the future work.
Before failing, a participating site may be in any one of the following states.
1. It has not yet sent out votecommit or voteabort message to the coordinating site.
2. It has sent votecommit or voteabort message to the coordinating site but did not
deliver global abort or global commit message from the coordinating site.
3It has been argued that the distributed systems with unreliable communication, i.e.,loss of mes-
sages, generation of messages or garbling of messages do not admit solutions to Non-Blocking Atomic
Commitment problem [49, 107]. The problem known as ’Generals Paradox’ is outlined in [49]
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3. It has delivered global abort or global commit message from the coordinating site.
In the first case, if a participating site has not sent out votecommit or voteabort message
to the coordinating site, the coordinating site waits for a random amount of time and
aborts the transaction by trigging an timeout event. We have already outlined that
aborting a transaction by its coordinating site still preserves the consistency. In the
second case, if a participating site fails before delivering a global abort/commit message,
it delivers these message when it recovers. If a participating site has already delivered
a global abort/commit message then it does not affect the computation.
To model the abortion of a global transaction at the coordinating site, we introduce a
new event TimeOut to our model. The specification of this event for this refinement is
given in the Fig. 3.22. As shown in the specifications, a coordinating site sends global
abort messages to participating sites and a transaction is globally aborted. Also, a
coordinator is in oksite when event TimeOut is activated.
It can be noted that the effects of the TimeOut event are similar to AbortWriteTran
event. The event AbortWriteTran is activated when a coordinating site delivers a vote-
abort message from a participating site, whilst the event TimeOut may be activated
if the coordinator does not receive any communication from a participating site. In
order to add this event to this refinement, we have to add this event to each level
of the refinement chain. We observe that the addition of this event at each level of
the refinement chain preserves the invariants. The detailed specifications of the event
TimeOut for each level of refinement chain are given the Appendix-B.
TimeOut(tt   TRANSACTION)      
        ANY   mm 
   WHERE  mm   MESSAGE   mm  dom(sender) 
               tt  trans  
         ran(transeffect(tt)){ }   
         (coordinator(tt)   tt)   activetrans 
                       transstatus(tt)=PENDING   
        coordinator(tt)    oksite 
        THEN         transstatus(tt) := ABORT        
       ||  activetrans := activetrans -{coordinator(tt) tt} 
            ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)):= abort 
            ||  freeobject := freeobject 	  {coordinator(tt)} 
  transobject(tt) 
      || globalabort := globalabort  	  {mm} 
      || tranglobalabort  := tranglobalabort 	  {mm   tt } 
     || sender := sender  	  {mm   coordinator(tt) } 
      || completed := completed  	  {tt   coordinator(tt) } 
        END; 
 
 Figure 3.22: Event TimeOut
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3.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have presented a formal approach to modelling and analyzing a
distributed transaction mechanism for replicated databases using Event-B. The abstract
model of transactions is based on the notion of a single copy database. In the first
refinement of the abstract model, we introduced the notion of a replicated database.
The replica control mechanism presented in this refinement allows an update transaction
to be submitted at any site. An update transaction commits atomically updating all
copies at commit or none when it aborts. A read-only transaction may perform read
operations on any single replica. The various events given in the refinement are triggered
within the framework of commit protocols which ensure global atomicity of update
transactions despite site or transaction failures. The system allows the sites to abort
a transaction independently and keeps the replicated database in a consistent state.
The second refinement simplifies the global commit event. In the third refinement, we
explicitly model the messaging among the sites and show how the various messages of
the protocols are sent by various sites. The fourth refinement model introduced the
failure of sites. We have also outlined a timeout event given as TimeOut, which may
be activated by a coordinator site to abort a transaction globally if it does not receive
a communication from a participating site. The preservation of the invariants of the
first refinement ensures that aborting a transaction by the TimeOut event preserves the
consistency of a database.
The system development approach considered is based on Event-B, which facilitates
incremental development of dependable systems. The work was carried out using the
Click’n’Prove B tool. The tool generates the proof obligations for refinement and con-
sistency checking. The majority of proofs were discharged using the automatic prover of
the tool, however one third of the complex proofs required use of the interactive prover.
Proof statistics of this development are outlined in the Table 3.2.
Machine Total POs Completely Automatic Required Interaction
Abstract Model 20 20 00
First Refinement 189 103 86
Second Refinement 36 22 14
Third Refinement 41 32 09
Fourth Refinement 21 14 07
Overall 307 191 116
Table 3.2: Proof Statistics- Distributed Transactions
In this chapter we have also outlined how we construct an invariant after observing
the proof obligations. Due to the large number of proof obligations, it is not possi-
ble to accommodate all proof obligations in this thesis. However, the important and
significant proof obligations and, the invariants we construct after observing them, are
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outlined. Also, in many cases the B tool initially generates very large and complex proof
obligations. These proof obligations may be simplified with interaction with the tool
by adding new hypothesis or instantiating the hypothesis containing the quantification.
Our understanding with this development is that a single proof obligation is not always
helpful constructing a right invariant. In most of the cases we have to consider a set of
proof obligations to construct a correct invariant.
Chapter 4
Causal Order Broadcast
4.1 Introduction
The notion of causal order broadcast of messages was introduced in [20] to reduce the
asynchrony of communication channels perceived by the application processes. The
global causal ordering of messages deals with the notion of maintaining the same causal
relationship that holds between message send and message receive events. It states that
the order of the delivery of messages to the processes can not violate the causal order
of corresponding broadcast events in the respective sender processes. If the broadcast
of any two messages is concurrent, then the processes are free to deliver them in any
order. The concept of causal order in distributed system was introduced and formalized
in [75], extended in [76] and it was developed further in ISIS [20] to introduce causal
order broadcast. Its vector clock based implementation is proposed in [21, 108].
For some applications it is not sufficient to deliver the messages in the same order (total
order) at participating sites but it is also important to the deliver the messages in a pre-
determined order [20]. For example, consider the network news application [52] where
users distribute their articles and reviews by a broadcast. For a user in the system, a
review is meaningful only if he has been delivered the main article. Since a broadcaster
of the review delivers the main article before he broadcasts the review, the application
requires that each user delivers the main article before a review is delivered. Similarly,
in an another example, consider a distributed computation in a banking environment
where the accounts of employees are to be updated first by paying salary then by paying
interest on the account balance. This is done by broadcasting a salary message before
broadcasting an interest message. In this case, it is not only important to deliver the
messages in the same total order to all participating sites but also each site must deliver
a salary message before delivering an interest message. The group communication prim-
itive causal order broadcast alleviates this problem by providing higher guarantees that
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Chapter 4 Causal Order Broadcast 68
messages are delivered to the sites/processes respecting the causality of their broadcast
events.
There exists a vast literature [38] on ordering of messages which shows the complexity
of the problem. It is further reported in [38] that there exist too few algorithms which
provide clear specification of the problem and provide proof of correctness. Some sig-
nificant applications of formal methods include using I/O automata to provide formal
specifications of a broadcast system [42]. The notion of meta-properties to specify and
analyze a protocol which switches between two broadcast algorithms is discussed in [82].
The formal results that define cases where total order satisfies causal relations between
messages is discussed in [130].
In this chapter we formally develop a system of a causal order broadcast using an
incremental development approach in Event-B. We begin with an abstract model of a
reliable broadcast, and in the first refinement, we outline the specification of an abstract
causal order. In further refinements we show how abstract causal order can correctly be
implemented by a system of vector clocks. The gluing invariants discovered in the process
define the relationship between the abstract casual order and vector clock mechanism.
4.2 Incremental Development of Causal Order Broadcast
In this section we outline an incremental development of a system of causal order broad-
cast consisting of five levels of refinement chain.
4.2.1 Outline of the refinement steps
In this development we begin with an abstract model of a reliable broadcast and suc-
cessively refine it to a model with vector clocks. A brief outline of each level is given
below.
L1 This consists of an abstract model of a reliable broadcast. In this model processes
communicate by broadcast and messages are delivered to each process only once,
including the sender. This model is outlined in Section 4.2.2.
L2 In this refinement, we outline how an abstract causal order is constructed by the
sender. An abstract causal order is constructing by combining FIFO and local
ordering properties. This refinement is outlined in Section 4.3.
L3 In this refinement, we introduce the notion of vector clocks. The abstract causal or-
der is replaced by the vector clocks rules. We also discover gluing invariants which
define the relationship of abstract causal order and vector rules. This refinement
is given in Section 4.4.
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L4 In this refinement, we present a simplification of the vector rules for updating the
vector clock of recipient processes. This refinement is outlined in Section 4.5.
L5 This is another refinement further simplifying the vector rules for updating vector
clocks. This refinement also is outlined in Section 4.5.
4.2.2 Abstract Model of a Reliable Broadcast
The abstract model of a reliable broadcast system is presented as an Event-B machine
in Fig. 4.1. PROCESS and MESSAGE are defined as sets. The brief description of this
machine is given as follows.
MACHINE           Broadcast 
SETS                         PROCESS; MESSAGE 
VARIABLES          sender , cdeliver 
INVARIANT         
/* I-1*/       sender     MESSAGE   PROCESS    
                       /* I-2*/          cdeliver    PROCESS   MESSAGE 
                       /* I-3*/                        ran(cdeliver)   dom(sender) 
    
INITIALISATION  sender :=   ||  cdeliver :=   
 
EVENTS 
 Broadcast ( pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE )         
                   WHEN  mm   dom(sender) 
                   THEN sender := sender   {mm 	  pp} 
            ||  cdeliver := cdeliver   {pp 	  mm} 
              END; 
 
Deliver ( pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE )    
        WHEN  mm    dom(sender)   
              (pp 	  mm)   cdeliver   
                    THEN      cdeliver := cdeliver   {pp 	  mm} 
                    END ; 
END 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Abstract Model of Broadcast
– sender is a partial function from MESSAGE to PROCESS defined in invariant
I-1. It contains mappings from MESSAGE to PROCESS. The mapping (m 7→ p)
∈ sender indicates that message m was sent by process p. The partial function
ensures that a message is sent by only one process.
– cdeliver is a relation between PROCESS and MESSAGE defined in invariant I-2.
A mapping of form (p 7→ m) ∈ cdeliver indicates that a process p has delivered a
message m. The sender and cdeliver are initialized as empty sets.
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– In our model of a broadcast system, a sent message is also delivered to its sender.
It may be noticed that all delivered messages must be messages whose Message
Sent event is also recorded. This property is defined as invariant I-3.
– The events of sending and delivery of messages are shown as the parameterized op-
erations Broadcast(pp,mm) and Deliver(pp,mm). It can be noted that the messages
are not yet ordered in the abstract model. When a Broadcast event is invoked,
variable sender is updated by adding a mapping of a process and a corresponding
message. A sender process also delivers the message at the time of broadcast. It is
shown by updating variable deliver. The Deliver event is guarded by predicates.
These predicates ensure that a process can only deliver a message whose message
sent event is recorded and the message has not been delivered before. Therefore,
on activation of this event a message is delivered to a process other than sender.
A message is delivered to a process if both conditions are satisfied.
4.3 First Refinement : Introducing Ordering on Messages
The refinement of the abstract model of broadcast is given in Fig. 4.2 and Fig. 4.3. A
brief description of the refinement steps is given below.
REFINEMENT     CausalOrder 
REFINES    Broadcast 
VARIABLES           sender, cdeliver, corder, delorder 
INVARIANT            
/* I-4*/   corder    MESSAGE   MESSAGE 
/* I-5*/    delorder     PROCESS   (MESSAGE   MESSAGE)   
/* I-6*/        dom(corder)     dom(sender) 
/* I-7*/                         ran(corder)       dom(sender) 
 
INITIALISATION      sender := 

       ||  cdeliver :=    
                        ||  corder :=         ||  delorder :=   
 
 
Figure 4.2: Causal Order Broadcast : Initialization
– The abstract causal order is represented by a variable corder. A mapping of the
form (m1 7→ m2 ) ∈ corder indicates that message m1 causally precedes m2. (Inv
I-4 )
– In order to represent the delivery order of messages at a process, variable delorder is
used. A mapping (m1 7→ m2 ) ∈ delorder(p) indicates that process p has delivered
m1 before m2. (Inv I-5 )
– Causal order on the messages can be defined only on those messages whose message
sent event is recorded. (Inv I-6,I-7 )
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– The events Broadcast(pp,mm) and Deliver(pp,mm) respectively model the events
of broadcasting a message and the causally ordered delivery of a message. As
shown in the operation of the Broadcast event, a causal order is built by the
sender process following a FIFO order and a local order. When a process pp
broadcasts a message mm, the variable corder is updated by the mappings in
(sender−1[{pp}] × {mm}). This indicates that all messages sent by pp before
broadcasting mm causally precede mm conforming to FIFO order. Similarly, the
mappings in (cdeliver[{pp}]×{mm}) indicate that the messages causally delivered
to the process pp before broadcasting mm also causally precedes mm conforming
to a local order.
– On the occurrence of the Broadcast event, variable sender is updated with cor-
responding entries of the sender process and the message. The guard mm /∈
dom(sender) ensures that each time a fresh message is broadcasted. The delivery
order at the sender process is updated at the time of broadcast. In the Deliver
event, a process pp delivers a message mm only when all messages which causally
precedes mm are delivered. The guards of this event also ensure that a message is
delivered only once.
In order to prove that this is a valid refinement of abstract model of a reliable broadcast,
we need to prove that the invariants in the Fig. 4.2 are preserved by the activation of the
events. For refinement checking, the B tool generates the proof obligations with respect
Broadcast (pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE )     
   WHEN    mm   dom(sender) 
                THEN  corder := corder   ( (sender -1[{pp}]   {mm})   
                      ( cdeliver [{pp}]  {mm})) 
                              ||   sender := sender   {mm   pp}  
                              ||   cdeliver :=  cdeliver   {pp   mm} 
                       ||  delorder(pp) := delorder(pp)    ( cdeliver [{pp}]   {mm}) 
 
             END; 
 
Deliver (pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE)      
   WHEN  mm    dom(sender) 
                   (pp   mm)   cdeliver                
                      m.( m     MESSAGE    (m   mm)    corder   
                                                                         (pp   m)     cdeliver) 
        THEN  cdeliver :=  cdeliver   {pp   mm} 
                      ||  delorder(pp) := delorder(pp)    ( cdeliver [{pp}]  {mm}) 
        END 
  
Figure 4.3: Causal Order Broadcast : Events
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to these invariants and corresponding events. These proof obligations are discharged
automatically by the prover.
4.3.1 Invariant Properties of Causal Order
After building the model of the abstract causal order our goal was to formally verify that
this model preserves the causal order properties informally defined in the section 2.3.
It states that the delivery order of the messages at a given process must conform to the
abstract causal order among them. In order to construct an invariant that states the
causal ordering properties are preserved by the model, we consider following two cases
generated by ProB [80], an animator and model checker for B.
M2 M2
M2
M1
M1
P2
M1
P1
Figure 4.4: Causal Order : CASE-I
M2
M2 M1M2
M1
P2
M1
P1
Figure 4.5: Causal Order : CASE-II
As shown in Fig. 4.4, messages M1 and M2 have the same delivery order at processes
P1 and P2 but have different delivery order as shown in Fig. 4.5. This is possible when
M1 and M2 do not have any causal ordering among them. The case-I tells us that
having a same delivery order at the processes does not imply that messages are causally
ordered. Similarly, from case-II we conclude that if the delivery order of the messages at
the processes are different then the messages are not causally ordered. Also [52] reports
that if the broadcast of two messages are not related by causal precedence, a causal
broadcast does not impose any requirement on the order they are delivered and the
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delivery order of any two messages may be different at various processes. Therefore, we
add following invariant to our model as a primary invariant :
m1 7→ m2 ∈ corder ∧
p 7→ m2 ∈ cdeliver
⇒
m1 7→ m2 ∈ delorder(p))
This invariant states that if two messages are causally ordered then their delivery order
will be same as their causal order only if a process has delivered the later message. In
order to verify that our model also preserves the transitivity property on the messages,
we also add following invariant to our model as a primary invariant:
m1 7→ m2 ∈ corder ∧
m2 7→ m3 ∈ corder
⇒
m1 7→ m3 ∈ corder
4.3.2 Proof Obligations and Invariant Discovery
In this section we outline how we verify that the model CausalOrder given in Fig. 4.2 and
Fig. 4.3 preserves the causal ordering on the messages. We also outline how the proof
obligations generated by the B tool and the interactive prover guide us constructing
new invariants. The primary invariant properties of the model of causal order broadcast
system are given in Fig. 4.6 as predicates which also include transitivity. We have
omitted the quantifications over all identifiers (m1,m2,p etc) to avoid clutter. We first
add the invariant Inv-1 to our model. After addition of this invariant to the model, the
B tool generated two proof obligations associated with events Broadcast and Deliver.
These proof obligations were discharged using the interactive prover without having to
add new invariants. 
 
  Invariants         Required By 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
/*Inv-1*/   (m1    m2)   corder  (p  m2)   cdeliver                Primary Invariant 
                          (m1    m2)   delorder(p)          
 
/*Inv-2*/   (m1    m2)   corder  (m2  m3)   corder            Primary Invariant 
                          (m1    m3)   corder 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Invariants-I
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In the next step, we add invariant Inv-2 to our model. This invariant states that our
model of Causal Broadcast preserves transitivity relationship on the messages. When
this invariant is added to the model, the B tool generates the following complex proof
obligation associated with the Broadcast event.
Broadcast(pp,mm)PO1

Inv2 ∧
mm /∈ dom(sender) ∧
m1 7→ m2 ∈ (corder ∪ (sender−1[{pp}]× {mm}) ∪ (cdeliver[{pp}]× {mm})) ∧
m2 7→ m3 ∈ (corder ∪ (sender−1[{pp}]× {mm}) ∪ (cdeliver[{pp}]× {mm}))
⇒
m1 7→ m3 ∈ (corder ∪ (sender−1[{pp}]× {mm}) ∪ (cdeliver[{pp}]× {mm}))


This proof obligation is reduced to following two simple proof obligations using the
interactive prover :
Broadcast(pp,mm)PO2

m1 7→ m2 ∈ corder ∧
m2 ∈ (sender−1[{pp}]) ∧
m1 /∈ (sender−1[{pp}]) ∧
⇒
m1 ∈ (cdeliver[{pp}])


and
Broadcast(pp,mm)PO3

m1 7→ m2 ∈ corder ∧
m2 ∈ (sender−1[{pp}]) ∧
m1 /∈ (cdeliver[{pp}]) ∧
⇒
m1 ∈ (sender−1[{pp}])


The proof obligation PO2 generated by the Broadcast event states that if a message m1
causally precedes m2 i.e., (m1 7→ m2 ) ∈ order, and that pp is sender of m2 and m1 was
not sent by process pp then process pp must have delivered m1. This corresponds to the
property of local order. Similarly, the proof obligation PO3 states that if m1 causally
precedes m2 and pp is the sender of m2 and pp has not delivered m1 then pp is sender
of m1. It can be noticed that this property corresponds to the FIFO order. Therefore,
to discharge these proof obligations, we add following invariant to the model.
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  Invariants         Required By 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
/*Inv-3*/   (m1 m2)  corder  m2  sender -1 [{p}]               Broadcast, 

 ( m1 sender -1 [{p}]   m1  cdeliver[{p}] )      Deliver 
 
/*Inv-4 */   (m1 m2)  corder  (p  m2)  cdeliver       Broadcast, 
                          

 (p  m1)   cdeliver                                                Deliver 
 
Figure 4.7: Invariants-II
m1 7→ m2 ∈ corder ∧
m2 ∈ (sender−1[{p}]) ∧
⇒
m1 ∈ (sender−1[{p}]) ∨m1 ∈ (cdeliver[{p}])
This invariant is given as Inv-3 in the Fig. 4.7. After adding invariant Inv-3 to the
model we discharge the proof obligations PO2 and PO3 associated with the Broadcast
event. However, due to the addition of Inv-3, additional proof obligations associated
with Broadcast and Deliver events are generated. The proof obligation associated with
the Broadcast event is discharged using the interactive prover. The following proof
obligation associated with the Deliver event can not be discharged interactively.
Deliver(pp,mm)PO4

Inv 3 ∧
m1 7→ m2 ∈ corder ∧
m2 ∈ (cdeliver[{pp}]) ∧
⇒
m1 ∈ (sender−1[{pp}]) ∪ (cdeliver[{pp}])


PO4 states that for messages m1 and m2 where m1 causally precedes m2 and a process
pp has delivered m2 then pp has either delivered m1 or broadcasted m1. On simplifying
PO4, it requires us to prove following.
m1 7→ m2 ∈ corder ∧
p 7→ m2 ∈ cdeliver
⇒
p 7→ m1 ∈ cdeliver
In order to prove the above, we add an invariant to our model given as Inv-4 in the
Fig. 4.7. It states that if m1 causally precedes m2 then any process p that has delivered
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m2, has also delivered m1. After adding invariant Inv-4 to the model we are able to
discharge PO4. The addition of Inv-4 generates new proof obligations associated with
Broadcast and Deliver events. These proof obligations are also discharged interactively
using interactive prover. It can be noticed that invariant Inv-4 also states the causal
order correctness criterion and is discovered during invariant strengthening.
We observe that after three iterations of invariant strengthening we arrive at an invariant
that is sufficient to discharge all proof obligations. By discharging all proof obligations
we ensure that this model preserves the causal precedence relationship on the messages.
4.4 Second Refinement : Introducing Vector Clocks
In this section, we outline how an abstract causal order can be refined by a system of
vector clocks. The goals of this refinement are given below.
– To replace the abstract global variable corder with vector clock rules.
– To refine the Broadcast event to generate the vector timestamp of messages which
realizes the global causal order.
– To refine the Deliver event to include a mechanism by which an early reception
of a message violating the global causal order may be detected at the recipient
process.
In our model, we use Birman, Schiper and Stephenson’s protocol [21] to update the vector
clock of a process broadcasting or delivering a message and to timestamp a message.
I. While sending a message M from process Pi to Pj , sender process Pi updates its
own time( ith entry of vector) by updating VTPi(i) as VTPi(i) := VTPi(i) + 1.
The message timestampVTM of message M is generated as VTM (k) := VTPi(k),
∀ k ∈ ( 1..N), where N is number of processes in system. Since a process Pi
increments its own value only at the time of sending a message, VTPi(i) indicates
number of messages sent out by process Pi.
II. The recipient process Pj (Pj 6= Pi) delays the delivery of messageM until following
conditions are satisfied.
i VTPj(i)= VTM (i) - 1
ii VTPj(k)≥ VTM (k), ∀k ∈ (1..N) ∧ (k 6= i).
The first condition ensures that process Pj has received all but one message sent
by process Pi. The second condition ensures that process Pj has received all
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messages received by sender Pi before sending the message M. A sender process
need not delay the delivery of a message. These conditions ensures global ordering
on messages.
III. The recipient process Pj updates its vector clock VTPj at message receive event
of message M as VTPj(k) := Max (VTPj(k),VTM (k)). Therefore in the vector
clock of process Pj , VTPj(i) indicates the number of messages delivered to process
Pj sent by process Pi.
This refinement(second refinement) consists of four state variables sender,cdeliver, VTP
and VTM. The new state variables VTP and VTM respectively represents the vector
time of a process and the vector timestamp of a message. These variables are typed as
follows.
  BroadCast (pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE)   
 WHEN  mm dom(sender)   
      THEN     LET   nVTP     BE 
                            nVTP = VTP(pp)   { pp   VTP(pp)(pp)+1} 
                      IN     VTM(mm) := nVTP    
                                     || VTP(pp) := nVTP    
    END 
                 ||  sender := sender   {mm   pp} 
                 || cdeliver := cdeliver   {pp   mm} 
       END ; 
 
  Deliver(pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE)     
       WHEN    mm    dom(sender)  
                  (pp   mm)    cdeliver                   
                           p.( p    PROCESS     p 	 sender(mm) 
  VTP(pp)(p)   VTM(mm)(p)) 
                          VTP(pp)(sender(mm)) = VTM (mm)(sender(mm)) - 1                   
       THEN       cdeliver := cdeliver   {pp   mm} 
                      ||  VTP(pp) := VTP(pp) 
 ({q | q   PROCESS   VTP(pp)(q) < VTM(mm)(q)}   VTM(mm)) 
        END; 
Figure 4.8: Second Refinement : Refinement with Vector Clocks
V TP ∈ PROCESS→ (PROCESS→NATURAL)
V TM ∈MESSAGE→ (PROCESS→NATURAL)
These variables are initialized as follows,
V TP := PROCESS × {PROCESS × 0}
V TM :=MESSAGE × {PROCESS × 0}
As shown above, the variables VTP and VTM are initialized by assigning a array of
vectors initialized with zero to each process and messages.
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The refined specifications of the Broadcast and Deliver events are given in Fig 4.8. A
brief description of the refinement is given in following steps.
– As shown in the BroadCast specifications, operations involving the abstract vari-
able corder are replaced by the vector rules. It can be noticed that at the
time of broadcasting a message mm, process pp increments its own clock value
VTP(pp)(pp) by one. VTP(pp)(pp) represents the number of messages sent by
process pp. The modified vector timestamp of the process is assigned to message
mm giving the vector timestamp of message mm.
– As shown in the event Deliver, messages are delivered at a process only if it has
delivered all but one message from the sender of that message. Vector timestamps
of recipient processes and messages are also compared to ensure that all messages
delivered by the sender of the message before sending it, are also delivered at the
recipient process. These conditions are included as a guard in Deliver operation.
It can be noticed that the guard involving the variable corder in the abstract
model is replaced by the guards involving comparison of the vector timestamps of
messages and processes in the refinement.1, 2
4.4.1 Gluing invariants relating Causal Order and Vector Rules
The replacement of the operations and guards involving variable corder in the abstract
model with operations and guards involving vector clock rules in refinement generates
proof obligations. These proof obligations can be discharged interactively using the
B tool after three rounds of invariant strengthening. A full set of gluing invariants
involving the abstract causal order and the vector clock rules is given in Fig. 4.9. A
brief description of these properties is given below.
– If the vector time of process P is equal or more than the vector timestamp of any
sent message M then P must have delivered message M. (Inv-5 )
– For any two messages m1 and m2 where m1 causally precedes m2, the vector
timestamp of m1 is always less than vector timestamp of m2.(Inv-6 )
– Since VTP(p)(p) represents the total number of messages sent by process p and
VTM(m)(p) represents the number of messages received by sender of m from
process p before sending m, the number of messages sent by process p will be
greater than or equal to the number of messages received by sender(m) from p.
(Inv-7 )
1(f − g) represents function f overridden by g.
2 (s  f) represents function f is domain restricted by s.
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         Invariants                            Required By 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
/*Inv-5*/  m    dom(sender)   VTP(p1)(p2)   VTM(m)(p2)             Broadcast, Deliver 
      (p1   m)    cdeliver                          
                  
/*Inv-6*/  (m1   m2)    corder                Broadcast, Deliver 
      VTM (m1)(p)   VTM(m2)(p)                        
/*Inv-7*/  m    dom(sender)                 Broadcast, Deliver 
                      VTM(m)(p)   VTP(p)(p)                       
 
/*Inv-8*/  VTM (m) (p) = 0                         Broadcast 
      m   ( dom(corder)    ran(corder) )       
      
/*Inv-9*/  p1   p2     VTP (p1)(p2)     VTP (p2) (p2)                    Broadcast              
 
                                                                                                                   
 
 
Figure 4.9: Invariants-III
– A message whose timestamp is a vector of zero’s implies that it is not causally
ordered. (Inv-8 )
– For any two separate processes p1 and p2, knowledge of p2 at p1 can not be
greater than the knowledge at p2 itself.(Inv-9 )
4.5 Further Refinements of Deliver Event
As outlined in the Rule II of original protocol [21], a recipient process Pj delays the
delivery of message M until following conditions are satisfied.
i VTPj(i)= VTM (i) - 1
ii VTPj(k)≥ VTM (k), ∀k ∈ (1..N) ∧ (k 6= i).
Also, Rule III of the protocol [21] states that in the event of causally ordered delivery
of a message M, the recipient process Pj updates its vector clock VTPj as, VTPj(k)
:= Max (VTPj(k) ,VTM (k)). The protocol requires updating the whole vector of the
recipient process.
Further refinements of Deliver event are outlined here stating that instead of updating
whole vector of the recipient process as outlined in the original protocol, updating only
one value in the vector clock of recipient process corresponding to the sender process is
sufficient to realize causally ordered delivery of the messages.
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In the second refinement, the vector clock of the recipient process pp is updated as :
V TP (pp) := V TP (pp)−
{(q | q ∈ PROCESS ∧ V TP (pp)(q) < V TM(mm)(q)} V TM(mm))
under the following guards :
∀p · (p ∈ PROCESS ∧ p 6= sender(mm)⇒ V TP (pp)(p) ≥ V TM(mm)(p))
V TP (pp)(sender(mm)) = V TM(mm)(sender(mm))− 1
It can be noticed that the vector clock of pp is updated by the values wherever the values
in the message vector are greater, while the guard of the event indicates that except the
sender of message, all values of the message vector must be smaller than recipient process
vector. This eventually results in updating only one value of the vector of the recipient
process which corresponds to the sender of the message. Therefore, we replace the above
operation by the following simplified operation in the third refinement which states that
only one value in the vector clock of the recipient process pp corresponding to the sender
process of message is updated.
V TP (pp) := V TP (pp) − {sender(mm) 7→ V TM(mm)(sender(mm))}
  BroadCast (pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE)   
 WHEN  mm dom(sender)   
      THEN     LET   nVTP     BE 
                            nVTP = VTP(pp)   { pp   VTP(pp)(pp)+1} 
                      IN     VTM(mm) := nVTP    
                                     || VTP(pp) := nVTP    
    END 
                 ||  sender := sender   {mm   pp} 
                   ||  cdeliver := cdeliver   {pp   mm}                
       END ; 
 
  Deliver(pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE)     
       WHEN    mm    dom(sender)  
                  (pp   mm)    cdeliver                   
                           p.( p    PROCESS     p 	 sender(mm) 
  VTP(pp)(p)   VTM(mm)(p)) 
                          VTP(pp)(sender(mm)) = VTM (mm)(sender(mm)) - 1                   
       THEN       cdeliver := cdeliver   {pp   mm} 
                      ||  VTP(pp) (sender(mm)) := VTM(mm)(sender(mm)) 
        END; 
Figure 4.10: Fourth Refinement
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The replacement of the operation generates new proof obligations which are discharged
by the automatic prover. This operation is further refined in the fourth refinement,
which precisely states that only one value in the vector clock of the recipient process
corresponding to the sender of message is updated.
V TP (pp)(sender(mm)) := V TM(mm)(sender(mm))
The fourth refinement is outlined in the Fig. 4.10. In this refinement step we observe
that proof obligations are generated due to the replacement of the operations of the
event Deliver. These proof obligations are automatically discharged by the B prover. A
full chain of refinement with complete set of invariants is given in the Appendix-C.
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have presented Event-B specifications for global causal ordering of
messages. In the abstract specifications of causal order we outlined how a causal order
is constructed by combining both FIFO and local order. In the refinement steps we
outline how an abstract causal order can correctly be implemented by a system of vector
clocks. This is done by replacing the abstract variable corder by vector clock rules. We
have considered the Birman, Schiper and Stephenson protocol [21] for implementing
global causal ordering using vector clocks. In the third and fourth refinements we found
that instead of updating whole vector of a recipient process as outlined in the original
protocol, updating only one value in the vector clock of recipient process corresponding
to the sender process is sufficient to realize causally ordered delivery of the message. In
this approach we have also discovered several invariants which help us to understand
why a causal order broadcast can be implemented using vector clocks. The overall proof
statistics are given in Table 4.1. Approximately sixty eight percent of the proofs were
discharged by the automatic prover, the rest were discharged by using interactive prover
of B tool.
Machine Total POs Completely Automatic Required Interaction
Abstract Model 14 14 00
Refinement1 43 21 22
Refinement2 47 28 19
Refinement3 06 06 00
Refinement4 02 02 00
Overall 112 71 41
Table 4.1: Proof Statistics- Causal Order Broadcast
Chapter 5
Total Order Broadcast
5.1 Introduction
As outlined in the previous chapter, if the broadcast of two messages is not related by the
causal precedence (parallel message) relationship, the causal order broadcast does not
impose any requirement on the order they are delivered to the other processes [52]. For
example, consider a case of replicated databases where the bank accounts of users are
replicated across several sites. Suppose a user deposits amount x to account A, it does
so by broadcasting add x to A to all sites. Suppose at the same time, at another site,
the bank decides to pay interest at the rate y by initiating a broadcast add y percent to
A. As the broadcast of both messages are not causally related, the causal order broadcast
allows delivery of these messages to participating sites in different orders. It may result
in two copies of account A at different sites having different values, thus transforming the
database into an inconsistent state. To prevent this situation, it is required that these
two messages must be delivered to all sites in the same order. The group communication
primitive called total order broadcast1 alleviates this problem by providing guarantees
that messages sent to a set of sites/processses are delivered in the same order.
The total order broadcast has been proposed for implementing active replication (state
machine approach) [74, 116, 103]. The state machine approach is a general method for
implementing fault-tolerant services in distributed systems. It has also been proposed to
improve the performance of replicated databases [9, 102], transactional systems [65, 114],
clock synchronization [132] and crash recovery [111] etc.
The total order broadcast can be defined in terms of two primitives TOBroadcast(m) and
TODeliver(m) where m ∈M andM is a set of possible messages [38]. It is assumed that
1The total order broadcast is also known as atomic broadcast. Both of the terms are used interchange-
ably, however there is a slight dispute with respect to using one over the other [38]. The term atomic
suggest the agrement property rather than total order.
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each message is uniquely identified and carries the identity of the sender. The total order
broadcast is defined as a reliable broadcast which satisfies the following requirement.
If processes p and q both deliver messages m1 and m2, then q delivers m1 before
m2 if and only if p delivers m1 before m2.
The agreement property of a reliable broadcast and total order requirements imply that
all correct processes eventually deliver the same sequence of messages [52].
5.2 Mechanism for Total Order Implementations
The key issues with respect to the total order broadcast algorithms are how to build a
total order and what information is necessary for defining a total order. The algorithms
for building a total order can broadly be classified [38] as sequencer based algorithms,
token based algorithms, communication history based algorithms and the destination
agreement algorithms [21, 36, 37, 38]. In sequencer based algorithms, a specific process
takes the role of a sequencer and becomes responsible for building a total order. In token
based algorithms (also known as privilege based algorithms), a sender can broadcast a
message only when it is granted the privilege (token) to do so. The order is defined by
a group of senders and the privilege to broadcast (and order) is granted to one process
at a time. The communication history based algorithms use logical timestamps. In
these algorithms, as in token based algorithms, the delivery order is determined by the
senders. However, processes are free to broadcast messages at any time. Most of these
algorithms ensure total order by delaying the delivery of a message at the destination
process. In destination agreement algorithms, a delivery order is determined by reaching
an agreement between the destination processes. Our model of total order broadcast is
based on the sequencer based algorithm.
In sequencer based algorithms, a specific process is elected as a sequencer and becomes
responsible for building a total order. It is assumed that each process may broadcast
a message at any time and a message will eventually be delivered to all processes in
the system inclusive of the sender. A sequencer process also takes the role of a sender
and destination in addition to the role of sequencer. There are two class of sequencer
based algorithms called fixed sequencer algorithms and moving sequencer algorithms. In
a fixed sequencer approach [21, 59], to broadcast a message m, a sender sends m to the
sequencer. Upon receiving m, the sequencer assigns it a sequence number and sends its
sequence number to all destinations. Each process delivers the message according the
sequence number assigned by the sequencer process. Moving sequencer algorithms [35,
131] are similar to fixed sequencer algorithms except that they allow the role of sequencer
to be moved from one process to another for load balancing.
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There exist three variants of fixed sequencer algorithms. These are called UB (Unicast
Broadcast), BB ( Broadcast- Broadcast) and UUB (Unicast-Unicast Broadcast). In the
unicast broadcast(UB) variant of the fixed sequencer algorithm, in order to broadcast a
message2 m, a process first unicasts m to the sequencer. Upon receiving the message,
the sequencer assigns a sequence number to it and again broadcasts m with the sequence
number. The protocol steps of the UB variant are illustrated in the Fig. 5.1.
P1
P2
P3
computation message (m)
Sequencer
[m,seqno(m)]
Figure 5.1: Unicast Broadcast variant
In the broadcast broadcast(BB) variant [21] of the fixed sequencer algorithm, the protocol
consists of first broadcasting m to all destinations including the sequencer, followed by
an another broadcast of its sequence number by the sequencer. All destination processes
deliver messages according to their sequence numbers assigned by the sequencer process.
As shown in the Fig. 5.2 process P2 broadcasts a computation message m. Upon delivery
of m to a sequencer process, the sequencer assigns a sequence number and broadcasts
its sequence number by a control message(m’ ). Upon receipt of the control messages, a
destination process delivers its computation message according to the sequence numbers.
Sequencer
control message (m’)
computation message (m)
P3
P2
P1
Figure 5.2: Broadcast Broadcast variant
In the third variant UUB, the protocol consists of three steps. As shown in the Fig. 5.3,
the firstly a sender process unicasts request−seqno(m) requesting a sequence number
from the sequencer for message(m). The sequencer unicasts the sequencer number of
the message (seqno(m)) to the sender. In the third step, the sender broadcasts the
computation message m alongside its sequence number (seqno(m)).
2We use the notion of computation Message to represent the messages to be delivered in a total order.
The control messages are generated by the system to implement ordering on the computation messages.
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computation message (m,seqno(m))
get_seqno(m)request_seqno(m)
Sequencer
P3
P2
P1
Figure 5.3: Unicast Unicast Broadcast
Since our model of transactions for the replicated databases is based on a broadcast
system, we focus on the BB variant only. In [139, 141] we have outlined how to process
update transactions in a replicated database system using a total order broadcast. In
the next section we present a formal analysis of total order broadcast with respect to the
broadcast broadcast(BB) variant of the fixed sequencer approach.
5.3 Abstract Model of Total Order Broadcast
In this section abstract specifications of a total order broadcast are presented. Later
in the refinements we show how a total order on the messages can be implemented by
assigning sequence numbers. The abstract model of a total order broadcast system is
given in Fig. 5.4 and Fig. 5.5. The initial part of the machine is given in Fig. 5.4 and the
specifications of events are given in Fig. 5.5. Types PROCESS and MESSAGE are used
to represent a set of processes and messages. The specification consists of four variables
sender, totalorder, tdeliver and delorder.
MACHINE       TotalOrder 
SETS                       PROCESS; MESSAGE  
VARIABLES          sender, totalorder, delorder, tdeliver 
INVARIANT   sender    MESSAGE   PROCESS  

 totalorder    MESSAGE   MESSAGE 

 delorder     PROCESS   (MESSAGE   MESSAGE) 

 tdeliver    PROCESS   MESSAGE 
INITIALISATION 
         sender := 

               ||    totalorder :=    
           delorder := PROCESS   { }   ||  tdeliver :=     
 
Figure 5.4: TotalOrder Abstract Model: Initial Part
A brief description of the machine is given in the following steps.
– sender is defined as a partial function fromMESSAGE to PROCESS. The mapping
(m 7→ p) ∈ sender indicates that message m was sent by a process p.
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– The variable totalorder is defined as a relation among the messages. A mapping
of the form (m1 7→m2 ) ∈ totalorder indicates that message m1 is totally ordered
before m2.
– In order to represent the delivery order of messages at a process, variable delorder is
used. A mapping (m1 7→ m2 ) ∈ delorder(p) indicates that process p has delivered
m1 before m2.
– The variable tdeliver represents the messages delivered following a total order. A
mapping of form (p 7→ m) ∈ tdeliver represents that a process p has delivered m
following a total order.
– The event Broadcast given in the Fig. 5.5 models the broadcast of a message.
Similarly, the event Order models the construction of a total order on a message
when it is delivered to a process in the system for the first time,i.e., an abstract
global total order is constructed on a message at the first ever delivery of it to
any process in the system. Later in the refinement we show that it is a role of
a sequencer process. The TODeliver models the delivery of the messages to a
process when a total order on the message has been constructed.
Broadcast (pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE )     
  WHEN   mm   dom(sender) 
       THEN  sender := sender   {mm   pp}                   
  END; 
 
Order (pp    PROCESS ,mm    MESSAGE )     
     WHEN   mm    dom(sender)              
                 mm   ran(tdeliver)           
                 ran(tdeliver)    tdeliver[{pp}]                  
    THEN   tdeliver := tdeliver   {pp   mm}                
                   ||  totalorder := totalorder   ( ran(tdeliver)    {mm})  
            ||  delorder(pp) := delorder(pp)   ( tdeliver[{pp}]   {mm})       
END; 
 
 TODeliver (pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE)    
     WHEN   mm    dom(sender)  
                 mm    ran ( tdeliver ) 
         pp   mm     tdeliver             
                 m.( m    MESSAGE   (m  mm)    totalorder    
                        	  (pp   m)    tdeliver) 
      THEN       tdeliver := tdeliver   {pp   mm}              
          ||  delorder(pp) := delorder(pp)   ( tdeliver[{pp}]   {mm})           
END  
 
Figure 5.5: TotalOrder Abstract Model : Events
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Constructing a Total Order
The event Order models the delivery of a messagemm at a process pp when it is delivered
for the first time. The following guards of this event ensure that the message mm has
not been delivered elsewhere and that each message delivered at any other process has
also been delivered to this process(pp).
mm /∈ ran(tdeliver)
ran(tdeliver) ⊆ tdeliver[{pp}]
Later in the refinement we show that this is a function of a designated process called
sequencer. As a consequence of the occurrence of the Order event, the message mm is de-
livered to the process pp and variable totalorder is updated by mappings in (ran(tdeliver)
× mm). This indicates that all messages delivered at any process in the system are or-
dered before mm. Similarly, the delivery order at the process is also updated such that
all messages delivered at any process precede mm. It can be noticed that the total order
for a message is built when it is delivered to a process for the first time.
The event TODeliver(pp,mm) models the delivery of a message mm to a process pp
respecting the total order. The guard mm ∈ ran(tdeliver) implies that mm has already
been delivered to at least one process. The guards of this event also ensure that all
messages, which precede mm in the abstract total order, have also been delivered to pp.
5.4 Invariant Properties of Total Order
After building the model of a total order broadcast, our goal was to formally verify that
our model preserves the total ordering properties defined in the section 2.3. The agree-
ment and total order requirements imply that all correct processes eventually deliver all
messages in the same order [52]. Thus, we add following invariant as a primary invariant
to our model.
(m1 7→ m2) ∈ delorder(p)
⇒
(m1 7→ m2) ∈ totalorder
This invariant states that if a process delivers any two messages then their delivery
order at that process corresponds to their abstract total order. Also, to prove that the
total order also preserves transitivity, we add the following as a primary invariant to our
model.
(m1 7→ m2) ∈ totalorder ∧
(m2 7→ m3) ∈ totalorder
⇒
(m1 7→ m3) ∈ totalorder
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Due to the addition of these invariants to our model as primary invariants, the B tool
generates several proof obligations associated with various events. In the next section,
we outline how the proof obligations generated by the interactive prover guide us in
discovering new invariants. Due to the large number of proof obligations generated by
the prover only a few important proof obligations are outlined. A complete list of a set
of primary and secondary invariants is outlined in Fig. 5.6 and 5.7.
5.4.1 Proving Total Ordering Property
In order to prove the total ordering property we add following primary invariant to our
model.
∀(m1,m2, p).((m1 7→ m2) ∈ delorder(p)⇒ (m1 7→ m2) ∈ totalorder)
When we added this invariant to our model two proof obligations were generated as-
sociated with the events Order and TODeliver. The proof obligation associated with
the event Order was discharged using interactive prover, however the proof obligation
associated with TODeliver could not be discharged. Following is the simplified form of
this proof obligation generated by the interactive prover.
TODeliver(PO1)

p 7→ m1 ∈ tdeliver ∧
p 7→ m2 /∈ tdeliver ∧
m2 ∈ ran(tdeliver)
⇒
m1 7→ m2 ∈ totalorder


This states that if process p has delivered m1 but m2 has been delivered elsewhere
then m1 precedes m2 in total order. In order to discharge this proof obligation, we
add an invariant to our model given as Inv-2 in Fig. 5.6. The addition of Inv-2 was
sufficient to discharge PO1, however a new proof obligation associated with TODeliver
was generated due to the addition of Inv-2. Following is the simplified form of the proof
obligation.
TODeliver(PO2)

m1 ∈ ran(tdeliver) ∧
m2 ∈ ran(tdeliver) ∧
m2 7→ m1 /∈ totalorder
⇒
m1 7→ m2 ∈ totalorder


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This proof obligation required us to prove that if two messages m1 and m2 are delivered
to any process(es) in the system then a total order exists among them, i.e., either m1
precedes m2 or m2 precedes m1 in the abstract total order. In order to discharge the
proof obligation we add another invariant Inv-3 to our model. Addition of this invariant
to the model generate further proof obligations.
After four rounds of invariant strengthening we arrive at the set of invariants given in
Fig. 5.6 which were sufficient to discharge all proof obligations. It may be noted that
the invariant Inv-1 is a primary invariant which states the total ordering property while
the other invariants are discovered when the proof obligations with respect to Inv-1 are
discharged. A brief description of the properties is given below.
– The total ordering property is given as Inv-1. It states that all processes deliver
the messages in the same abstract total order.
– If a process p has delivered m1, but not m2, and if m2 was delivered to at least
one process elsewhere in the system then m1 precedes m2 in total order(Inv-2 ).
 
 
  Invariants     Required By 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
/*Inv-1*/    (m1 m2)   delorder(p)      Primary Invarinat 

  (m1  m2)   totalorder 
 
/*Inv-2*/  (p    m1)   tdeliver    (p  m2)    tdeliver    TODeliver 
                              m2   ran(tdeliver)   

 (m1    m2)   totalorder  
 
/*Inv-3*/ m1   ran(tdeliver)    m2   ran(tdeliver)    Order, TODeliver 
   (m2    m1)   totalorder  

 (m1    m2)   totalorder  
 
/*Inv-4*/  (p    m1)   tdeliver    (p  m2)    tdeliver    Order, TODeliver 
   (m2    m1)   totalorder  

 (m1    m2)   totalorder  
 
/*Inv-5 */  (p1    m1)   tdeliver    (p1  m2)    tdeliver   Order, TODeliver 
   (p2    m1)   tdeliver    (p2  m2)    tdeliver   

 (m1    m2)   totalorder  
 
/*Inv-6*/       m   MESSAGE    m    m   totalorder  Order, TODeliver 
   
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Invariants-I
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– If two messages m1 and m2 have been delivered anywhere in the system then a
total order exists among them, such that, either m1 precedes m2 or m2 precedes
m1 in total order. (Inv-3 )
– If a process p has delivered two message m1 and m2 then either m1 precedes m2
or m2 precedes m1 in totalorder(Inv-4 ).
– Given two processes p1 and p2, then for any two messages m1 and m2 if the
process p2 has delivered both messages and p1 has delivered m1 but not m2 then
m1 precedes m2 in total order(Inv-5 ).
– A total order is irreflexive (Inv-6 ).
5.4.2 Proving Transitivity Property
Our next step was to verify that our model of the total order broadcast also preserves
transitive properties on the abstract total order. In order to verify that total order is
transitive, we add following to the list of the invariants.
(m1 7→ m2) ∈ totalorder ∧
(m2 7→ m3) ∈ totalorder
⇒
(m1 7→ m3) ∈ totalorder
Addition of this invariant generates proof obligations associated with the events Broad-
cast, Order and TODeliver. We are able to discharge proofs related to the Broadcast
event using the interactive prover. However, the following Proof Obligation associated
with Order event could not be discharged by the automatic prover.
Order(pp,mm)PO3

(m1 7→ m2) ∈ totalorder ∧
(p 7→ m2) ∈ tdeliver
⇒
(p 7→ m1) ∈ tdeliver


This property on the messages states that for two message m1 and m2 if m1 is totally
ordered before m2 then for any process p which has delivered m2 implies that it has
also delivered m1. In order to discharge this proof obligations, we add Inv-8 given in
Fig. 5.7.
When we add this invariant to our model it generates further proof obligations associated
with the events Broadcast, Order and TODeliver. The proof obligation associated with
TODeliver is discharged using the automatic prover. The simplified form of proof obli-
gation associated with the events BroadCast which cannot be discharged automatically
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is given below.
BroadCast(pp,mm)PO4

Inv-8 ∧
mm /∈ dom(sender) ∧
(pp 7→ m2) ∈ tdeliver ∧
(mm 7→ m2) ∈ totalorder ∧
m1 = mm ∧
m2 6= mm
⇒
(pp 7→ mm) ∈ tdeliver


It can be noticed that there is a contradiction in the hypotheses of this proof obligation,
i.e., the hypothesis mm /∈ dom(sender) and (mm 7→ m2 ) ∈ totalorder can not be true
simultaneously because of our assumption that a totalorder is built only when a message
has been sent out. Similarly, the goal (pp 7→ mm) ∈ tdeliver cannot be proved under the
hypothesis mm /∈ dom(sender). Thus, we add the following invariant(s) to our model
given as Inv-9,10 in Fig. 5.7.
∀m .( m ∈ ( dom(totalorder) ∪ ran(totalorder) )⇒ m ∈ ran(tdeliver))
∀(m).(m /∈ dom(sender) ⇒ m /∈ ran(totalorder))
∀(m).(m /∈ dom(sender) ⇒ m /∈ dom(totalorder))
ran(tdeliver) ⊆ dom(sender)
Addition of these invariants was sufficient to discharge all proof obligations. Therefore
after four iterations of invariant strengthening we arrive at a set of invariant that is
sufficient to discharge all proof obligations generated due the addition of Inv-7. The full
set of invariants is given in Fig. 5.7. A brief description of these properties are outlined
below.
– A total order is transitive(Inv-7 ).
– For any two messages m1 and m2 where m1 is totally ordered before m2 then a
process p which delivered m2 has also delivered m1 (Inv-8 ).
– The total order is built for those messages which have been delivered to at least
one process(Inv-9 ).
– A total order cannot be build for messages which have not been sent and each
message delivered at any process must be a sent message (Inv-10 ).
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Invariants     Required By 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
/*Inv-7 */       (m1    m2)   totalorder    (m2  m3)   totalorder   Primary Invariant 
           (m1    m3)   totalorder      
 
/*Inv-8 */       (m1 m2)   totalorder    (p m2)   tdeliver   Broadcast,Order 
                            (p  m1)  tdeliver     TODeliver 
            
/*Inv-9 */       m   ( dom (totalorder)   ran(totalorder) )               Order 
                         m   ran(tdeliver)    
 
/*Inv-10 */      m    dom(sender)   m    dom(totalorder) Broadcast, Order
         m    dom(sender)   m    ran(totalorder) TODeliver 
         ran(tdeliver)   dom(sender)   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Invariants-II
5.5 Total Order Refinements
In the previous section we have given an overview of the abstract model of total order
broadcast. In this section we present a overview of our refinement chain consisting of
six levels. A brief outline of each refinement step is given below.
L1 This consists of an abstract model of total order broadcast. In this model, abstract
total order is constructed when a message is delivered to a process for the first time.
At all other processes a message is delivered in the total order. We have already
outlined this level in section 5.3.
L2 This is a refinement of the abstract model which introduces the notion of the
sequencer. In this refinement we outline how a total order on the messages is
constructed by the sequencer.
L3 This is a simple refinement giving a more concrete specification of the Order event.
Through this refinement we illustrate that a total order can be built using the
messages delivered to the sequencer rather than all sites.
L4 In this refinement we introduce the notion of computation messages and sequence
numbers. Global sequence numbers of the computation messages are generated by
the sequencer. The delivery of messages is done based on the sequence numbers.
L5 In this refinement we introduce the notion of control messages. We also introduce
the relationship of each computation message to the control messages.
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L6 A new event Receive Control is introduced. We illustrate that a process other
than sequencer can deliver a computation message only if it has received a control
message for it.
5.5.1 First Refinement : Introducing the Sequencer
In the first refinement, given in Fig. 5.8, we introduce the notion of a sequencer. The
sequencer is defined as a constant for this model as sequencer ∈ PROCESS.
 
 Broadcast (pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE )     
  WHEN   mm   dom(sender) 
       THEN  sender := sender   {mm   pp} 
       END; 
 
Order (pp    PROCESS ,mm    MESSAGE )     
     WHEN   pp = sequencer  

 mm    dom(sender)              

 (sequencer    mm)     tdeliver                
 THEN   tdeliver := tdeliver   {pp   mm}                
                 ||  totalorder := totalorder   ( ran(tdeliver)    {mm})    
       END; 
 
 TODeliver (pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE)    
     WHEN   pp   sequencer 
    

 mm    dom(sender)  
             

   mm    ran ( tdeliver ) 
    

   pp   mm     tdeliver             
             

  m.( m    MESSAGE   (m  mm)    totalorder    
                        	  (pp   m)    tdeliver) 
      THEN      tdeliver := tdeliver   {pp   mm}              
  END  
 
Figure 5.8: TotalOrder Refinement-I
As shown in the refined specification of Order event given in Fig. 5.8, a message is first
delivered to the sequencer process. It can be noticed that the the following guards in
the abstract specification
mm /∈ ran(tdeliver)
ran(tdeliver) ⊆ tdeliver[{pp}]
are replaced by following.
pp = sequencer
(sequencer 7→ mm) /∈ tdeliver
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The replacement of the guards in the Order event generates new proof obligations. Using
the same approach of invariant discovery as outlined in section 5.4, we arrived at a set
of invariants that was sufficient to discharge all proof obligations. These invariants are
given in Fig. 5.9. 
 
  Invariants                             Required By 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
/*Inv-11*/     (sequencer    m)   tdeliver     m   ran(tdeliver)              Order,TODeliver 
 
/*Inv-12*/     m   dom(totalorder)   (sequencer    m)   tdeliver       Order 
 
/*Inv-13*/     m   ran(totalorder)   (sequencer    m)   tdeliver        Order 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9: TotalOrder Refinement-I : Invariants
A brief description of these invariants is given in the following steps.
– A message not delivered to the sequencer has not been delivered elsewhere.(Inv-11 )
– If a total order on any message m has been constructed then it must have been
delivered to the sequencer.( Inv-12,13 )
Similarly, it can be noticed that a guard pp 6= sequencer is added in the specifications
of TODeliver event. Thus, on occurrence of the event TODeliver, a message mm is
delivered to a process other than the sequencer.
5.5.2 Second Refinement : Refinement of Order event
This refinement outlines a more concrete specification of the Order event. Through this
refinement we illustrate that a total order can be built using the messages delivered to
the sequencer. As shown in the Fig. 5.8, a total order is generated as follows :
totalorder := totalorder ∪ (ran(tdeliver)× {mm})
It states that all messages delivered at any process are ordered before the new message
mm. In the refined Order event the totalorder is constructed as follows :
totalorder := totalorder ∪ (tdeliver[{sequencer}]× {mm})
This states that all messages delivered to the sequencer are ordered before the new
message mm. The specifications of this refinement are given in the Fig. 5.10.
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      Broadcast (pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE )     
  WHEN   mm   dom(sender) 
       THEN  sender := sender   {mm   pp} 
       END; 
 
Order (pp    PROCESS ,mm    MESSAGE )     
     WHEN   pp = sequencer  

 mm    dom(sender)           

 (sequencer    mm)     tdeliver                
 THEN   tdeliver := tdeliver   {pp   mm}                
                 ||  totalorder := totalorder   ( tdeliver[{sequencer}]    {mm})    
       END; 
 
 TODeliver (pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE)    
     WHEN   pp   sequencer 
    

 mm    dom(sender)  
             

   mm    ran ( tdeliver ) 
    

   pp   mm     tdeliver             
             

  m.( m    MESSAGE   (m  mm)    totalorder    
                        	  (pp   m)    tdeliver) 
      THEN      tdeliver := tdeliver   {pp   mm}              
 END  
 
 
 
Figure 5.10: TotalOrder Refinement-II : Refined Order Event
The replacement of the operations in the event Order generates proof obligations which
require us to prove that the message delivered elsewhere in the system has also been
delivered to the sequencer. In order to discharge the proof obligations we add the
invariant Inv-14 given in the Fig. 5.11. This invariant was sufficient to discharge the
proof obligations.
 
  Invariants                             Required By 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
/*Inv-14*/     ran(tdeliver) 
   tdeliver[{sequencer}]   Order,TODeliver 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11: TotalOrder Refinement-II : Invariants
5.5.3 Third Refinement : Introducing Sequence Numbers
In the third refinement, given in Fig. 5.12, we introduce the notion of a computation
message and the sequence numbers. The messages broadcast by the the processes which
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need to be delivered in the total order are called computation messages. In this inter-
mediate refinement step, the sequence number of a computation message is assigned by
the sequencer. This refinement introduces the following new variables.
computation ⊆MESSAGE
seqno ∈ computation 7→Natural
counter ∈ Natural
The variable seqno is used to assign the sequence number to the computation messages.
The counter, initialized to zero, is maintained by the sequencer process and incremented
by one each time a control message is sent out by the sequencer process. It can be
noted in the specification of the TODeliver event that these messages are delivered to
the processes other than the sequencer in their sequence numbers.
 
 Broadcast (pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE )     
  WHEN   mm   dom(sender) 
       THEN  sender := sender   {mm   pp}   
        || computation := computation    {mm}       
       END; 
 
Order (pp    PROCESS ,mm    MESSAGE  )     
     WHEN   pp = sequencer  

 mm    dom(sender)  

 mm    computation 

  (sequencer    mm)     tdeliver                 
 THEN   totalorder := totalorder   ( tdeliver[{sequencer}]   {mm})  
     ||  tdeliver := tdeliver   {pp   mm}                  
      || seqno := seqno    {mm   counter}  
      || counter:= counter + 1  
        END; 
 
 TODeliver (pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE)    
     WHEN   pp   sequencer 
    

 mm    dom(sender)  
             

   mm    ran ( tdeliver ) 
    

   pp   mm     tdeliver             
             

  m.( m    computation    ( seqno(m) < seqno(mm) )  
                        	  (pp   m)    tdeliver) 
      THEN      tdeliver := tdeliver   {pp   mm}              
  END  
 
 
Figure 5.12: TotalOrder Refinement-III
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It can be noticed that following guard in the abstract TODeliver
(m 7→ mm) ∈ totalorder ⇒ (pp 7→ m) ∈ tdeliver
is replaced by
seqno(m) < seqno(mm)⇒ (pp 7→ m) ∈ tdeliver
The change of the guards in the TODeliver event generates new proof obligations. These
proof obligations are discharged by adding new invariants given in Fig. 5.13 to the
model. Invariant Inv-15 states that if m1 precedes m2 in the abstract total order then
the sequence number assigned to m1 is less than the sequence number assigned to m2.
The invariant Inv-16 states that if a computation message has been assigned a sequence
number then the sequencer must have delivered it.
 
  Invariants                   Required By 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
/*Inv-15*/      m1   m2  totalorder   Order,TODeliver 

seqno(m1)  <   seqno(m2) 
 
/*Inv-16*/      m  computation   m  dom(seqno) Order,TODeliver 

sequencer    m   tdeliver 
Figure 5.13: TotalOrder Refinement-III : Invariants
5.5.4 Fourth Refinement : Introducing Control Messages
In this refinement we introduce the notion of control messages. A control message is
broadcast by the sequencer process for each computation message. In this refinement, a
process broadcasts a computation message mm to all processes including the sequencer.
Upon delivery of this message, the sequencer assigns it a sequence number and broad-
cast its control message. All processes except the sequencer deliver the corresponding
computation messages in the order of the sequence numbers. This refinement consists of
following new state variables typed as follows :
control ⊆MESSAGE
messcontrol ∈ control 7֌ computation
The variables control and computation are used to cast a message as either a computation
or a control message. The set control contains the control messages sent by the sequencer.
The variable messcontrol is a partial injective function which defines the relationship
between a control message and its computation message. A mapping (m1 7→ m2 ) ∈
messcontrol indicates that message m1 is the control message related to the computation
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message m2. Since messcontrol is defined as a partial injective function, it also implies
that there can only be one control message for each computation message and vice-versa.
The set ran(messcontrol) contains the computation messages for which control messages
have been sent by the sequencer. The refined model is given in the Fig. 5.14.
The guard mm ∈ ran(tdeliver) of the TODeliver event is replaced by the guard mm
∈ ran(messcontrol) in the Refinement-IV. This indicates that a computation message
is delivered to a process other than a sequencer only if its control message has been
sent out by the sequencer. Later in the refinement we replace this guard stating that
a computation message is delivered to a process other than the sequencer only if its
control message has been received by this process. The change in the guards of Order
and TODeliver events generates proof obligations which are discharged by adding a set
of invariants given in Fig. 5.15 to the model.
 
 Broadcast (pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE )     
  WHEN   mm   dom(sender) 
       THEN  sender := sender   {mm   pp}   
        || computation   := computation   {mm}            
       END; 
 
Order (pp    PROCESS ,mm    MESSAGE,mc    MESSAGE  )     
     WHEN   pp = sequencer  

 mm    dom(sender)  

 mm    computation 

  (sequencer    mm)     tdeliver  

 mc   dom(messcontrol) 

 mm   ran(messcontrol)                 
 THEN   totalorder := totalorder   ( tdeliver[{sequencer}]   {mm})  
     ||  tdeliver := tdeliver   {pp   mm}      
                  ||   control  := control   {mc}          
                              ||   messcontrol := messcontrol   {mc   mm}  
      || seqno := seqno    {mm   counter}                                
      || counter:= counter + 1  
        END; 
 
 TODeliver (pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE)    
     WHEN   pp   sequencer 

 mm    dom(sender)  

   mm    ran ( messcontrol ) 
    

   pp   mm     tdeliver             
             

  m.( m    computation   ( seqno(m) < seqno(mm) )  
                        	  (pp   m)    tdeliver) 
      THEN      tdeliver := tdeliver   {pp   mm}              
  END  
 
 
Figure 5.14: TotalOrder Refinement-IV
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  Invariants                   Required By 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
/*Inv-17*/      ran(messcontrol)    ran(tdeliver)  Order,TODeliver 
 
/*Inv-18*/      ran(messcontrol)    computation  Order,TODeliver 
 
Figure 5.15: TotalOrder Refinement-IV : Invariants
5.5.5 Fifth Refinement : Introducing Receive Control Event
A new event ReceiveControl is introduced in this refinement. This event models receiv-
ing a control message at a process. A new variable receive is also introduced in this
refinement typed as follows :
receive ∈ PROCESS ↔ control
A mapping p 7→ m ∈ receive indicates that process p has received a control message m.
The specifications of the refined events are given in 5.16.
 
 ReceiveControl (pp   PROCESS , mc   MESSAGE )     
 WHEN  mc   control 

  (pp    mc)     receive 
 THEN receive := receive   {pp   mc}   
 END 
 
 TODeliver (pp   PROCESS , mm   MESSAGE)    
     WHEN  pp   sequencer 

 mm   computation 

 (pp   mm)     tdeliver     

 (pp   messcontrol-1 (mm))    receive    

 

m.( m   computation  	    (seqno(m)  
   seqno(mm) 
                          (pp   m)   tdeliver) 
      THEN     tdeliver := tdeliver   {pp   mm}              
 END  
 
Figure 5.16: Refinement-V : Receive Control
As shown in the specifications, variable receive is updated when a control message is re-
ceived at a process. The event TODeliver models the delivery of a computation message
to a process. Also, as shown in the TODeliver event given in Fig. 5.16, the guard
mm ∈ ran(messcontrol)
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is replaced by the following :
(pp 7→ messcontrol−1(mm)) ∈ receive
This guard of the TODeliver event ensures that a process pp delivers a computation
message mm only when its corresponding control message has been received by the
process pp. The change in the guards generates proof obligations associated with the
event TODeliver. In order to discharge these proof obligations we add the following to
the list of invariants.
 
  Invariants                       Required By 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
/*Inv-19*/     m  computation   messcomtrol-1(m)   receive      Order,TOdeliver 
            m   ran(messcontrol)  
 
Figure 5.17: TotalOrder Refinement-V : Invariants
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we presented the abstract specifications of a total order broadcast. The
Broadcast Broadcast variant of a fixed sequencer protocol is used for the development
of a system of total order broadcast. In the abstract model, we outline how an ab-
stract total order is constructed on the messages. Precisely, an abstract total order is
constructed at the first ever delivery of a message to any process in the system. All
other processes deliver that message in the abstract total order. We have also outlined
invariant properties of the abstract total order broadcast and outline how new invariants
are discovered while discharging the proof obligations.
In the first refinement we introduce the notion of the sequencer process and show that a
message is first delivered to the sequencer and a total order is built by the sequencer. In
the second refinement, we precisely outline that an abstract total order is constructed
using the messages delivered to the sequencer rather than all processes. In the third
refinement, we provide further detail of the protocols steps and introduce the notion
of sequence numbers. A process delivers a message based on sequence numbers rather
than using abstract total order. In the fourth refinement, a notion of control messages
is introduced. We also introduce the relationship of computation and control messages.
A control message is sent by a sequencer process for each computation message after
the delivery of a computation message to the sequencer process. In the fifth refinement,
we illustrate how a computation message is delivered to a process using its sequence
number after delivering a control message to that process.
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This case study illustrates how an incremental approach to system development can be
used to obtain more concrete specifications. Powerful tool support helped us to discover
several new invariants that help to understand why a total order broadcast can correctly
be implemented using sequence numbers. A clear relationship between computation and
control messages is outlined to indicate that our system generates exactly one control
message for each computation message. The full refinement chain is outlined in the
Appendix-D. The overall proof statistics are given in Table 5.1. Approximately sev-
enty five percent of the proofs were discharged by the automatic prover, the rest were
discharged by using the interactive prover of the B tool.
Machine Total POs Completely Automatic Required Interaction
Abstract Model 48 29 19
Refinement1 19 16 03
Refinement2 2 2 00
Refinement3 18 14 04
Refinement4 15 14 01
Refinement5 04 04 00
Overall 106 79 27
Table 5.1: Proof Statistics- Total Order Broadcast
Chapter 6
Causally and Totally Ordered
Broadcast
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we extend the system of a causal order broadcast to a system of total
causal order broadcast1 such that the delivery of the messages also satisfies a total order
on the messages in addition to a causal order. A total causal order broadcast not only
preserves the causality among the messages but also delivers them in a total order. Our
model is based on the Broadcast Broadcast variant of a fixed sequencer algorithm and it
uses a notion of the sequencer that builds a total order on the messages. The advantage
of processing update transactions over a total causal order broadcast is that the database
always remains in a consistent state due to the guarantees of providing a total order on
the delivery of update messages. Also, this broadcast preserves the causality among the
update messages.
6.2 Mechanism for building a Total Causal Order
In this section we outline the mechanism for building a total causal order on computation
messages. In our model, a computation message is first delivered to a process in a causal
order followed by another delivery in a total order. A process is said to codeliver a
message when it is delivered following a causal order. Similarly, a process is said to
todeliver a message when it is delivered following a total order. It may be noted that
in our model, the todelivery of a message also corresponds to the delivery in a total
causal order. The mechanism for implementing a total causal order is outlined through
an example in the Fig. 6.1.
1A reliable broadcast that satisfies both causal and total order is also known as Causal Atomic
Broadcast.
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P3
P2
P1
Sequencer
M1 M2 M1’ M2’
control message(M1) control message(M2)
co broadcast(M1) to deliver(M1) to deliver(M2)
co deliver(M2)co deliver(M1)
co deliver(M2)co deliver(M1) co broadcast(M2)
Figure 6.1: Execution Model of a Total Causal Order Broadcast
Consider a broadcast of messages M1 and M2 by the processes P2 and P3 respectively.
As shown in Fig. 6.1, broadcasts of M1 and M2 are related by a causal precedence
relationship as given below :
broadcast(M1)→ broadcast(M2)2
Since the broadcast of M1 and M2 is related with the causal precedence relationship,
they are codelivered at other processes inclusive of the sequencer respecting their causal
order as given below :
codeliver(M1)→ codeliver(M2)
Upon codelivery of the computation messages at the sequencer process, the sequencer
assigns computation messages a sequence number and further broadcasts its sequence
number through the control messages. It may be noted that the sequencer broadcasts
the control messages of computation messages in the order they were codelivered at
sequencer. Therefore, upon codelivery of M1 and M2 at the sequencer, the sequencer
broadcasts control messages of M1 and M2 such that :
broadcast(controlmessage(M1))→ broadcast(controlmessage(M2))
As all broadcasts in our model are done through a causal order broadcast, the control
messages are also codelivered at all processes. Therefore, for any recipient of the control
messages of M1 and M2 the following also holds :
codeliver(controlmessage(M1))→ codeliver(controlmessage(M2))
2 ”→” denote precedes relation.
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When a process codelivers a control message, it also todelivers the corresponding com-
putation message. Thus the following also holds :
todeliver(M1)→ todeliver(M2)
It can be noted that todelivery of a computation message represents a delivery following
a total causal order. Since a sequencer assigns sequence numbers to the computation
messages in the order they were codelivered to the sequencer, each computation mes-
sage is todelivered to a process respecting the causality of their respective computation
message.
Therefore, for any two computation messagesM1 andM2 related by a causal precedence
relationship, the following relationship holds which states that if the broadcast of M1
precedes the broadcast of M2 then the todelivery of M1 also precedes todelivery of M2.
broadcast(M1)→ broadcast(M2)⇒ todeliver(M1)→ todeliver(M2)
If the broadcast of any two computation messages is not related by a causal precedence
relation (parallel messages), causal order broadcast is free to codeliver them in any
order at the sequencer. However, the sequencer will assign them the separate sequence
numbers guaranteeing that they are delivered to all processes in a total order. Therefore
parallel messages are also delivered to a process in a total order in the total causal order
broadcast.
In the following sections we present the incremental development of a system of a total
causal order broadcast.
6.2.1 Overview of the Refinement Chain
The refinement chain for this development consists of five levels. An overview of the
refinement steps is outlined below.
L1 In the abstract model we outline the construction of abstract total and causal
order on the computation messages. This model is outlined in the Section 6.3.
L2 In this refinement we introduce the notion of vector clocks and sequence numbers.
The abstract causal order and abstract total order are replaced with the vector
clock rules and sequence numbers respectively. This refinement is outlined in
Section 6.4.
L3 In the second refinement, we outline how the need for the generation of separate
sequence numbers can correctly be implemented by the vector clock rules. This
refinement is given in Section 6.5.
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L4 In this refinement, we present a simplification of the vector rules for updating the
vector clock of recipient processes. This refinement is outlined in Section 6.6.
L5 This is another refinement further simplifying the vector rules for updating vector
clocks. This refinement also is outlined in Section 6.6.
6.3 Abstract Model of Total Causal Order Broadcast
In the abstract model we outline how an abstract causal order and abstract total order
on the computation messages are constructed. We also outline how they are delivered
in a total causal order.
6.3.1 Abstract Variables
The initial part of the abstract model of total causal order broadcast is in Fig. 6.2 as
a B machine. The specifications of the events of the machine are given in Fig. 6.3 and
Fig. 6.4. As shown in Fig. 6.2, sequencer is defined as a constant, where a process is
assigned as the sequencer non-deterministically. The variable sender is used to represent
messages broadcast by a process.
The variable cdeliver represents the messages codelivered to the processes following a
causal order. Similarly, the variable tdeliver represents the messages todelivered to the
processes following a total order. This machine also consists of the following state vari-
ables typed as follows :
computation ⊆MESSAGE
control ⊆MESSAGE
messcontrol ∈ control 7֌ computation
The variables control and computation are used to cast a message as either a computation
or a control message. The variable messcontrol is a partial injective function which
defines the relationship between a computation message and its control message. A
mapping (m1 7→m2 ) ∈messcontrol indicates that the messagem1 is the control message
related to the computation message m2. Sincemesscontrol is defined as a partial injective
function, it also implies that there can be only one control message for each computation
message and vice-versa. The set ran(messcontrol) contains the computation messages
for which control messages have been sent by the sequencer.
In order to represent the causally ordered delivery of the messages at a process, variable
cdelorder is used. A mapping of the form (m1 7→ m2 ) ∈ cdelorder(p) indicates that
the process p has codelivered m1 before m2. Similarly, a mapping (m1 7→ m2) ∈
tdelorder(p) indicates that the process p has todelivered m1 before m2. It may be noted
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MACHINE       TotalCausalOrder 
CONSTANTS          sequencer 
PROPERTIES         sequencer    PROCESS 
 
SETS                       PROCESS; MESSAGE; 
       
VARIABLES          sender , cdeliver , tdeliver ,  computation , 
                                 control , messcontrol , causalorder , 
                                  totalorder, cdelorder, tdelorder 
 
INVARIANT  sender    MESSAGE   PROCESS 

  cdeliver     PROCESS   MESSAGE 
     

  tdeliver    PROCESS   MESSAGE 

 computation    MESSAGE  

 control    MESSAGE 

  messcontrol    control   computation    

  causalorder    MESSAGE   MESSAGE 
      

  totalorder    MESSAGE   MESSAGE 

 cdelorder    PROCESS  (MESSAGE   MESSAGE) 

 tdelorder    PROCESS  (MESSAGE   MESSAGE) 
 
  INITIALISATION 
                             sender := 

    ||  cdeliver :=     ||  tdeliver :=    ||  
                          computation := 

  || control :=    ||  messcontrol :=    || 
        causalorder :=

  ||   totalorder :=   ||  
       cdelorder := PROCESS   { }   ||   
       tdelorder := PROCESS   { }  
 
Figure 6.2: TotalCausalOrder: Initial Part
that a message may have been codelivered at a process but is still waiting for it to be
todelivered.
6.3.2 Events in the abstract model
The Broadcast event given in the Fig. 6.3 models the broadcast of a computation message.
It can be noticed that a causal order is built by the sender process while broadcasting a
computation message. A message is codelivered to the sender at the time of broadcast.
The event CausalDeliver models the event of causally ordered delivery of a message to a
process. The guards of the CausalDeliver event also ensure that a message is codelivered
only once. The following guards of the CausalDeliver event ensure that a process pp
causally codelivers a message mm only if it has codelivered all messages which causally
precedes mm.
∀m.((m 7→ mm) ∈ causalorder ⇒ (pp 7→ m) ∈ cdeliver)
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Upon delivery of a message mm in causal order the variable cdelorder is also updated
so that all messages codelivered to process pp are ordered before mm.
BroadCast (pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE )      
 WHEN  mm   dom(sender) 
      THEN    sender := sender   {mm   pp} 
   ||  causalorder := causalorder    ( (sender -1[{pp}]   {mm}) 
                                                ( cdeliver[{pp}]  {mm})) 
       ||     cdeliver := cdeliver   {pp   mm}  
   ||  cdelorder(pp) :=cdeloder(pp)     (cdeliver[{pp}]   {mm}) 
         ||  computation   := computation     {mm}                
      END; 
 
 
CausalDeliver(pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE)      
 WHEN  mm    dom(sender) 
           (pp   mm )   cdeliver 
                m.( m    MESSAGE   (m   mm)    causalorder  
                           	  (pp   m)    cdeliver) 
      THEN cdeliver := cdeliver   {pp   mm}  
   ||  cdelorder(pp) :=cdeloder(pp)     (cdeliver[{pp}]   {mm})              
      END; 
 
Figure 6.3: TotalCausalOrder: Events-I
The specifications of the events SendControl and TODeliver are given in Fig. 6.4. The
SendControl is an event of sending a control message once a computation message is
codelivered at the sequencer. The following guard of this event ensures that a control
message(mc) for a computation message(mm) is broadcasted only when it has already
broadcasted control messages for the computation messages which causally precedes mm.
∀m.((m 7→ mm) ∈ causalorder ⇒ m ∈ ran(messcontrol))
The set ran(messcontrol) contains the computation messages for which control messages
have been sent by the sequencer. In the operations of event SendControl, it can be
noticed that the sequencer also builds the causal order on the control messages and the
variable messcontrol is updated by adding a corresponding mapping. A total order for
the computation messages mm is also built by the sequencer by updating the abstract
variable totalorder as :
totalorder := totalorder ∪ (m× {mm})
where m = ran(messcontrol). This implies that all computation messages, for which the
sequencer has already sent out control messages, are now totally ordered before mm.
Chapter 6 Causally and Totally Ordered Broadcast 108
SendControl (pp    PROCESS ,mm    MESSAGE, mc    MESSAGE )     
      WHEN      pp = sequencer 
                 mc   dom(sender)              
                mm   ran(messcontrol)            
                mm    computation 
                (pp   mm)    cdeliver  
                m. ( m    MESSAGE     m    computation  
                                  (m   mm)    causalorder     m    ran (messcontrol))  
       THEN  causalorder := causalorder    ( (sender -1[{sequencer}]   {mc}) 
                                                          ( cdeliver[{sequencer}]   {mc}))  
              ||  sender := sender   {mc   sequencer} 
              ||  control := control    {mc} 
              ||  messcontrol := messcontrol   {mc   mm} 
              ||   LET m BE m = ran(messcontrol) 
                  IN totalorder := totalorder   ( m   {mm}) END        
        END; 
 
TODeliver (pp    PROCESS ,mc    MESSAGE)    
      WHEN  mc    dom(sender)  
               mc    control 
      (pp   mc)    cdeliver 
      (pp   messcontrol(mc))    cdeliver 
               (pp   messcontrol(mc))   tdeliver 
                   m.( m    MESSAGE   m    computation  
                             ( m   messcontrol(mc)    totalorder)    (pp   m)    tdeliver ) 
       THEN      tdeliver := tdeliver    {pp   messcontrol(mc)} 
                  ||   tdelorder(pp) := tdeloder(pp)   (tdeliver[{pp}] {messcontrol(mc)})              
       END  
 
Figure 6.4: TotalCausalOrder: Event-II
The TODeliver event models a totally ordered delivery of a computation message to
a process. This event is activated when a process pp codelivers a control message mc.
The guard of the event ensures that at the codelivery of a control message mc by a
process pp, it also delivers a computation message in a total order corresponding to the
control message mc if it has already delivered all computation messages which are totally
ordered before a computation message defined as messcontrol(mc). The messcontrol(mc)
represents a computation message corresponding to the control message mc.
Upon todelivery of a message mm, the variable tdelorder is also updated so that all
messages todelivered to the process pp are ordered before mm.
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6.3.3 Verification of Ordering Properties
In order to verify that our model of total causal order broadcast preserves the abstract
causal order when the messages are todelivered to the processes, we need to prove that
if the broadcast of any two messages is related by a causal precedence relationship then
they are todelivered to all processes in a total order respecting their causal precedence
relationship. Therefore, we add the following to the list of invariants as a primary
invariant.
m1 ∈ ran(messcontrol) ∧
m2 ∈ ran(messcontrol) ∧
m1 7→ m2 ∈ causalorder
⇒
m1 7→ m2 ∈ totalorder
This invariant states that for any two computation messages m1 and m2, whose control
messages have been sent out by the sequencer, and if m1 causally precedes m2 i.e., (m1
7→ m2 ) ∈ causalorder then m1 also precedes m2 in the abstract total order i.e., (m1
7→ m2 ) ∈ totalorder. The reasons for adding the clauses m1 ∈ ran(messcontrol) and
m2 ∈ ran(messcontrol) is that an abstract total order on the messages is constructed by
the sequencer only when their control messages are sent out. This invariant also shows
that the causality is preserved while building an abstract total order by the sequencer.
Therefore, if the broadcast of any two messages is related by a causal precedence rela-
tionship then they are todelivered to all processes in a total order respecting their causal
precedence relationship.
The addition of this invariant (Inv-1 ) as a primary invariant generates several other
proof obligations. In order to discharge these proof obligations we need to add new
invariants to the model. After two rounds of invariant strengthening, we arrive at a set
of invariants that is sufficient to discharge all proof obligations. These invariants are
outlined in the Fig. 6.5. The codes for the events are given in the Table 6.1.
A brief description of these invariants is given below.
- For any two computation messages m1 and m2 whose control message has been
sent out i.e., m1,m2 ∈ ran(messcontrol), if m1 causally precedes m2 then a total
order also exists among them i.e., m1 is totally ordered before m2. (Inv-1 )
– A message is codelivered to a process before it is todelivered to that process. This
invariant also states that a message delivered in a total order has also been delivered
in a causal order.(Inv-2 )
- For any two computation messages m1 and m2 where m1 causally precedes m2
and the control messages for m2 have been sent out implies that the control mes-
sage for m1 have also been sent. This invariant also indicates that the sequencer
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Invariants        Required By 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
/*Inv-1*/            m1   ran(messcontrol)    m2   ran(messcontrol)             Primary Invariant
  (m1   m2 )   causalorder   
                             (m1   m2 )   totalorder 
 
/*Inv-2*/           (p   m)    tdeliver      (p   m )   cdeliver                      BC,SC,CD                        
 
/*Inv-3*/            m1  computation     m2  computation                             BC,SC, TOD
  (m1   m2 )   causalorder  
                              m2   ran(messcontrol)  
                             m1   ran(messcontrol)   
  
/*Inv-4*/           m   ran(messcontrol)     (sequencer m)  cdeliver         CD,SC
                     
                    
 
 
Figure 6.5: Invariants-I : Abstract Model
BC BroadCast CD CausalDeliver
SC SendControl TOD TODeliver
Table 6.1: Events Code
broadcasts the control messages for the computation messages in their causal order.
(Inv-3 )
- Each message whose control message has been sent should also have been codeliv-
ered at the sequencer.(Inv-4 )
In order to verify that the TotalCausalOrder model also preserves both total order and
causal ordering properties, we add a set of invariants given as Invariant-II in Fig. 6.6 as
primary invariants. Addition of these invariants to the model generates proof obligations.
Following a similar approach given in the Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we discharge the
proof obligations associated with these invariants.
 
Invariants        Required By 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
/*Inv-5*/       (m1   m2)   causalorder      (p   m2 )  cdeliver Primary Invariant                       
                       (m1   m2 ) cdeloder(p)  
 
/*Inv-6*/       (m1   m2)   tdelorder(p)     (m1   m2 ) totalorder         Primary Invariant 
 
                    
 
 
Figure 6.6: Invariants-II : Abstract Model
A brief description of these invariants is given below.
– Given two messages m1 and m2, if message m1 causally precedes m2 and a process
p has codelivered m2 then the delivery order at process p must have been m1
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followed by m2. This invariant states the required property for the causal order.
(Inv-5 )
– For two messages m1 and m2 where m1 is todelivered before m2 at a process p (
m1 7→ m2 ∈ delorder(p)) then m1 precedes m2 in the abstract total order. This
invariant states the required property for the total order. (Inv-6 )
 
Invariants        Required By 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
/*Inv-7*/             (m1    m2)   causalorder                                            Primary Invariant 

  (m2    m3)   causalorder    
                         (m1    m3 ) causalorder 
 
/*Inv-8*/          (m1    m2)   causalorder      (p    m2)   cdeliver        BC,CD, SC,TOD                                    
                         (p    m1)   cdeliver                                                             
 
/*Inv-9*/          (m1    m2)   totalorder    
                       

  (m2    m3)   totalorder                                                Primary Invariant 
                         (m1    m3 ) totalorder   
 
/*Inv-10*/          (m1    m2)   totalorder      (p    m2)   tdeliver          SC,TOD 
                         (p    m1)   tdeliver    
 
                    
 
 
Figure 6.7: Invariants-III : Abstract Model
The invariant properties of the model of total causal order showing the transitivity on
the abstract causal and total order are given in the Fig. 6.7. A brief description of these
properties is given below.
– An abstract causal order is transitive.(Inv-7 )
– For two messages m1 and m2, if m1 causally precedes m2 and process p has
codelivered the message m2 then p has also codelivered the message m1.(Inv-8 )
– An abstract total order is transitive.(Inv-9 )
– For two messages m1 and m2, if m1 precedes m2 in total order and process p has
todelivered the message m2 then p has also todelivered m1. (Inv-10 )
The proof obligations associated with these invariants are discharged using the process
outlined in sections 4.3 and 5.4. Discharging these proof obligations was relatively easy,
because we already knew the invariants needed to discharge these proof obligations. A
complete set of invariants for this model is given in the Appendix-E.
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6.4 First Refinement of Total Causal Order
In this section, we outline the first refinement of the abstract model of total causal order
broadcast. In this refinement we introduce the notion of vector clocks and sequence
numbers. The abstract variables causalorder and totalorder in this refinement are re-
placed with the vector clock rules and sequence numbers respectively. In this refinement
we introduce two new variables VTP and VTM to implement causal ordering. The
variables VTP and VTM respectively represent the vector time of a process and the
vector timestamp of a message. Similarly, in order to implement total ordering we also
introduce variables seqno and counter.
6.4.1 Events in the First Refinement
The events of the first refinement of the machine TotalCausalOrder using vector clocks
and sequence numbers are shown in the Fig. 6.8 and Fig. 6.9. It can be noticed that the
operations of events (Broadcast, CausalDeliver and SendControl) involving the abstract
variable causalorder are replaced by the vector rules. Similarly, the operations of events
SendControl and TODeliver involving the abstract variable totalorder are replaced by
the sequence numbers(seqno).
  Broadcast(pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE)   
 WHEN    mm dom(sender)   
      THEN    LET  nVTP   
    BE   nVTP = VTP(pp)   { pp   VTP(pp)(pp)+1} 
                      IN    VTM(mm) := nVTP    
        ||  VTP(pp) := nVTP   END 
               || sender := sender   {mm   pp} 
                 ||  cdeliver := cdeliver   {pp   mm} 
               || computation := computation   {mm} 
      END ; 
 
 
  CausalDeliver (pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE)     
       WHEN   mm    dom(sender)              
               (pp   mm)   cdeliver                  
                p.( p    PROCESS    p 	  sender(mm)  
  VTP(pp)(p)   VTM(mm)(p)) 
               VTP(pp)(sender(mm)) = VTM (mm)(sender(mm))-1                   
       THEN 
                   cdeliver := cdeliver   {pp   mm} 
               ||   VTP(pp) := VTP(pp) 
                  ({q | q   PROCESS   VTP(pp)(q) < VTM(mm)(q)}   VTM(mm)) 
       END; 
Figure 6.8: First Refinement- Part I
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SendControl (pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE, mc    MESSAGE )     
   WHEN   pp = sequencer 
                 mc   dom(sender)            
                 mm   ran(messcontrol)            
                   mm    computation 
                 pp   mm     cdeliver 
        (m,p)  ( p    PROCESS   m    MESSAGE   m    computation 
        VTM (m)(p)   VTM(mm)(p)     m    ran(messcontrol))  
            THEN   control := control  	  {mc} 
           ||  messcontrol := messcontrol 	  {mc   mm} 
           ||  LET  nVTP  BE  nVTP = VTP(pp) + { pp   VTP(pp)(pp)+1} 
          IN     VTM(mc) := nVTP  
      ||  VTP(pp) := nVTP   
    END 
           ||  sender := sender 	  {mc   pp} 
           ||   LET  ncount  BE  ncount =  counter +1 
           IN     counter := ncount   
      ||  seqno(mm) := ncount   
    END 
   END; 
 
TODeliver (pp    PROCESS ,  mc    MESSAGE)   
     WHEN  mc    dom(sender)  
           mc    control 
     (pp   mc)    cdeliver 
     (pp   messcontrol(mc))    cdeliver 
              (pp   messcontrol(mc))   tdeliver 
     m.( m   MESSAGE   m    computation  
       ( seqno(m) < seqno (messcontrol(mc) )    (pp   m)    tdeliver ) 
     THEN     tdeliver := tdeliver 	   {pp   messcontrol(mc)} 
     END 
 
Figure 6.9: First Refinement - Part II
The events Broadcast and SendControl are the events of sending a message. The event
Broadcast models the broadcast of computation messages and event SendControl models
the broadcast of control messages. In both of the events, the sender process pp incre-
ments its own clock value VTP(pp)(pp) by one. Recall that VTP(pp)(pp) represents
the number of messages sent by the process pp. The modified vector timestamp of the
process is also assigned to message mm giving vector timestamp of message mm.
The CausalDeliver event models causally ordered delivery of a message mm at process
pp. Consider the following guard of this event involving abstract causal order.
∀m.((m 7→ mm) ∈ causalorder ⇒ (pp 7→ m ∈ cdeliver)
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This guard is replaced by the following guards involving vector clock rules in the refine-
ment.
(1) ∀p.(p ∈ PROCESS ∧ p 6= sender(mm)⇒ VTP(pp)(p) ≥ VTM(mm)(p))
(2) VTP(pp)(sender(mm)) = VTM(mm)(sender(mm))− 1
The first condition states that the vector timestamp of a recipient process pp and message
mm are compared to ensure that all messages received by the sender of a message
before sending it, are also received at the recipient process. The second condition states
that process pp has received all but one message from the sender of the message mm.
An operation updating the vector clock of recipient process pp is also shown in the
specification of CausalDeliver event.
The variable seqno is used for building a total order on the computation messages. In the
refined specification of event SendControl, it can be noticed that the operation involving
abstract totalorder is replaced by an operation containing variables seqno and counter.
The counter is incremented each time a control message is sent and it is assigned to the
control messages.
The guards of the event TODeliver are strengthened in this refinement. It can be noticed
that the following guard of the event TODeliver involving abstract totalorder
∀m.(m ∈ computation∧ (m 7→ messcontrol(mc) ∈ totalorder)⇒ (pp 7→ m) ∈ tdeliver)
is replaced by the following guard involving sequence numbers.
∀m.(m ∈ computation ∧ (seqno(m) < seqno(messcontrol(mc)))⇒ (pp 7→ m) ∈ tdeliver)
The above states that the process has todelivered all computation messages whose se-
quence number is less than the sequence number of the computation message corre-
sponding to the control message mc.
6.4.2 Constructing Gluing Invariants
In this section we briefly outline how the proof obligations generated due to the re-
placement of the guards and operations containing abstract variables causalorder and
totalorder by the vector clock rules and sequence numbers respectively help us discover
gluing invariants. A few important gluing invariants are given in the Fig 6.10. A com-
plete list of invariants is given in Appendix-E.
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6.4.2.1 Relationship of abstract causal order and vector clock rules
The replacement of the guards and operations involving the variable causalorder in the
abstract model by the equivalent rules of vector clocks generate several proof obligations
due to refinement checking. Initially, the only proof obligation that can not be proved
is given below in simplified form. It involves the relationship between causalorder and
the vector timestamp of a message generated by the event CausalDeliver.
CausalDeliver(pp,mm)PO1

mm ∈ dom(sender)
(pp 7→ mm) /∈ cdeliver
∀p.(p ∈ PROCESS ∧ p 6= sender(mm)⇒ V TP (pp)(p) ≥ V TM(mm)(p)
V TP (pp)(sender(mm)) = V TM(mm)(sender(mm))− 1
m ∈MESSAGE
m 7→ mm ∈ causalorder
⇒
(pp 7→ m) ∈ cdeliver


In this proof obligation it can be noticed that a message m causally precedes mm i.e.,(m
7→ mm) ∈ causalorder and process pp has not codelivered mm. According to the vector
clock rules, pp can codeliver mm only when it has codelivered all messages which causally
precede mm. If a process pp has codelivered all but one message from the sender of mm
then the following must be hold :
V TP (pp)(sender(mm)) = V TM(mm)(sender(mm))− 1
Similarly, if a process pp has codelivered all messages sent by the sender of mm before
sending mm and it has also codelivered mm then the following must hold :
V TP (pp)(sender(mm)) ≥ V TM(mm)(sender(mm))
Thus we add an invariant given at Inv 11 in Fig. 6.10 which states that if the vector
time of process p1 is equal or greater than the vector timestamp of any sent message
m then p1 must have codelivered the message m. Adding Inv 11 to the model gener-
ates proof obligations associated with other events. Discharging these proof obligations
required other invariants given as Inv 12,13 and 14. After three iterations of invariant
strengthening we arrive at a set of invariants which is sufficient to discharge all proof
obligations relating abstract causalorder and vector clock rules.
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6.4.2.2 Relationship of abstract total order and sequence number
Replacing the abstract variable totalorder by the sequence number in the operations of
SendControl and the guards of the TODeliver event generates proof obligations. The
first proof obligation which can not be discharged automatically requires us to prove the
following for the TODeliver event.
TODeliver(pp,mc)PO2

mc ∈ dom(sender)
mc ∈ control
pp 7→ messcontrol(mc) ∈ cdeliver
(pp 7→ messcontrol(mc)) /∈ tdeliver
∀m.(m ∈ computation ∧ (seqno(m) < seqno(messcontrol(mc))⇒ (pp 7→ m) ∈ tdeliver)
m ∈ computation
m 7→ messcontrol(mc) ∈ totalorder
⇒
(pp 7→ m) ∈ tdeliver


It may also be noted that this proof obligation appears due to the replacement of the
following guard of TODeliver involving the abstract variable totalorder :
∀m.((m 7→ messcontrol(mc) ∈ totalorder⇒ (pp 7→ m) ∈ tdeliver)
by the guard involving variable seqno :
∀m.((seqno(m) < seqno(messcontrol(mc))⇒ (pp 7→ m) ∈ tdeliver)
Therefore, in order to discharge this proof obligation we add the invariant Inv-15 to
our model which relates the abstract variable totalorder to the concrete seqno. This
invariant states that if two computation messages m1 and m2 are in totalorder then
the sequence number of m1 is less than sequence number of m2. We notice that this
invariant is sufficient to discharge all proof obligations generated by the SendControl
and the TODeliver events.
6.4.2.3 Gluing Invariants
The invariant showing the relationship of the abstract causalorder and totalorder with
the vector rules and sequence numbers is given in the Fig. 6.10. The codes for the events
are given in Table 6.1. A brief description of these properties is given below.
- If the vector time of process P is equal to or greater than the vector timestamp of
any sent message M then P must have codelivered the message M (Inv-11 ).
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Invariants          Required By 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
/*Inv-11*/   m   dom(sender)   VTP(p1)(p2)   VTM(m)(p2)                            BC,CD,SC 
         (p1   m)    cdeliver )                          
/*Inv-12* / (m1   m2)    causalorder    VTM (m1)(p)   VTM(m2)(p))         BC,CD 
/*Inv-13*/       m    dom(sender)     VTM(m)(p)   VTP(p)(p) )                            BC,CD 
/*Inv-14*/       VTM (m)(p)=0    m   ( dom(causalorder)   ran(causalorder))  BC,CD 
 
/*Inv-15*/  (m1   m2)      totalorder     seqno(m1) < seqno(m2)                   SC,TOD 
                
 
Figure 6.10: Gluing Invariants-IV : First Refinement
- For any two messages m1 and m2 where m1 causally precedes m2, the vector
timestamp of m1 is less than the vector timestamp of m2 (Inv-12 )
- Since VTP(p)(p) represents the total number of messages sent by a process p and
VTM(m)(p) represents the number of messages received by the sender of m from
process p before sending m, the number of messages sent by process p will be
greater than or equal to the number of messages received by the sender(m) from
p (Inv-13 ).
- A message whose timestamp is a vector of zero’s implies that it is not causally
ordered(Inv-14 ).
- If any two computation messages m1 and m2 are in totalorder then the sequence
number of m1 is less than the sequence number of m2 (Inv-15 ).
6.5 Second Refinement : Replacing Sequence Number by
the Vector Clocks
In the second refinement, we outline how the need for generating separate sequence
numbers can correctly be implemented by the vector clock rules. It can be noticed that
the total order on the messages in the first refinement is realized with the sequence
numbers. The specifications of the Broadcast and CausalDeliver events of the first
refinement remain unaltered as none of these events make use of sequence numbers. The
events SendControl and TODeliver in the first refinement are further refined to eliminate
the need for the sequence number generated by the sequencer. In the second refinement,
the variables seqno and counter are replaced by the vector clock rules. The specifications
of the refined SendControl and TODeliver events are given in Fig. 6.11, 6.12.
As shown in Fig. 6.11, the operation assigning the sequence number to the computation
message is removed in the refined SendControl event. We use the fact that the vector
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SendControl (pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE, mc    MESSAGE )     
   WHEN   pp = sequencer 
                 mc   dom(sender)            
                 mm   ran(messcontrol)            
                   mm    computation 
                 pp   mm     cdeliver 
        (m,p)  ( p    PROCESS   m    MESSAGE   m    computation 
        VTM (m)(p)   VTM(mm)(p)     m    ran(messcontrol))  
            THEN   control := control  	  {mc} 
           ||  messcontrol := messcontrol 	  {mc   mm} 
           ||  LET  nVTP  BE  nVTP = VTP(pp) + { pp   VTP(pp)(pp)+1} 
          IN     VTM(mc) := nVTP   ||  VTP(pp) := nVTP   END 
           ||  sender := sender 	  {mc   pp} 
           END; 
 
 
Figure 6.11: Second Refinement : SendControl
timestamp of the control message contains the information required for todelivery of
the messages. Also, as shown in the Fig. 6.12, the guard of the event TODeliver which
contains sequence numbers in the abstract model is replaced by the vector rules. We
use the fact that the sequence numbers for the computation message are generated by
the sequencer each time it sends a control message. Thus, for a given control message
M and the corresponding computation message (M
′
), the following holds :
seqno(M
′
) = V TM(M)(sequencer)
This replacement in the refinement generates proof obligations involving seqno and the
vector timestamp of messages. To prove these proof obligations we add Inv-16, shown
in Fig. 6.13 to our refined model. Adding Inv-16 to the refinement requires us to add
new invariants Inv-17,18 to the refinement. A brief description of these invariants is
given below.
– For a control message m sent by the sequencer, the value VTM(m)(sequencer)
of the vector timestamp of m represents the sequence number of the computation
message corresponding to control message m. In other words, the sequence number
assigned to a computation message is the same as the sequencer’s own logical time
at the time of sending its control message(Inv-16).
– For two control messages m1 and m2, if the vector timestamp of m1 is less than
the vector time stamp of m2 then the sequence number given to the corresponding
computation message of m1 is also less than sequence number of the computation
message of m2 (Inv-17).
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TODeliver (pp    PROCESS ,  mc    MESSAGE)   
    WHEN  mc    dom(sender)  
             mc    control 
       (pp   mc)    cdeliver 
       (pp   messcontrol(mc))    cdeliver 
                  (pp   messcontrol(mc))   tdeliver 
        m.( m   MESSAGE   m    computation    
          ( VTM(messcontrol-1(m))(sequencer)  <  VTM(mc)(sequencer) ) 
                                                                                    (pp   m)    tdeliver )     
 THEN     tdeliver := tdeliver    {pp   messcontrol(mc)} 
 END 
 
Figure 6.12: Second Refinement : TODeliver
– For two computation messages m1 and m2, if the sequence number given to m1 is
less than the sequence number of m2 then the vector timestamp of the correspond-
ing control message m1 is also less than the vector time stamp of corresponding
control message of m2 (Inv-18).
After discharging the proof obligations generated due to the addition of these invariants
associated with the events Broadcast, SendControl and TODeliver, we ensure that the
events in Fig. 6.11, 6.12 are valid refinements of events in Fig. 6.9.
6.6 Further Refinements
In the third and fourth refinements we simplify the operations of the CausalDeliver event
given in the Fig. 6.8. In the second refinement the vector clock of the recipient process
                       Invariants                    Required By 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
/*Inv-16*/   m    control 	  (m 
  sequencer)   sender                 SC,TOD  
           seqno(messcontrol -1(m)) = VTM(m)(sequencer))             
 
/*Inv-17*/  m1    control 	  m2   control                     BC,SC,TOD 
          	   VTM(m1)(p)   VTM(m2)(p)                                      
               seqno (messcontrol -1(m1))   seqno (messcontrol -1(m2))   
 
/*Inv-18*/  m1    computation 	  m2   computation      SC,TOD 
           	  seqno (m1)   seqno (m2)                                            
             VTM(messcontrol(m1))(p)   VTM(messcontrol(m2))(p) 
Figure 6.13: Second Refinement : Gluing Invariant
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is updated as :
V TP (pp) := V TP (pp)−
{(q | q ∈ PROCESS ∧ V TP (pp)(q) < V TM(mm)(q)} V TM(mm))
The above operation is replaced by the following simplified operation in the third re-
finement which states that only one value in the vector clock of the recipient process pp,
corresponding to the sender process of the message, is updated.
V TP (pp) := V TP (pp) − {sender(mm) 7→ V TM(mm)(sender(mm))}
This operation is further refined to the following in the fourth refinement which precisely
states that only one value in the vector clock of the recipient process is updated.
V TP (pp)(sender(mm)) := V TM(mm)(sender(mm))
The refined CausalDeliver event in the fourth refinement is given in Fig 6.14. In each
refinement step we observed that proof obligations are generated due to the replacement
of the operations of the event CausalDeliver. These proof obligations are automatically
discharged by the B prover. A full chain of refinement with a complete set of invariants
is given in the Appendix-E.
 CausalDeliver (pp    PROCESS , mm    MESSAGE)     
       WHEN   mm    dom(sender)              
               (pp   mm)   cdeliver                  
                p.( p    PROCESS    p   sender(mm)    VTP(pp)(p)   VTM(mm)(p)) 
               VTP(pp)(sender(mm)) = VTM (mm)(sender(mm))-1                   
       THEN 
                   cdeliver := cdeliver 	  {pp   mm} 
               ||   VTP(pp)(sender(mm)) := VTM(mm)(sender(mm)) 
       END; 
Figure 6.14: Causal Deliver Event
6.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have outlined the development of a system of total causal order
broadcast. A total causal order broadcast not only preserves the causal precedence re-
lationship among the messages but also delivers them in a total order. In our model of
a total causal order broadcast, the computation messages are broadcast using a causal
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order broadcast. These computation messages are first delivered to all processes includ-
ing the sequencer respecting their causal order. Upon causally ordered delivery of a
computation message at the sequencer, the sequencer generates a sequence number for
that computation message and broadcasts its sequence number by a control message.
Similar to our model of a total order broadcast, a process other than the sequencer
delivers a computation message in the order of sequence numbers. It may be noted that
all computation messages are delivered at the sequencer in causal order and their con-
trol messages are sent in the order they were delivered at the sequencer. Therefore, the
sequence number generated by the sequencer also captures the causality among the com-
putation messages. Later in the refinement, we outlined that the generation of explicit
sequence numbers is redundant and it can be implemented using the vector timestamp
of the messages.
In the abstract model of this broadcast we outlined how the abstract causal order and a
total order on the computation messages are constructed. In the first refinement of the
abstract model we replace abstract causal order by the vector clock rules. Similarly, we
also replace the abstract total order with sequence numbers to outline how an abstract
total order can correctly be implemented by sequence numbers. In the second refinement
we show that an abstract system can be implemented by a vector clock system. We also
outline in this refinement, why the generation of sequence numbers is redundant and
how it is related to the vector timestamps. The last two refinements show simplification
of the event of delivery of a message in a causal order.
We notice that proof obligations are generated due to the addition of the primary invari-
ants to the model and refinement checking. These proof obligations help us construct
and discover the new invariants required to discharge the proof obligations. In this
case study, the discovery of new invariants was relatively easy as we already knew the
invariants relating abstract causal order, total order, vector clocks and sequence num-
bers. These invariants were discovered while the discharging proof obligations for the
case studies given in the Chapter 4 and the Chapter 5. Since most invariants added to
the model are predicates with quantification, the average of number of steps involved
with each proof is estimated at about twelve to fifteen. The proof statistics for the
development of a system of a total causal order are given in Table 6.2.
Machine Total POs Completely Automatic Required Interaction
Abstract Model 92 57 35
Refinement 1 50 31 19
Refinement 2 14 04 10
Refinement 3 06 06 00
Refinement 4 04 04 00
Overall 166 102 64
Table 6.2: Proof Statistics- Total Causal Order Broadcast
Chapter 7
Liveness Properties and
Modelling Guidelines
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we outline liveness properties that need to be preserved by the B models
of distributed systems. We also outline how enabledness preservation and non-divergence
are related to the liveness properties of the B models of distributed systems. We address
the liveness issues related to our model of distributed transactions. Finally, we present
some general modelling guidelines for the development of the models of distributed
systems in Event-B.
7.2 Liveness in the Event-B Models
Safety and liveness are two important issues in the development of distributed sys-
tems [73]. The distinction between safety and liveness properties was motivated by the
different tools and techniques for proving them and various interpretations of these prop-
erties are discussed in [66]. Informally, as described in [73], a safety property expresses
that something (bad) will not happen during a system execution. A liveness property
expresses that something (good) will eventually happen during the execution.
With regard to safety, the most important property which we want to prove about models
of distributed systems is invariant preservation. The invariant is a condition which must
hold permanently on the state variables. By invariant preservation we mean proving
that the actions of the events do not violate the invariants. With regards to the safety
properties, the existing tools generate proof obligations for consistency checking and
refinement checking. Discharging the proof obligations generated due to consistency
checking means that the actions of the events do not violate the invariants. Discharging
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the proof obligations for refinement checking also implies that each reachable concrete
state in the refinement is also reachable in the abstraction.
Despite providing strong proof support to aid reasoning about the safety properties, the
existing tools provide weak support for other complex forms of reasoning about liveness
properties, such as enabledness preservation or non-divergence, and feasibility checking.
By enabledness preservation, we mean whenever some events in the abstraction are
enabled then the corresponding events or new events in the refinement are also enabled.
Similarly, non-divergence requires us to prove that the new events in the refinement
do not take control forever. The issues relating to the liveness properties are currently
being addressed in the new generation of Event-B tools being developed [92, 44]. In the
remaining sections we outline these issues and present guidelines to address these issues
in the Event-B development of distributed systems.
7.2.1 Feasibility
With respect to the safety properties of distributed systems, in addition to consistency
and refinement checking, feasibility checking is also an important issue. It is our under-
standing that verifying the feasibility of a valid initial state of a distributed system is
an important step in the development of a distributed system. Consider the following
example B machine given in the Fig. 7.1.
MACHINE   temp 
CONSTANTS  N 
PROPERTIES  N     NAT 
SETS      PROC ;  MESG 
VARIABLES  sender 
INVARIANTS  sender      MESG     PROC 
INITIALISATION 
  ANY  x  WHERE  x    NAT     x < N       x > N  THEN sender := 

  END  
EVENTS 
  Broadcast = 
  ANY  p , m , y  WHERE  p     PROC    m    MESG      y    NAT     y < N       y > N   
  THEN  sender :=   sender     { m   p}  END  
END  
 
 
Figure 7.1: Feasibility of Initialization and Event
As shown in the initialization clause of the machine, the variable sender is initialized to
a null set only if the guard is true. Since the guards is always false for all values of x,
the initialization of variable sender is not feasible. Therefore, the initialization of the
machine in a consistent state is never possible. Similarly, since the guard of the event
Broadcast is always false for all values assumed by the variable y, the event will never
be enabled. The current B tools generate two trivial proof obligations due to invariant
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preservation, one each associated with the initialization and the event broadcast. These
proof obligations are automatically discharged by the existing B tools.
Since the existing tools are not able to generate the proof obligations relating to feasibil-
ity, it is not possible to determine whether a valid initialization of the machine is feasible
or whether an event will ever be enabled. In order to check the feasibility of the ini-
tialization, the use of ProB is highly recommended. To check feasibility, the tools must
generate proof obligations to determine if there exist any contradictions in the guards
of the events. We believe that the new generation B tool e.g., Rodin [44] addresses this
issue and generates proof obligations to ensure the feasibility of of a consistent initial
state and the possibility of activation of events.
7.2.2 Non-Divergence
New events and variables can be introduced in refinement. Each new event of a refine-
ment refines a skip event and defines a computation on new variables. In such cases,
it is useful to prove that the new events do not together diverge, i.e., run forever. If a
new event is allowed to run forever then the abstract event possibly may not occur. For
example, as outlined in the first refinement of the abstract model of transactions given
in Chapter 3, if the new events such as BeginSubTran, SiteAbortTx or SiteCommitTx
take the control forever then the events of global commit/abort are never activated and
a global commit decision may never be achieved.
In order to prove that the new events do not diverge, we use a VARIANT construct.
A variant V is a variable such that V ∈ N, where N is a set of natural numbers. For
each new event in the refinement we should be able to demonstrate that the execution
of each new event decreases the variant and the variant never goes below zero. This
allows us prove that a new event can not take control forever, since a variant can not be
decreased indefinitely. In order to achieve this, the most challenging task is to construct
a variant expression and prove that it is preserved by the activation of the events. The
process of the construction of a variant expression for the first refinement of the model
of transactions is as below.
In the refinement of our model of transactions, the notion of sites and the status of
a transaction at a site is introduced. The new events in the refinement change the
concrete state of the transactions. A transaction state at each participating site is
first set to pending by the activation of BeginSubTran. The activation of the event
SiteCommitTx changes the status from pending to precommit while the activation of
SiteAbortTx sets the status from pending to abort at that site. A transaction in the
precommit state at a site changes the state to either commit or abort by the activation
of event ExeCommitDecision or ExeAbortDecision respectively. The state diagram for
a concrete transaction state transitions at a site is shown in the Fig. 7.2. As shown in
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the figure each state is represented by a rank. The initial state represents a state of a
transaction tt at a participating site ss when it is not active, i.e., the sitetranssstatus of
tt at ss is not defined (ss /∈ dom(sitetranstatus(tt))). After submission of a transaction,
a transaction first become active at the coordinator site. Subsequently, due to the
activation of the event BeginSubTran(tt,ss), sub-transactions are started separately at
different sites, i.e., at each activation of this event, tt becomes active at participating
sites ss. As shown in the figure, new events in the refinement change the state of a
transaction at a site such that each time the rank is decreased.
rank = 3
rank = 0
rank = 2
rank = 1
Initial
Pending
Precommit
Commit
ExeCommitDecision(t,s)
SiteAbortTx(t,s)SiteCommitTx(t,s)
ExeAbortDecision(t,s)
BeginSubTran(t,s)
Abort
Figure 7.2: Concrete Transaction States in the Refinement
A variant in the refinement is defined as a variable variant :
variant ∈ trans→Natural
and initialized as variant := ∅.
As shown in the Fig. 7.3, when a fresh transaction tt is submitted by the activation
of the event StartTran(tt), the initial value of variant is set as varinat(tt) := 3 * N,
where N is total number of the sites in the system. Instead of showing all new events
that decrease the variant, the events SiteCommitTx and SiteAbortTx that decrease the
variant are shown in the Fig. 7.4. It can be noticed that both events decrease the variant
and change the status of a transaction from a pending state to precommit or abort state.
Since activation of the new events in the refinement decrease the variant, the rank of
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state is changed from three to zero, such that, variant(tt) will always be greater than or
equal to zero.
StartTran(tt)                                                                                            
    ANY       ss, updates, objects    
    WHERE     ss   SITE  

 tt   trans  

 updates   UPDATE   

 objects    1 (OBJECT) 

 ValidUpdate (updates,objects) 
    THEN         trans := trans   {tt}       
          ||   transstatus(tt) := PENDING   
                           ||    transobject(tt) := objects    
          ||   transeffect(tt) := updates 
                          ||   coordinator(tt) := ss 
                          ||    sitetransstatus(tt)  := {coordinator(tt)   pending} 
             ||       variant(tt) := 3 * N 
    END; 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Variant
      SiteCommitTx(tt,ss)   
     WHEN     (ss  tt) 	   activetrans    
        
   sitetransstatus(tt)(ss)= pending 
                     
   ss   coordinator(tt)     
        
   ran(transeffect(tt)){ }       
       THEN           sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := precommit 
        || variant(tt) := variant(tt) -1  
       END; 
 
 SiteAbortTx(tt,ss)  
     WHEN      (ss  tt) activetrans  
       
   sitetransstatus(tt)(ss)= pending 
                   
   ss   coordinator(tt)    
       
   ran(transeffect(tt)){ }      
    THEN        sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := abort    
                        ||  freeobject := freeobject   {ss}  transobject(tt) 
                 ||  activetrans := activetrans -{ss   tt} 
     || variant(tt) := variant(tt) - 2  
END; 
 
  
Figure 7.4: Events Decreasing a Variant
In order to prove that the activation of the new events given in the Fig. 7.2 does not
diverge, we need to prove that the changes in the state of a transaction at a site corre-
sponds to the decrement in the rank from three to zero. The variable variant is decreased
each time a new event in the refinement is activated. Thus, we construct the invariant
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∀t · (t ∈ trans⇒
variant(t) ≥ ( 3 ∗ card(SITE − activetrans−1[{t}]
+2 ∗ card(sitetransstatus(t)−1[{pending}]
+1 ∗ card(sitetransstatus(t)−1[{precommit}]
+0 ∗ card(sitetransstatus(t)−1[{commit, abort}]
)
)
Figure 7.5: Invariant used in variant Proofs
property involving the variable variant that need to be satisfied by the action of the
events in the refinement. This property is given in Fig 7.5.
In this expression, activetrans−1[{t}] returns a set of sites where transaction t is in active
state. Similarly, sitetransstatus(t)−1[{pending}] returns a set of site where a transaction
t is in pending state. In order to prove that the new events in the refinement do not
diverge, we have to show that the above invariant property on a variable variant holds on
the activation of the events in the refinement. In order to prove this invariant property
we need to add invariants 7.1 and 7.2 to the model. The invariant 7.1 states that if a
transaction t is not active at a site s then the variable variant is greater than or equal
to zero. The invariant 7.2 states that the variable variant is greater than or equal to
zero if the status of a transaction t at site s either precommit, pending, abort or commit.
∀(s, t) · (t ∈ trans ∧ s ∈ SITE ∧ (s 7→ t) /∈ activetrans
⇒ variant(t) ≥ 0) (7.1)
∀(s, t) · (t ∈ trans ∧ s ∈ SITE ∧ sitetransstatus(t)(s) ∈ {pending, precommit, abort, commit}
⇒ variant(t) ≥ 0) (7.2)
Therefore, in order to prove that the new events in the refinement do not diverge, we
need to construct an invariant on variant that holds on the activation of the events in the
refinement such that each new event in the refinement decreases the variant and variant
never goes below zero. Also, to prove an invariant property that includes a variant, we
need to construct new invariants that are sufficient to discharge the proof obligations.
7.2.3 Enabledness Preservation
With respect to liveness, freedom from deadlock is an important property in a distributed
database system. Our model of transactions requires us to prove that each transaction
eventually completes execution, i.e., either it commits or aborts. With respect to Event-
B models, it requires us to prove that if a transaction completes execution in the abstract
model of a system, then it must also complete in the concrete model. We ensure this
property by enabledness preservation.
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Enabledness preservation requires us to prove that the guards of the one or more events
in the refinement are enabled under the hypothesis that the guard of one or more events
in the abstraction are also enabled. Precisely, let there exist events Ea1 , E
a
2 ..., E
a
n in the
abstraction and a corresponding event Eri in the refinement refines the abstraction event
Eai . The events H
r
1 , ..., H
r
k are the new events in the refinement. A weakest notion of
enabledness preservation can be defined as follows:
Grd(Ea1 ) ∨Grd(E
a
2 )... ∨Grd(E
a
n)
⇒
Grd(Er1) ∨Grd(E
r
2)... ∨Grd(E
r
n) ∨Grd(H
r
1) ∨Grd(H
r
2)... ∨Grd(H
r
k) (7.3)
The weakest notion of enabledness preservation given at 7.3 states that if one or more
events in the abstraction is enabled then one or more events in the refinement are also
enabled. The strongest notion of the enabledness can be defined as below :
Grd(Eai )⇒ Grd(E
r
i ) ∨Grd(H
r
1) ∨Grd(H
r
2)... ∨Grd(H
r
k) (7.4)
The notion of enabledness preservation defined in 7.4 states that if the event Eai in the
abstraction is enabled then either the refining event Eri is enabled or one of the new
events are enabled.
We have also outlined in Chapter 3 that a concrete model may be deadlocked due to race
conditions. To ensure that all updates are delivered to all sites in the same order, we
need to order update transactions such that all sites deliver updates in the same order.
This may achieved if a site broadcasts an update using a total order broadcast. In the
presence of abstract ordering on the update transactions, all updates are delivered to all
sites in a same order, thus the concrete model does not deadlock. In the next section,
we outline how enabledness preservation properties relates to our model of transactions
in the presence of abstract ordering on the update transactions.
Abstract Transaction States
In our model of transactions, an update transaction, once started, updates the ab-
stract database atomically when the transaction commits, or makes no changes in the
database, when it aborts. We have represented the global state of update transac-
tions by a variable transstatus in the abstract model of the transactions. The variable
transtatus is defined as transtatus ∈ trans → TRANSSTATUS, where TRANSSTA-
TUS={COMMIT,ABORT,PENDING}. The transstatus maps each transaction to its
global state. With respect to an update transaction, activation of the following events
change the global transaction states.
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– StartTran(tt) : The activation of this event starts a fresh transaction and the state
of the transaction is set to pending.
– CommitWriteTran(tt) : A pending update transaction commits by atomically up-
dating the abstract database and it status is set to commit.
– AbortWriteTran(tt) : A pending update transaction aborts by making no change
in the abstract database and its status is set to abort.
Initial 
Pending 
Commit Abort
AbortWriteTran(tt)
StartTran(tt)
Complete(tt)
CommitWriteTran(tt)
Figure 7.6: Transaction States in the Abstract Model
The transitions in the transaction states due to the activation of events in the abstract
model of the transactions are outlined in the the Fig. 7.6. CommitWriteTran(tt) and
AbortWriteTran(tt) together are represented as Complete(tt), as both of these events
model the completion of a update transaction. As outlined in the figure, our abstract
model of transactions is free from deadlock, since an update transaction in the abstract
model commits atomically by updating the database or aborts by doing nothing. How-
ever, in the refinement, update transaction consists of collections of interleaved events
updating each replica separately. Due to the interleaved execution of transactions at
several sites, we need to show that the concrete model does not deadlock in the presence
of a total order broadcast.
Abstract Ordering on the transactions
As outlined in the refinement of the model of transactions given as Replica2 in Chap-
ter 3, in addition to a notion of a replicated database and the sites, new events are also
introduced. It may be recalled that in this refinement conflicting transactions may be
blocked. In order to ensure that our concrete model of transactions does not block and
makes progress, we introduce a new event Order in the refinement. The very purpose
of introducing new event Order(tt) is to ensure that the transactions are executed at all
sites in a predefined abstract order on the transactions. The event Order models gen-
eration of abstract ordering on the update transactions. For the purpose of simplicity,
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the event IssueWriteTran(tt) is also merged with BeginSubTran(tt) such that the event
BeginSubTran(tt) models starting a sub-transaction at a site including the coordinator.
In the refined model, the sub-transactions at the participating sites are started in the
order of the abstract ordering on the transactions. This abstract ordering on the trans-
actions can be realized by introducing explicit total ordering on the messages in further
refinements.
To model an abstract order on the transactions we introduce new variables tranorder
and ordered typed as follows:
tranorder ⊆ trans↔ trans
ordered ⊆ trans
A mapping of the form t1 7→ t2 ∈ tranorder indicates that a transaction t1 is ordered
before t2, i.e., at all sites t1 will be processed before t2. It may be noted that the ab-
stract transaction ordering can be achieved by implementing total ordering on all update
messages. In order to represent the state of a transaction at a site, we use a variable site-
transstatus. The variable sitetransstatus maps each transaction, at a site, to transaction
states given by a set SITETRANSTATUS, where SITETRANSTATUS={pending, com-
mit, abort, precommit}. The Order event models building an abstract transaction order
on the started transactions. The event BeginSubtran models starting a sub-transaction
in the order defined by the abstract variable tranorder. The specifications of the events
Order and BeginSubTran are given in the Fig. 7.7.
Instead of giving the specifications of all events of the refinement in the similar detail,
brief descriptions of the new events in this refinement are outlined below.
– Order(tt) : This event builds an abstract order on the transactions.
– BeginSubTran(tt) : This event models starting a sub-transaction at a site includ-
ing the coordinator. The sub-transactions are started in the order of abstract
transaction order. The status of the transaction tt at site ss is set to pending.
– SiteAbortTx(ss,tt) : This event models a local abort of a transaction at a site. The
transaction is said to complete execution at the site. The status of the transaction
tt at site ss is set to abort.
– SiteCommitTx(ss,tt) : This event models precommit of a transaction at a site.
The status of the transaction tt at site ss is set to precommit.
– ExeAbortDecision(ss,tt) : This event models abort of a precommitted transaction
at a site. This event is activated once the transaction has globally aborted. The
status of the transaction tt at site ss is set to abort. The transaction is said to
complete execution at the site.
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Order(tt   TRANSACTION )   
  WHEN    tt    trans   
 tt  orderd 
  THEN     tranorder := tranorder   (ordered  {tt}) 
                   ||   ordered := ordered   {tt} 
 END; 
 
BeginSubTran ( tt  TRANSACTION ,ss  SITE)  
  WHEN    tt   trans   
   tt   ordered   
     	   (ss
  tt)  activetrans       
     	   ran(transeffect(tt)){ }  
                      	   transobject(tt)   freeobject[{ss}]   
    	   transstatus(tt)=PENDING 
               	    tz.(tz   trans 	  (ss 
  tz)   activetrans  
          transobject(tt)   transobject(tz) =  ) 
	   tx.(tx   trans 	  (tx 
  tt)   tranorder  
      (tx 
  ss)   completed )   
 THEN          activetrans := activetrans   {ss
  tt}               
                    ||   sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := pending 
                ||  freeobject := freeobject - {ss}   transobject(tt) 
END; 
 
 Figure 7.7: Order and BeginSubTran events
– ExeCommitDecision(ss,tt) : This event models commit of a precommitted transac-
tion at a site. This event is activated once the transaction has globally committed.
The status of the transaction tt at site ss is set to precommit. The replica at the
site is updated with the transaction effects and the transaction is said to complete
execution at this site.
The transaction states in the refinement is outlined in the Fig. 7.8 and 7.9. As shown
in the figure, initially the status of a fresh transaction is set to pending by the acti-
vation of StartTran event. A pending transaction is ordered by the activation of the
Order event, before it starts a sub-transaction at a participating site. A site starts a
sub-transaction in transaction order and independently decides to either abort or pre-
commit the sub-transaction by activation of either SiteAbortTx or SiteCommitTx. These
new events of the refinement set the status of transactions to abort or precommit. The
coordinating site takes a decision of global commit by the activation of either Com-
mitWriteTran or AbortWriteTran events. It can be noticed that both CommitWrite-
Tran(tt) and AbortWriteTran(tt) events together are represented as Complete(tt), as
both of these events model the completion of a update transaction. An update trans-
action then reaches the final state of a global commit or abort. A site implements the
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global commit decision to update the replica at that site by the activation of ExeCom-
mitDecision at participating sites. This event takes place only after the activation of
CommitWriteTran. Similarly, a site implements a global abort decision by the activation
of ExeAbortDecision. This event occurs after the activation of AbortWriteTran at the
coordinator. These events set the transaction status at that site to abort or commit.
Initial
Pending
Ordered
StartTran(tt)
Order(tt)
sitetranstatus= pending
SiteAbortTx(tt)
sitetranstatus= abort
SiteCommitTx(tt)
sitetranstatus= precommit
Transaction States
in Refinement
BeginSubTran(tt)
CommitAbort
AbortWriteTran(tt) CommitWriteTran(tt)
Complete(tt)
Figure 7.8: Transaction States in the Refinement-I
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Abort/Commit
sitetranstatus= abort sitetranstatus= commit
sitetranstatus= precommit
Transaction States in Refinement
ExeAbortDecision(tt,ss) ExeCommitDecision(tt,ss)
Figure 7.9: Transaction States in the Refinement-II
Proof Obligations for Enabledness Preservation
In this section, we outline the proof obligations to verify that the refinement is en-
abledness preserving. Our objective is to prove that if a transaction completes in the
abstraction then it also completes in the refinement. The weakest notion of enabledness
preservation1 given at 7.3 requires us to prove following :
Grd(StartTran(t) ∨ CommitWriteTran(t) ∨ Grd(AbortWriteTran(t))
⇒ Grd(StartTran∗(t))
∨ Grd(Order(t))
∨ Grd(BeginSubTran(t, s))
∨ Grd(SiteCommitTx(t, s))
∨ Grd(SiteAbortTx(t, s))
∨ Grd(CommitWriteTran∗(t))
∨ Grd(AbortWriteTran∗(t)) (7.5)
The property given at 7.5 is not sufficient as it states that if one or more events in Start-
Tran, AbortWriteTran or CommitWriteTran is enabled in the abstraction then one of
the refined events or the new events is enabled in the refinement. It does not guarantee
that if a transaction t completes in the abstraction then it also completes in the refine-
ment. What we need to prove is that if either AbortWriteTran or CommitWriteTran in
1An event E in the abstract model is defined as E∗ in the refinement.
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the abstraction is enabled then one of the refined events or new events in the refinement
is enabled. According to the strongest notion of enabledness preservation given at 7.4,
it requires us to prove 7.6, 7.9 and 7.10.
Grd(StartTran(t))
⇒ Grd(StartTran∗(t))
∨ Grd(Order(t))
∨ Grd(BeginSubTran(t, s))
∨ Grd(SiteCommitTx(t, s))
∨ Grd(SiteAbortTx(t, s)) (7.6)
The property at 7.6 states that if the guard of the StartTran event is enabled then the
guard of refined StartTran or the guards of new events are enabled. This property is
provable due to following observations.
Grd(StartTran(t))⇒ Grd(StartTran∗(t)) (7.7)
In order to prove this property, the following proof obligation needs to be discharged.
This proof obligation is trivial and can be discharged by the automatic prover of the
tool.
∀t(t ∈ TRANSACTION ∧ t /∈ trans⇒ t /∈ trans) (7.8)
Grd(CommitWriteTran(t))
⇒ Grd(Order(t))
∨ Grd(BeginSubTran(t, s))
∨ Grd(SiteCommitTx(t, s))
∨ Grd(SiteAbortTx(t, s))
∨ Grd(CommitWriteTran∗(t)) (7.9)
The property at 7.9 states that if the guard of the CommitWriteTran event is enabled
then the guards of refined CommitWriteTran or the guards of new events are enabled.
This property is too strong to prove due to following reasons. A transaction may not
commit in the refinement until some other transaction either commits or aborts. There-
fore, the guards of the AbortWriteTran may be enabled, as commit of a transaction
depends on the abort of other transaction. Also, for the same reasons the property
at 7.10 is not provable either.
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Grd(AbortWriteTran(t))
⇒ Grd(Order(t))
∨ Grd(BeginSubTran(t, s))
∨ Grd(SiteCommitTx(t, s))
∨ Grd(SiteAbortTx(t, s))
∨ Grd(AbortWriteTran∗(t)) (7.10)
Therefore, we need to reconstruct the properties given at 7.9 and 7.10 given as 7.11
and 7.12 respectively. It can be noticed that we need to prove that if the guards of
the events AbortWriteTran or CommitWriteTran are enabled in the abstract model
then either the guards of new events or the guards of refined AbortWriteTran or Com-
mitWriteTran events are enabled in the refinement.
Grd(CommitWriteTran(t))
⇒ Grd(StartTran∗(t))
∨ Grd(Order(t))
∨ Grd(BeginSubTran(t, s))
∨ Grd(SiteCommitTx(t, s))
∨ Grd(SiteAbortTx(t, s))
∨ Grd(CommitWriteTran∗(t))
∨ Grd(AbortWriteTran∗(t)) (7.11)
Grd(AbortWriteTran(t))
⇒ Grd(StartTran∗(t))
∨ Grd(Order(t))
∨ Grd(BeginSubTran(t, s))
∨ Grd(SiteCommitTx(t, s))
∨ Grd(SiteAbortTx(t, s))
∨ Grd(CommitWriteTran∗(t))
∨ Grd(AbortWriteTran∗(t)) (7.12)
We observe that the proof obligations constructed due to the weakest notion of the
enabledness preservation are not sufficient to prove that if a transaction completes in
abstraction then it also completes in the refinement. Also, we observe that the strongest
notion of enabledness preservation is too strong to prove.
What we really need is a notion of enabledness preservation that is stronger than the
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weakest notion(see property 7.3) and weaker than the strongest notion(see property 7.4).
This can be defined as below.
1. If the event StartTran is enabled in the abstraction then it is also enabled in the
refinement.
2. If the completion event, i.e., either CommitWriteTran or AbortWriteTran event
is enabled in the abstract model then these completion events are also enabled in
the refinement.
We have already outlined that the first property is preserved by our model of transactions
given at 7.7. For the second property, we further construct the property given at 7.13.
Grd(CommitWriteTran(t)) ∨ Grd(AbortWriteTran(t))
⇒ Grd(Order(t))
∨ Grd(BeginSubTran(t, s))
∨ Grd(SiteCommitTx(t, s))
∨ Grd(SiteAbortTx(t, s))
∨ Grd(CommitWriteTran∗(t))
∨ Grd(AbortWriteTran∗(t)) (7.13)
We observe that property 7.13 is also not provable because a transaction t cannot com-
plete its execution until some other transaction completes. Therefore, we finally con-
struct the property 7.14.
Grd(CommitWriteTran(tx)) ∨ Grd(AbortWriteTran(tx))
⇒ ∃ty · Grd(Order(ty)
∨ ∃ty · Grd(BeginSubTran(ty, s))
∨ ∃ty · Grd(SiteCommitTx(ty, s))
∨ ∃ty · Grd(SiteAbortTx(ty, s))
∨ Grd(CommitWriteTran∗(tx))
∨ Grd(AbortWriteTran∗(tx)) (7.14)
As shown in 7.14, if the events corresponding to a completion of a transaction tx in
the abstraction are enabled then the new events Order, BeginSubtran, SiteCommitTx,
SiteAbortTx are enabled for other transactions ty or the refined Complete events are also
enabled for tx. Since we allow the interleaving of the transactions in the refinement, if
a transaction tx completes by a commit then another transaction ty may also complete
by an abort.
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The proof obligations for the property 7.14 can be simplified as follows. For a given
transaction t that has started but not ordered then the event Order activates before the
activation of other events in the refinement. Therefore, if one or both of the abstract
events CommitWriteTran or AbortWriteTran is enabled and the transaction is not or-
dered then the guard of event Order in the refinement must be enabled. The proof
obligation corresponding to this property is given below :
Grd(Complete(t)) ∧ t /∈ ordered⇒ Grd(Order(t)) (7.15)
The proof obligation 7.15 can be simplified by replacing Complete(t) by the transaction
completion events shown as below.
Grd(CommitWriteTran(t)) ∨Grd(AbortWriteTran(t))
∧ t /∈ ordered⇒ Grd(Order(t)) (7.16)
Similarly, if a transaction t is ordered then the guard of the events BeginSubtran,
SiteCommitTx, SiteAbortTx or the refined Complete must be enabled. The proof obli-
gation corresponding to this property is given below.
Grd(Complete(t)) ∧ t ∈ ordered
⇒ Grd(BeginSubTran(t, s))
∨ ∃ty ·Grd(SiteCommitTx(ty, s))
∨ ∃ty ·Grd(SiteCommitTx(ty, s))
∨Grd(Complete∗(t)) (7.17)
The proof obligation 7.17 may further be simplified under following observations. Con-
sider a transaction t that has started, ordered but it is not active at a site s then the guard
of BeginSubTran(t,s) must be enabled. In order to prove this property, the following
proof obligation needs to be discharged.
Grd(Complete(t))
∧ t ∈ ordered
∧ (s 7→ t) /∈ activetrans
∧ ∀tx · (tx ∈ trans ∧ (tx 7→ t) ∈ tranorder ⇒ (t 7→ s) ∈ completed
⇒ Grd(BeginSubTran(t, s)) (7.18)
Further, if a transaction t that has started, ordered and is active at a site s then the
guard of SiteCommitTx, SiteAbortTx or the refined Complete(t) must be enabled. This
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proof obligation is given below.
Grd(Complete(t)) ∧ t ∈ ordered ∧ (s 7→ t) ∈ activetrans
⇒ ∃ty ·Grd(SiteCommitTx(ty, s))
∨ ∃ty ·Grd(SiteAbortTx(ty, s))
∨Grd(Complete∗(t))) (7.19)
The existing B tools do not generate proof obligations for enabledness preservation.
However, the issue of enabledness preservation and non-divergence is being addressed
in the new generation of B tools, e.g., Rodin [44]. The proof obligations outlined above
are specific to our model of transactions. However, using the same strategy, the proof
obligations for other models of distributed systems may be generated. Discharging these
proof obligations ensures that the model is enabledness preserving. The same strategy
needs to be used to formulate the proof obligations for each level of refinement.
7.3 Guidelines for an Event-B Development
In this section, we briefly outline the guidelines for the incremental construction of a
model of a distributed system in Event-B. It is our understanding that most distributed
algorithms are deceptive and they may allow unanticipated behavior during execution.
There exists a vast variety of problems related to distributed systems. There also exists
several solutions to each of these problems. A formal verification is required to un-
derstand that these algorithms achieve what they are supposed to do. The guidelines
presented here are particularly helpful if the main purpose of the construction of a model
of a distributed system is to specify the abstract problem and to verify the correctness
of a proposed solution or a design decision in the refinement steps.
Firstly, we present the general methodological guidelines for modelling in Event-B. Sub-
sequently, the guidelines for an effective management of the B tools to discharge the
proof obligations, are presented. These guidelines emerged from the experience of our
case studies [139, 140, 141, 142] presented in this thesis and the Mondex case study [31].
7.3.1 General Methodological Guidelines for Modelling in Event-B
In this section, general methodological guidelines for the construction of models of dis-
tributed systems in Event-B, are presented.
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Guideline 1 :
Sketch the informal requirements and the safety properties of a system
Before undertaking the development of a large distributed system, it is necessary to
formulate informal definitions and the requirements of a system. Formulation of these
requirements varies with the system. However, each system requires a clear description
of the functional and safety requirements. The functional requirement usually deals
with the main function of the system. The safety requirements underline the critical
properties that a system must meet. Formulation of the informal requirements should
be an iterative process, which should go on together with the development of the formal
models.
In the development of the formal models for the case studies outlined in this thesis, we
considered the protocol steps as functional requirements for the construction of formal
models. For example, we considered the read anywhere write everywhere replica control
protocol for the management of replicas in Chapter 3, vector clocks for implementing
causal ordering in Chapter 4, sequencer based protocol for total order in Chapter 5 and
vector clocks for implementing total causal order in Chapter 6. After the construction
of the formal models, at each refinement step proof obligations are generated by the B
tool for refinement and consistency checking. By discharging these proof obligations, we
ensure that a refinement meets safety requirements. Additionally, in order to prove that
a model also preserves critical properties of the protocol, we further construct and add
primary invariants to the model that represent critical properties of the system. The
addition of these primary invariants to the model generates additional proof obligations.
While discharging the proof obligations, we also discover a set of new invariants called
secondary invariants. These proof obligations and invariants provide a deeper insight
into the system and help us understand why a protocol meets the critical properties.
Guideline 2 :
Use the refinement approach to gain insight
An abstract model is generally regarded as an bird’s eye view of the system. It is
important to make sure that the abstract model appropriately reflects the overall view
of the system under development. The first attempt in the formal devolvement of the
system should be on the modelling of the problem in the abstract model rather than
proposing the solution. Once the abstract problem is defined in the abstract model,
the detailed solutions of the problem should gradually be introduced in the refinement
steps. The modelling assumptions made in the construction of an abstract model are
crucial. The informal process of reconciling the requirements at each level of refinement
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help discovering invalid modelling assumptions. A critical view of the proof obligations
generated by the tools also helps discovering invalid modelling assumptions. It should
be remembered that the state of the refined system is largely constrained by the choice
of variables and the events in the abstraction.
Consider our model of transactions in Chapter 3. In the abstract model, an update
transaction performs update on a one-copy database. In the refinement, we introduce
the notion of replicas. Replicas in the refinement are updated within the framework of a
read anywhere write everywhere protocol. The proof obligations and the invariants dis-
covered at this stage provide insight into why a one-copy database is a valid abstraction
of replicated databases, i.e., why a replicated database preserves the one-copy equiva-
lence consistency criterion. Similarly, in Chapter 4, in the abstract model we define
abstract causal ordering on the messages and in a refinement we introduce vector clocks
to implement causal ordering. Both proof obligations and the discovered invariants help
understand why a vector clock mechanism implements abstract causal ordering on mes-
sages. Also, using the same technique in Chapter 5, in the abstract model we outline
how a total order is constructed on the messages and in the refinements we introduce
the details of control messages and sequence numbers. Through the proof and new in-
variants, we understand how the mechanism of generating sequence numbers delivers
the messages correctly in a total order.
Guideline 3 :
Keep abstraction gap as small as possible
During the development of a refinement chain, keep the abstraction gap as small as
possible. Precisely, while adding new events and variables in the refinement, it is good
to keep the state space representation as abstract as possible. Allowing a very detailed
state space in a single refinement step may require discharging lengthy and complex
proof obligations. Keeping the abstraction gap smaller means discharging less complex
proof obligations. Discharging a proof obligation may also require addition of the new
invariants to the model. A large and complex proof obligation may require a huge
amount of work which otherwise could be split into easier and smaller units of work.
Since an invariant for the abstract models is available for free for the refined model,
smaller abstraction gaps in each refinement step help splitting otherwise complex proof
steps into the simpler ones. Also, keeping smaller abstraction gaps may lead to a higher
degree of automatic proofs, since a relatively simple proof obligation is more likely to
be discharged by the automatic prover.
For example, consider the first refinement given in the Chapter 3. Due to the intro-
duction of the replica control mechanism and a large number of concrete variables, we
observe a vary large concrete state space. Therefore, we end up discharging a relatively
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large number of complex proof obligations compared to the other refinement steps, as
outlined in the Table 3.2. Also, due to large abstraction gaps in the first two refine-
ments of the refinement chain in the Chapter 6, a relatively large number of complex
proof obligations is generated, as shown in the Table 6.2. However, discharging these
proof obligations was relatively easy as most of the invariant properties were already
discovered as a part of development of the model of a causal order in Chapter 4 and a
total order in Chapter 5.
Guideline 4 :
Tools are critical in managing proofs and the refinement chain
The B tools are central to Event-B modelling. They greatly ease the burden of modelling
efforts by the generation of proof obligations, remembering the proof steps, discharging
the proof obligations and maintaining the refinement chain. The complexity of the proof
obligations generated by the tool are also dependent on the way the B constructs are
used in the modelling. For example, use of the relational override operator may generate
more complex proof obligations than using set union. Similarly, the tool may generate
simple proof obligations if the state of a variable is represented by a set variable construct
rather than using enumerated sets. For example, one way of modelling computation and
control messages is by using a variable mtype ∈ MESSAGE → MTYPE where MTYPE
= {computation, control} and assigning the type of a message as mtype(mm):= compu-
tation. An easier step could be to declare variable computation, control as computation
⊆ MESSAGE and assigning the type of a message as computation := computation ∪ {
mm }. An invariant computation ∩ control = ∅ ensures that both messages are distinct.
The prover generates relatively easier proof obligations for the later and discharges the
proof automatically.
Guideline 5 :
Let the proof obligations guide construction of the gluing invariants
In our case studies we have outlined the construction of the gluing invariants by inspec-
tion of the proof obligations. The proof obligations generated by the B tool contain
sufficient information to construct new invariants. However, in the first instance an at-
tempt should be made to discharge a proof obligation through interaction with the tool
by inspecting available hypotheses and the invariants. In many cases, there may not be
a need to add a new invariant, rather an interaction with the tool e.g., simplifying the
hypotheses and goals or by providing a good instantiation will suffice. The addition of a
new invariant to the model must be seen as a last solution and must be constructed after
a very careful examination of the proof obligations, available hypotheses and the existing
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invariants. It should be remembered that each newly constructed invariant needs to be
proved to be consistent for each event in the model. It is also necessary to convince
yourself informally that a newly discovered invariant is expected to be an invariant. In
some cases, a new invariant may also provide a clue that either previously constructed
invariants or the model itself need to be fixed. A blind construction of a new invariant
may result in a growth in the number of proof obligations or may lead to invalid changes
in the model which may result in a situation of proving a wrong invariant for an invalid
model. In the case of an addition of an invariant, efforts should be made to construct a
new invariant which is close to the form of the proof obligations. By adding an invariant
which is close to the proof obligation, the proof efforts are usually eased.
For example, as outlined in the Chapter 4, consider the following two proof obligations
generated by the B tool. The first proof obligation requires us to prove that if a message
m1 causally precedes m2 and that pp is sender of m2 and m1 was not sent by process
pp then process pp must have delivered m1.
m1 7→ m2 ∈ corder ∧ m2 ∈ (sender−1[{pp}]) ∧ m1 /∈ (sender−1[{pp}])
⇒ m1 ∈ (cdeliver[{pp}]) (7.20)
Similarly, the second proof obligation states that if m1 causally precedes m2 and pp is
the sender of m2 and pp has not delivered m1 then pp is sender of m1.
m1 7→ m2 ∈ corder ∧ m2 ∈ (sender−1[{pp}]) ∧ m1 /∈ (cdeliver[{pp}])
⇒ m1 ∈ (sender−1[{pp}]) (7.21)
Therefore, in order to discharge these proof obligations, we add the following invariant
to the model that is close to the form of these proof obligations. This invariant states
that if m1 precedes m2 in causal order, p is sender of m2 , then p has either delivered
m1 or it is a sender of m1. We observe that this invariant is sufficient to discharge these
proof obligations.
m1 7→ m2 ∈ corder ∧ m2 ∈ (sender−1[{p}])
⇒ m1 ∈ (sender−1[{p}]) ∨m1 ∈ (cdeliver[{p}])
We also outlined the construction of invariants in the chapters 3-6 guided by the proof
obligations.
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Guideline 6 :
Frequently use model checker to understand the prover failure
Discharging complex proof obligations using the interactive prover is quite a tricky affair.
In the event of a prover’s failure to discharge a proof obligation, it is not always possible
to determine if the prover could not prove the goal due to the inappropriate selection of
the hypotheses or the goal can not be proved at all under the available hypotheses. One
of the main limitations [6] of the predicate prover of the existing tools is its sensitivity
towards useless hypotheses. The predicate prover may prove a certain statement with a
selection of right hypotheses but may not prove or takes much longer time to prove the
same statement under the selection of a large number of useless hypotheses.
This situation is more of importance if the proof obligation was generated due to the
addition of a new invariant. In such cases it is necessary to determine informally if the
newly constructed invariant is a valid invariant and the model needs to be fixed or the
invariant is violated due to activation of an certain event. The use of a model checker
(ProB) is strongly recommended to precisely understand how the state variables are
changed due to the activation of events and what invariants are violated. The model
checker can also be used to find counter examples which may lead to fixing the model
or invariants.
For example, as outlined in the Chapter 4, a causal order broadcast is a reliable broad-
cast that satisfies the causal order requirement, i.e., a causal order broadcast delivers
messages respecting their causal precedence relationship. In order to verify that our
model of causal order, given as first refinement, preserves causal order properties, we
considered the following two properties relating abstract causal order and delivery order.
m1 7→ m2 ∈ corder ⇒ m1 7→ m2 ∈ delorder(p) (7.22)
m1 7→ m2 ∈ delorder(p)⇒ m1 7→ m2 ∈ corder (7.23)
The property at 7.22 states that for any two messages m1 and m2 such that m1 precedes
m2 in causal order then the delivery order at a process p is also m1 followed by m2. The
property at 7.23 states that given two messages m1 and m2, and m1 is delivered before
m2 to a process p then m1 precedes m2 in causal order. We use model checking to
precisely understand why and when both of the above are not the invariant properties.
The property at 7.22 is not an invariant property as the causal order is constructed at the
time of sending a message and the messages are delivered after arbitrary time. Similarly,
the property at 7.23, is not an invariant property due to parallel messages, i.e., parallel
messages may be delivered to all processes in same delivery order. After frequent use of
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the model checker and animator(ProB), we arrive at the following invariant property.
m1 7→ m2 ∈ corder ∧ p 7→ m2 ∈ cdeliver
⇒ m1 7→ m2 ∈ delorder(p)
Guideline 7 :
Redundancy may be useful
A redundant variable is one whose value may be extracted from other variables of the
model. Using redundant variables may be helpful in constructing the gluing invariants
and the generation of relatively simple proof obligations. These variables may gradually
be removed in the subsequent refinement steps. While removing the redundant variables
in the refinement, the proofs may be easier due to the existing invariants. However, in-
troducing too much redundancy in the model may lead to increased effort in managing
it. For example, variables activetrans, sitetransstatus, freeobject used in the first refine-
ment in Chapter 3 help discharge several complex proof obligations. However, there
exists a strong relationship among them as outlined in the second refinement.
Guideline 8 :
Be aware that Refinement chains are not always top down
Contrary to the general belief, refinement chains are not always top down. Due to
the detection of modelling errors or lack of understanding in the design decisions, the
abstract model may need fixing. In the case of a change in the model, a new refinement
chain may evolve. The detection of errors or omissions at a later stage in the refinement
and fixing them in the abstract model is an integral part of the evolution of a valid
refinement chain. For example, in the third refinement of the model of transactions,
given in Chapter 3, we introduce explicit messaging among the sites that corresponds
to a reliable broadcast. In this refinement, the update transactions may be blocked due
to the race conditions.
In order to deal with blocked transactions, we introduce the timeout strategy that aborts
an update transaction at the coordinating site. We already outlined in the first refine-
ment that our replica control mechanism preserves the consistency of a database in
the event of an abort of an update transaction. The effect of an timeout is similar to
globally aborting a transaction by a coordinating site. While adding this event to the
third refinement, we realized that this event must also exist in the abstract model, as
the activation of this event sets the global status of a transaction to ABORT in the
abstract model. Also, similar to the effects of AbortWriteTran event, activation of the
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TimeOut event removes a transaction from a list of active transactions at coordinator
and adds the transaction object to a list of free objects at the coordinator. However,
the differences between these events are visible in the third refinement where activation
of AbortWriteTran requires that the coordinator has delivered at least one vote-abort
message from the coordinator. Therefore, we have to modify the refinement chain and
we introduce TimeOut at each refinement level. The specifications of TimeOut events
for each refinement level of the model of transactions are given in Appendix-B.
7.3.2 Guidelines for Discharging Proof Obligations using B Tools
As outlined above, the tools are critical in managing the proof efforts and the develop-
ment of the refinement chain. Guidelines are presented below outlining effective strate-
gies to discharge proof obligations.
G1. While constructing a gluing invariant after the inspection of the proof obligations,
always try to construct an invariant which is close to the form of the proof obliga-
tion.
G2. Where possible avoid using complex structures in the invariants such as quantifica-
tions, a relational override operator or an inverse function. For example, consider
the following invariant.
∀(p,m).(p ∈ process ∧m ∈ message ∧ (p 7→ m) ∈ deliver ⇒ m ∈ dom(sender))
Instead of writing this invariant using the quantification, it can be simply be
expressed as ran(deliver) ⊆ dom(sender). The proof obligations generated due to
the use of quantifications in the invariant are more complex than using simple set
theoretic constructs.
G3. There exist three predicate provers in the tools pr, po and p1. p1 is considered to
be the most powerful prover. However, in certain cases, p1 fails to prove a goal
while pr or po are able to prove the same goal. Also, it is much quicker to replay
the proofs discharged using either pr or po than those discharged using the prover
p1.
G4. It is sometimes useful to prove a lemma first (using ah button), which when proved
becomes a new hypothesis. A lemma should be constructed in such a way that it
is close to the goal of proof obligation. For example, consider the following proof
obligation generated during development of a model of total order broadcast.
m1 ∈ dom(sender) ∧ m2 ∈ dom(sender) ∧
(m1 7→ m2) ∈ totalorder ∧ (pp 7→ m2) ∈ tdeliver
⇒ (m1 7→ m2) ∈ delorder(pp)
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In order to discharge this proof obligation, the following lemma should be proved
using add hypothesis.
pp 7→ m1 ∈ tdeliver
G5. While interacting with a proof obligation generated due to the addition of an
invariant containing universal quantification, propose a valid instantiation for that
quantification.
G6. While discharging a proof obligation containing existential quantification, always
propose a valid witness to this quantification.
G7. In certain cases the tool allows you to discharge the proof obligations case by
case(using ov button). Performing the proof steps case by case allows you to
interact with simpler proof obligations.
G8. While inspecting the available hypotheses, if any one is found in contradiction,
try to prove the negation of that hypothesis. For example, consider the following
proof obligation generated by the prover due to addition of primary invariants in
the development of a model of total order broadcast.
mm /∈ dom(sender) ∧ (pp 7→ m2) ∈ tdeliver ∧ (mm 7→ m2) ∈ totalorder ∧
m1 = mm ∧ m2 6= mm
⇒ (pp 7→ mm) ∈ tdeliver
It can be noticed that there is a contradiction in the hypotheses of this proof
obligation, i.e., the hypothesis mm /∈ dom(sender) and (mm 7→ m2 ) ∈ totalorder
can not be true simultaneously, since a totalorder is built only on the sent messages.
Also, the goal (pp 7→ mm) ∈ tdeliver cannot be proved under the hypothesis mm /∈
dom(sender). Therefore, we add an hypothesis mm ∈ dom(sender) and discharge
it after adding an invariant ran(tdeliver) ⊆ dom(sender).
G9. In the case of prover failures, inspect the available hypotheses and remove the
useless hypotheses from the list of available hypotheses. If the model of the system
is fairly large, the most likely cause of the failure of the prover is the presence of
useless hypotheses in the selection.
G10. In most cases it is useful to simplify the goals and available hypotheses by in-
teraction, before attempting to prove a goal (using ov,rm,ri2). The provers are
good at proving the simpler goals. For example, consider following goal in a proof
obligation :
m1 7→ m2 ∈ totalorder ∪ ran(tdeliver)× {mm}
2For explanation of these clause, see [6].
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This goal on starting remove membership(rm) can be simplified to following :
(m1 7→ m2 ∈ totalorder) ∨ (m1 7→ m2 ∈ ran(tdeliver)× {mm})
This goal can be reduced to the following by using the remove disjunction (rd)
clause of the tool.
m1 7→ m2 ∈ totalorder
m1 7→ m2 ∈ ran(tdeliver)× {mm}
However, it can be noticed that each time a goal is modified, the available hy-
potheses displayed by the tool also changes. The simpler goals are easily proved
by the automatic prover of the tool.
7.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we addressed the issue of liveness in the B models of distributed trans-
actions. Safety and liveness are two important issues in the design and development
of distributed systems [73]. Safety properties express that something bad will not hap-
pen during system execution. A liveness property expresses that something (good) will
eventually happen during the execution. With regards to safety properties, the existing
tools generate proof obligations for consistency and refinement checking. Discharging
the proof obligations generated due to consistency checking mean that the activation of
the events does not violate the invariants. Discharging the proof obligations due to the
refinement checking implies that the gluing invariants that relate abstract and concrete
variables are preserved by the activation of the events in the refinement. With regard
to the liveness, it is useful to state that the model of the system under development
is non-divergent and enabledness preserving. By enabledness preservation, we mean
that whenever some event (or group of events) is enabled at the abstract level then
the corresponding event (or group of events) is eventually enabled at the concrete level.
Similarly, non-divergence requires us to prove that the new events in the refinement
do not take control forever. The issues relating to the liveness properties are currently
being addressed in the new generation of Event-B tools being developed [44, 92].
We outlined how enabledness preservation and non-divergence are related to the live-
ness of the B models of distributed transactions. To ensure that a concrete model also
makes progress and does not deadlock more often than its abstraction, it is necessary to
prove that if an abstract model makes progress due to the activation of events then the
concrete model also makes progress due to the activation of the events in the refinement.
We ensure this property by enabledness preservation. In order to prove that a concrete
machine also makes a progress, we need to prove that the guards of one or more events
in the refinement are enabled under the hypothesis that the guard of one or more events
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in the abstraction are also enabled. We specified the necessary conditions for enabled-
ness preservation for the model of transactions that need to be preserved. In order to
show that the new events in the refinement do not take control forever we outlined a
construction of an invariant property on a variant. For each new event in the refinement
we should be able to demonstrate that the execution of each new event decreases the
variant and variant never goes below zero. This allows to us prove that a new event can
not take control forever, since a variant can not be decreased indefinitely.
In the later part of the chapter, we presented the guidelines for the development of a
distributed system using Event-B. Since the use of a tool is critical in managing the proof
obligations and the management of the refinement chain, guidelines for discharging the
proof obligations using B tool are also discussed.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
In this chapter, we outline what we achieved in terms of applying Event-B for the
incremental construction of the formal models of distributed transactions and broadcast
protocols for replicated databases. In Section 8.1, we first summarize the research carried
out within different chapters and explain how we meet the research objectives outlined
in Chapter 1. Subsequently, in Section 8.2, we compare our approach of development of
formal models of distributed systems and reasoning about them, with other approaches.
Lastly, in Section 8.3, we explore areas of future research where the knowledge gained
in the thesis can be used to further enhance the understanding of replicated databases.
8.1 Summary
Distributed algorithms are hard to understand and verify. Several approaches exist for
the verification of these algorithms which include model checking, proving theorems by
hand or proving invariant properties on the trace behavior. However, the application
of proof based formal methods for the automated systematic design and development
of such distributed systems and verification of the critical properties is rare. Often dis-
tributed algorithms are deceptive and an algorithm that looks simple may have complex
execution paths and allow unanticipated behavior. There exists a vast variety of prob-
lems related to distributed systems. Also there exist several solutions to each of the
problems. Rigorous reasoning about the algorithms is required to ensure that an algo-
rithm achieves what it is supposed to do. Event-B is a formal technique that consists of
describing rigorously the problem in the abstract model, introducing solutions or design
details in refinement steps to obtain more concrete specifications, and verifying that the
proposed solutions are correct. The B tools provide significant automated proof support
for generating the proof obligations and discharging them. This technique requires the
discharge of proof obligations for consistency checking and refinement checking. These
proofs help us to understand the complexity of the problem and the correctness of the
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solutions. They also help us to discover new system invariants providing a clear insight
into the system and enhance our understanding of why a design decision should work.
The aim of the thesis is to demonstrate the application of Event-B to the incremental
construction of formal models of distributed transactions and broadcast protocols for
replicated databases, and to reason about them. A brief note of the work presented in
the thesis is outlined below.
Rigorous Design of Distributed Transactions
In Chapter 3, we have presented a formal approach to modelling and analyzing a dis-
tributed transaction mechanism for a replicated database using Event-B. The abstract
model of transactions is based on the notion of a one-copy database. In the refinement
of the abstract model, we introduced the notion of a replicated database. This formal
approach carries the development of the system from an initial abstract specification of
transactional updates on a one-copy database to a detailed design containing replicated
databases in the refinement. The replica control mechanism considered in the refine-
ment allows both update and read-only transactions to be submitted at any site. In the
case of a commit of the transaction, each site updates its replica separately. An update
transaction commits atomically, updating all copies at commit or none when it aborts.
A read-only transaction may perform read operations on any one replica. The various
events given in the Event-B refinement are triggered within the framework of commit
protocols that ensure global atomicity of update transactions despite transaction fail-
ures. The system allows the sites to abort a transaction independently and keeps the
replicated database in a consistent state. The transaction mechanism on the replicated
database is designed to provide the illusion of atomic update of a one-copy database. By
verifying the refinement, we verify that the design of the replicated database conforms
to the one-copy database abstraction despite transaction failures at a site and preserves
one-copy equivalence consistency criterion. In the further refinement, we also outlined
how these transactions can be processed in the presence of a reliable broadcast.
Implementing Causal Ordering on Messages by Vector Clocks
Capturing the causal precedence relation among the different events occurring in a dis-
tributed system is key to the success of many distributed computations. Vector clocks
have been proposed as a mechanism to capture the causality among the messages and
provides a framework to deliver the messages to the sites in their respective causal order.
In Chapter 4, we have presented Event-B specifications for the global causal ordering
of the messages in a broadcast system. In the specifications we have outlined how an
abstract causal order is constructed on the messages. In the refinement steps, we out-
lined how an abstract causal order can correctly be implemented by a system of vector
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clocks. This is done by replacing the abstract variable corder in the abstract specifi-
cations by vector clock rules in the concrete refinement. Due to refinement checking,
several proof obligations are generated by the B tool. These proof obligations help us
discover the invariants which define the relationship between abstract causal order and
vector clock rules. We have also outlined how the gluing invariants are constructed after
the inspection of the proof obligations. Our model is based on the Birman, Schiper and
Stephenson’s protocol [21] for implementing global causal ordering using vector clocks.
In the refinement, we found that instead of updating the whole vector of a recipient
process as outlined in the original protocol, updating only one value in the vector clock
of a recipient process corresponding to the sender process is sufficient to realize causally
ordered delivery of the message.
Implementing Total Ordering on Messages by Sequence Numbers
In Chapter 5, we outlined an incremental development of a system of total order broad-
cast. A total order broadcast delivers messages to all sites in the same order. The
advantage of processing update transactions over a total order broadcast is that a total
order broadcast delivers updates to all participating sites in the same order. Unneces-
sary aborts of update transactions due to blocking can be avoided using a total order
broadcast which delivers and executes the conflicting operations at all sites in the same
order.
We have outlined the key issues with respect to the total order broadcast algorithms, such
as, how to build a total order on messages and what information is required to deliver
the messages in a total order. The Broadcast Broadcast variant of a fixed sequencer
protocol is used for the development of a system of a total order broadcast. In the
abstract model, we outline how an abstract total order is constructed at the first ever
delivery of a message to any process in the system. All other processes deliver that
message in the abstract total order. We also identify the invariant properties for total
order and add them to the model as primary invariants. We further discover a set of
secondary invariants that are required to discharge the proof obligations generated by
addition of primary invariants to the model. Later in the refinement, we introduce the
notion of sequencer and control messages and show how sequence numbers are generated
by the sequencer. The gluing invariants discovered in the refinement checking relate
the abstract total order with the sequence numbers. Both gluing invariants and proof
obligations provide a clear insight into the system and the reasons why the delivery
based on the sequence numbers preserves a total order on the messages.
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Implementing a Total Causal Order on Messages by Vector Clocks
In chapter 6, we have given the incremental development of a system of total causal order
broadcast. A total causal order broadcast not only preserves the causal precedence
relationship among the messages but also delivers them in a total order. The main
advantage of processing update transactions over a total causal order broadcast is that
the database always remains in a consistent state due to the guarantees of providing
a total order on update messages. Another advantage of this broadcast is that the
causality of the update messages is also preserved.
In this chapter, the Event-B specifications of an execution model of a total causal order
broadcast system are presented. In the abstract model of this broadcast we outlined how
the abstract causal order and a total order on the computation messages are constructed.
In this model, a message is delivered to each process twice, first in a causal order followed
by another delivery in a total order. The second delivery of a computation message in
a total order corresponds to the delivery in a total causal order. In order to verify that
this model satisfies the required ordering properties we add the invariants corresponding
to the causal order and total order to our model as a primary invariants and discharge
the proof obligations generated by the B tool due to the addition of these invariants.
This system is based on a vector clock model and there also exists a specific process
sequencer which sequences the computation messages to implement total ordering on
the messages. In the refinement we outline how both causal and total order can be
implemented using vector clocks.
Liveness Properties and Modelling Guidelines
In Chapter 7, the issue of liveness in a distributed system is addressed. After exploring
the enabledness preservation and non-divergence properties for Event-B development,
we outline how these liveness properties relate to the model of transactions. We also
outlined how the strong variants of the broadcast protocol given in Chapter 4, 5 and 6
can be used to define abstract ordering on the transactions, thus ensuring the delivery of
conflicting operations of update transactions to all participating sites in the same serial
order.
The existing tools currently do not generate proof obligations for ensuring enabledness
preservation and non-divergence. We outlined construction of the proof obligations to
show that the model of transactions is both enabledness preserving and non-divergent.
Lastly, general methodological modelling guidelines for the incremental development of a
distributed system are also presented. We have also presented guidelines for discharging
the proof obligations generated by the B tool.
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8.2 Comparison with other Related Work
Though there exists vast literature on distributed algorithms and protocols covering
several aspects of transactions, group communication and distributed databases, the
application of proof based formal methods for precise definition of problems and ver-
ification of the correctness of their solutions is rare. In this section, we compare our
approach with the other significant work on the application of formal methods.
The input/output(I/O) automaton model [83, 84], developed by Lynch and Tuttle, is a
labelled transition system model for components in asynchronous concurrent systems.
In [41], I/O Automata are used for formal modelling and verification of a sequentially
consistent shared object system in a distributed network. In order to keep the repli-
cated data in a consistent state, a combination of total order multicast and point to
point communication is used. In [40], I/O automata are used to express lazy database
replication. The authors present an algorithm for lazy database replication and prove the
correctness properties relating performance and fault-tolerance. In [42, 104] the speci-
fications for group communication primitives are presented using I/O automata under
different conditions such as partitioning among the group and dynamic view oriented
group communication. The proof method used in this method for reasoning about the
system involves invariant assertions. An invariant assertion is defined as a property of
the state of a system that is true in all execution. A series of invariants relating state
variables and reachable states is proved using the method of induction. The work done
so far using I/O Automata has been carried out by hand [47, 42].
In [12, 11], Z is used to specify formally a transaction decomposition in a database
system. The authors present a mechanism to decompose the transactions to increase
the concurrency without sacrificing the consistency of a database. They introduce the
notion of sematic histories to formulate and prove necessary properties, and reason
about interleaving with other transactions. The authors have used the Z specification
language for expressing various models and all analysis is done by hand. The authors
also highlighted the need for powerful tool support to discharge proof obligations.
In [130], a formal method is proposed to prove the total and causal order of multicast
protocols. The formal results provided in the paper can be used to prove whether an
existing system has the required property or not. Their solutions are based on the
assumption that a total order is built using the service provided by a causal order
protocol. The proof of correctness of the results is done by hand.
Instead of model checking, proving theorems by hand or proving correctness of the trace
behavior, our approach is based on defining properties in the abstract model and proving
that our model of the algorithm is a correct refinement of abstract model. The formal
approach considered in our work is based on Event-B which facilitates incremental devel-
opment of systems. We have used the Click’n’Prove B tool for the proof management.
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This tool generates the proof obligations due to refinement and consistency checking
and helps discharge proof obligations by the use of automatic and interactive provers.
The majority of the proofs are discharged by the automatic prover. However, some
complex proofs require use of the interactive prover. During the process of discharging
proof obligations, new invariants are also discovered. We have outlined the process of
discovering new invariants by the inspection of the proof obligations. The proofs and
the invariants help us to understand the complexity of the problem, providing a clear
insight into the system.
The overall proof statistics for various developments are given below.
Model POs Automatic Interactive % Automatic
POs POs
Model of Transactions 307 191 116 63 %
Causal Order Broadcast 112 71 41 64 %
Total Order Broadcast 106 79 27 75 %
Total Causal Order Broadcast 166 102 64 62 %
Overall 691 443 248 64 %
Table 8.1: Proof Statistics- Overall
Our experience with the case studies presented in this thesis strengthens our belief that
abstraction and refinement are valuable techniques for the modelling and verification of
complex distributed systems.
8.3 Future Work
In this section, we outline the possible extensions to our work presented in this thesis.
1. Replica control mechanisms can broadly be classified as eager or lazy data replica-
tion. In eager database replication, all replicas are updated within the transaction
boundary. The coordination of all sites takes place before a transaction commits
and conflicts among the transactions are also detected before they commit. Eager
database replication comes with a significant cost in the case of a site or com-
munication link failure. An update transaction cannot commit until all sites are
reachable. An alternative solution is lazy replication where the updates are prop-
agated after an update transaction commits. Lazy replication allows the different
copies of the replica to exhibit different values, therefore sacrificing the data con-
sistency for a period of time. The other copies of the replicas at other sites are
progressively updated after committing a transaction. Lazy replication can be
used in situations where the availability of the data is considered critical. We plan
to extend our model such that an update transaction commits by updating the
replica at its coordinating site and the new values are communicated to the other
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sites by a total order broadcast. The sites update the replica when they receive
the update message. This approach is efficient but allows data inconsistencies to
take place. We require rigorous reasoning about this approach to show that the
database is in a consistent state when the reconciliation take place.
2. Our model of distributed transactions is based on the notion of full replication
and the transactions are executed within the framework of the read one and write
all(ROWA) replica control protocol. In this technique, a transaction can read a
local copy but, to update an object, it must update all copies. This technique
is suitable when the transaction workload is predominantly read only. The per-
formance of this mechanism tends to degrade in a system where updates are as
frequent as reads. In a separate study in [60], it is also shown that the interleaving
of more conflicting transactions leads to more abortions due to the timeouts. One
extension to the present work is to use a voting technique [97] instead of ROWA,
where a transaction must write to a majority of the replicas instead of all. The
updates are then propagated to the rest of the replicas. Similarly, a read-only
transaction reads at least enough copies to make sure that one of the copies is up-
to-date. Each copy of replica may have a version number representing the number
of updates it has had. A rigorous reasoning is required to understand, how a voting
technique preserves the data consistency.
3. We also plan to extend the existing model to model explicitly the failure and
recovery of the sites. This requires an extension of the ROWA replica control
mechanism to ROWA-A. ROWA-A ( Read One Write All- Available) allows an
update transaction to commit after updating the replicas at all available sites.
Since we use ordering on messages, upon recovery, a failed site executes all updates
in the order they were received. The commit protocol, based on presumed commit,
is proposed for the commitment of an update transaction. This model of replicated
databases brings higher performance for the updates because updates will not be
blocked at a failed site. The explicit modelling of the coordinator and participating
site failure is required to understand precisely how they restore the data consistency
after the recovery.
4. The work presented in this thesis assumes that the data is fully replicated. Full
replication, however, is not the most efficient strategy for all applications. Many
applications require that the data is replicated at only a few sites. In practice,
many applications may require both data fragmentation and partial replication for
the purpose of efficiency. Also, full replication suffers from storage problems. One
of the extensions of the existing model of replicated data is to allow partial repli-
cation. The communication among the sites must allow the combination of a total
order broadcast and a point-to-point communication. The use of point-to-point
communication reduces the communication overhead caused by the broadcast.
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The work presented in this thesis focusses on processing transactional updates in repli-
cated databases using ordered broadcasts. We believe that the methodology and the
models presented in the thesis may be extended to enhance our understanding of other
related techniques used in replicated databases such as lazy data replication, voting
techniques, failure and recovery of a site, partial replication and fragmentation.
Appendix A
Distributed Transactions
A.1 Abstract Model 
 
MACHINE          Replica1 
 
DEFINITIONS   PartialDB  == ( OBJECT    VALUE ) ; 
                 UPDATE  ==  (PartialDB    PartialDB ) ; 
                      ValidUpdate (update,readset) == ( dom(update)= readset   VALUE 
                                                                                      ran(update)   readset   VALUE )   
SETS             TRANSACTION;  OBJECT; VALUE;   
                           TRANSSTATUS={COMMIT,ABORT,PENDING} 
 
VARIABLES     trans, transstatus, database, transeffect, transobject 
 
INVARIANT             trans   (TRANSACTION) 
              transstatus   trans   TRANSSTATUS 
             database  OBJECT   VALUE 
              transeffect  trans   UPDATE 
             transobject  trans   1 (OBJECT)   
                 	 t.(t trans 
  ValidUpdate (transeffect(t), transobject(t)) )  
 
INITIALISATION      trans :=                              || transstatus :=   
                                 ||  transeffect :=  {}           || transobject :={}  
                                 ||  database :  OBJECT   VALUE                        
EVENTS 
 
StartTran( tt TRANSACTION )    
         ANY       updates , objects            
         WHERE              tt  trans 

 updates  UPDATE   

 objects  1 (OBJECT) 

 ValidUpdate (updates,objects) 
         THEN      trans := trans  {tt}     
           ||   transstatus(tt) := PENDING 
                 ||      transobject(tt) := objects   
           ||  transeffect(tt) := updates 
         END ; 
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CommitWriteTran( tt  TRANSACTION)   
    ANY     pdb                              
         WHERE            tt   trans  

 transstatus(tt) =PENDING  

 ran(transeffect(tt))  {} 

 pdb =  transobject(tt)  database  
        THEN     transstatus(tt) := COMMIT  
           ||     database  := database   transeffect(tt)(pdb) 
       END; 
 
AbortWriteTran( tt   TRANSACTION)   
         WHEN    tt   trans  

 transstatus(tt) = PENDING  

 ran(transeffect(tt))  {} 
   THEN        transstatus(tt) := ABORT 
    END; 
 
val   ReadTran (tt TRANSACTION ) 	   
                 WHEN            tt  trans   


 transstatus(tt) = PENDING  


 ran(transeffect(tt))= {} 
                  THEN             val := transobject(tt)   database     
                ||      transstatus(tt) := COMMIT 
                   END; 
 
 
A.2 First Refinement 
 
 
REFINEMENT     Replica2    
REFINES               Replica1 
 
SETS                     SITE ;  
       SITETRANSSTATUS={commit,abort,precommit,pending} 
 
VARIABLES         trans, transstatus, activetrans, coordinator, sitetransstatus, 
                              transeffect, transobject, freeobject, replica 
 
INVARIANT         activetrans  SITE   trans   
        coordinator   trans   SITE    
                              sitetransstatus  trans   (SITE   SITETRANSSTATUS) 
                              replica  SITE   ( OBJECT   VALUE)  

 freeobject  SITE   OBJECT 

ran(activetrans)   trans  
      
  ( o , s ) . ( o  OBJECT   s  SITE   ( s   o)  freeobject  
 database(o) = replica(s)(o) )  
 
   ( t , o ) . (  t  trans   o  OBJECT  
   (coordinator(t) ﬀ  t) ﬁ  activetrans  ﬂ oﬁ transobject(t)    
        ﬃ  database(o) = replica(coordinator(t))(o) ) 
 
   ( s , t1 , t2) . ( s  ! SITE  "   t1 ! trans "    t2 ! trans 
        "   (s #  t1) $  activetrans   %  (s &  t2) $  activetrans     
                        '  transobject(t1) ( transobject(t2)) *    
        +  t1=t2   )  
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 
  
 ( t , s , o ) . (   t  trans     s  SITE    o  OBJECT  
          transstatus(t)= COMMIT   (s   t)  activetrans                                          
         o   dom(transeffect(t)(transobject(t)  replica(s))) 
                        	  database(o) = transeffect(t)(transobject(t)  replica(s))(o) ) 
 
   
    ( t , s , o ) . (   t  trans     s  SITE    o  OBJECT  
          transstatus(t)= COMMIT   o   transobject(t)    
         (s   t)   activetrans      
                         o   dom(transeffect(t)(transobject(t)  replica(s)))              
                        database(o) = replica(s)(o) 
 
       ( t ) . (  t  trans    transstatus(t)=ABORT                                                    
ﬀ
 sitetransstatus(t)(coordinator(t))= abort ) 
 ﬁ
  ﬂ ( t ) . (  t ﬃ trans     transstatus(t)= COMMIT                                                 
 
 sitetransstatus(t)(coordinator(t))= commit  )    
 
 !
  " ( t , s , o ) . (   t # trans  $   s # SITE  $  o # OBJECT  
        $  transstatus(t)% COMMIT  & (s ' t)(  activetrans     
                         )  o *  transobject(t)  
        +  database(o )= replica(s)(o)  
            
   ,   - ( t ) . (  t . trans  / transstatus(t)0 PENDING       
       1 ran(transeffect(t))0{2}    
                      3   (coordinator(t) 4  t) 5  activetrans 
        
ASSERTIONS  
 
     6 (  t1 , t2) . ( s  7 SITE  8   t1 7 trans 8    t2 7 trans 
         8   ( coordinator( t1 )  9  t1) :  activetrans    
        ;  (coordinator(t1)  <  t2 ) :  activetrans     
                        ;  transobject(t1) = transobject(t2)> ?    
        @  t1=t2   ) 
 A
  B ( t , s , o ) . (   t C trans  D   s C SITE  D  o C OBJECT  
        D  transstatus(t) = ABORT   E (s F t)G  activetrans      
                         H  o I  transobject(t)  
        J  database(o )= replica(s)(o)  
 K
  L ( t , s , o ) . (   t M trans  N   s M SITE  N  o M OBJECT  
        N  transstatus(t) = PENDING  O (s P t)Q  activetrans      
                         R  o S  transobject(t)  
        T  database(o )= replica(s)(o)             
 
INITIALISATION     trans := U      || transstatus := U        || activetrans := U   
                            ||  coordinator  := U   || sitetransstatus  := U      ||  transeffect := {}    
      ||  transobject  := {}   || freeobject  := SITE  V OBJECT 
                                ||   ANY  data  WHERE  data S OBJECT W  VALUE                               
            THEN  replica :=  SITE  V {data}  END 
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StartTran(tt)                                                                                            
    ANY       ss, updates, objects    
    WHERE     ss  SITE  

 tt  trans  

 updates  UPDATE   

 objects  1 (OBJECT) 

 ValidUpdate (updates,objects) 
    THEN         trans := trans  {tt}       
          ||   transstatus(tt) := PENDING   
                           ||    transobject(tt) := objects    
          ||   transeffect(tt) := updates 
                          ||   coordinator(tt) := ss 
                          ||    sitetransstatus(tt)  := {coordinator(tt)   pending} 
    END; 
 
  IssueWriteTran(tt)    
           WHEN      tt  trans   

 (coordinator(tt)   tt)   activetrans   

 sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) = pending 

 ran(transeffect(tt)) {}   

 transobject(tt) 	 freeobject[{coordinator(tt)}] 

 
 tz.(tz  trans  (coordinator(tt)   tz)  activetrans  
                                 transobject(tt)  transobject(tz) =   ) 
    THEN       activetrans := activetrans  {coordinator(tt)  tt} 
                        ||   sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) := precommit 
                      ||   freeobject := freeobject - {coordinator(tt)}  transobject(tt) 
END; 
 
  CommitWriteTran(tt)      
         ANY          pdb        
         WHERE    tt trans   
          

  pdb =  transobject(tt)  replica(coordinator(tt)) 
          

  ran(transeffect(tt)) {}   
          

  (coordinator(tt)   tt)  activetrans 
               

  transstatus(tt) = PENDING  
          

  
s.( s  SITE   sitetransstatus(tt)(s) = precommit ) 
               

  
(s,o)  (s  SITE  o  OBJECT  o transobject(tt)  
             (s   o)  freeobject) 
               

  
s.(s   SITE   (s   tt) activetrans) 
         THEN      transstatus(tt) := COMMIT     
       ||  activetrans := activetrans -{coordinator(tt) tt} 
                     ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)):= commit     
                      ||  freeobject := freeobject  {coordinator(tt)}  transobject(tt) 
                      ||   replica(coordinator(tt))  :=  replica(coordinator(tt))   transeffect(tt)(pdb)  
         END; 
 
  AbortWriteTran(tt)       
          WHEN      tt trans  
       

  ran(transeffect(tt)){}   
       

  (coordinator(tt)   tt)  activetrans 
                     

  transstatus(tt)=PENDING   
       

  s. (s SITE  sitetransstatus(tt)(s)= abort) 
          THEN      transstatus(tt) := ABORT        
        ||  activetrans := activetrans -{coordinator(tt) tt} 
             ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)):= abort 
             ||  freeobject := freeobject  {coordinator(tt)}  transobject(tt) 
          END; 
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val    ReadTran(tt,ss)    
           WHEN      tt trans   
          transstatus(tt)=PENDING   
          transobject(tt)   freeobject[{ss}] 
                        ss = coordinator(tt)  
          ran(transeffect(tt)) = {}    
          THEN       val := transobject(tt)  replica(ss)   
        ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := commit  
                   ||  transstatus(tt):=COMMIT              
           END; 
 
 BeginSubTran(tt,ss) 
    WHEN     tt 	  trans    
         sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) 
 { precommit , abort } 
                    (ss  tt) activetrans    
         ss  coordinator(tt)    
         ran(transeffect(tt)){} 
                    transobject(tt)  freeobject[{ss}]   
         ss  dom(sitetransstatus(tt)) 
                     tz.(tz 	 trans  (ss   tz)	  activetrans  
        transobject(tt)  transobject(tz) =  ) 
THEN         activetrans := activetrans  {ss  tt}               
                       ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := pending 
                 ||  freeobject := freeobject - {ss}  transobject(tt) 
END; 
 
 SiteCommitTx(tt,ss)  
     WHEN     (ss  tt) 	  activetrans    
          sitetransstatus(tt)(ss)= pending 
                       ss  coordinator(tt)     
          ran(transeffect(tt)){}       
       THEN           sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := precommit 
       END; 
 
 SiteAbortTx(tt,ss) 
     WHEN      (ss  tt)
 activetrans  
         sitetransstatus(tt)(ss)= pending 
                     ss  coordinator(tt)    
         ran(transeffect(tt)){}      
    THEN        sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := abort    
                        ||  freeobject := freeobject  {ss} transobject(tt) 
                 ||  activetrans := activetrans -{ss   tt} 
END; 
 
 ExeAbortDecision(ss,tt)  
    WHEN      tt	 trans   
          (ss  tt)	  activetrans     
                    ss  coordinator(tt)  
         ran(transeffect(tt)){} 
 sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) = abort 
 sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) = precommit 
THEN    sitetransstatus(tt)(ss):= abort    
       ||  activetrans := activetrans -{ss   tt} 
               ||  freeobject := freeobject  {ss}  transobject(tt) 
    END; 
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ExeCommitDecision(ss,tt)     
         ANY             pdb      
  WHERE        tt   trans    

 (ss  tt)  activetrans    

 ss  coordinator(tt)  

 ran(transeffect(tt))  {} 

 pdb =  transobject(tt)  replica(ss)   

 sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) = commit 

 sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) = precommit 
  THEN            activetrans := activetrans -{ss   tt}      
      ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := commit 
               ||  freeobject := freeobject  {ss}  transobject(tt) 
                      ||  replica(ss)  :=  replica(ss) 	  transeffect(tt)(pdb)  
END; 
 
 
 
A.3  Second Refinement 
 
 
REFINEMENT     Replica3   
REFINES               Replica2 
 
VARIABLES         trans, transstatus, activetrans, coordinator, sitetransstatus, 
                              transeffect, transobject, freeobject, replica 
INVARIANT     
     
 ( t , s , o ) . (   t  trans     s  SITE    o  OBJECT   o   transobject(t)   
          sitetransstatus(t)(s) =  precommit      
                        s   o  freeobject  ) 
 
   ( t , s , o ) . (   t  trans     s  SITE    sitetransstatus(t)(s)= precommit   
                        s   t  activetrans) 
 
   ﬀ   ﬁ ( t , s , o ) . (   t ﬂ trans  ﬃ   s ﬂ SITE   ﬃ  o ﬂ OBJECT   o    transobject(t)  
                      !   s "  t # activetrans 
                                             $  s %  o & freeobject  )     
 
INITIALISATION     trans := '      || transstatus := '        || activetrans := '   
                            ||  coordinator  := '   || sitetransstatus  := '      ||  transeffect := {}    
      ||  transobject  := {}   || freeobject  := SITE  ( OBJECT 
                            ||    ANY  data  WHERE  data ) OBJECT *  VALUE                               
       THEN  replica :=  SITE  ( {data}  END 
StartTran(tt) +                                                                                          
    ANY      ss, updates, objects    
    WHERE    ss , SITE  
-
 tt . trans  
-
 updates , UPDATE   
-
 objects , /1 (OBJECT) 
-
 ValidUpdate (updates,objects) 
    THEN        trans := trans 0 {tt}       
        ||   transstatus(tt) := PENDING   
                         ||    transobject(tt) := objects    
        ||   transeffect(tt) := updates 
                        ||   coordinator(tt) := ss 
                       ||    sitetransstatus(tt)  := {coordinator(tt) 1  pending} 
    END; 
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  IssueWriteTran(tt)    
          WHEN     tt  trans   

 (coordinator(tt)   tt)   activetrans   

 sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) = pending 

 ran(transeffect(tt)) {}   

 transobject(tt)  freeobject[{coordinator(tt)}] 

  tz.(tz  trans 	 (coordinator(tt)   tz)
  activetrans  
                              transobject(tt)  transobject(tz) =   ) 
   THEN      activetrans := activetrans  {coordinator(tt)  tt} 
                   ||   sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) := precommit 
           ||  freeobject := freeobject - {coordinator(tt)}  transobject(tt) 
  END; 
 
  CommitWriteTran(tt)      
        ANY          pdb        
        WHERE    tt trans   
         

  pdb =  transobject(tt)  replica(coordinator(tt)) 
         

  ran(transeffect(tt)) {}   
         

  (coordinator(tt)   tt)  activetrans 
              

  transstatus(tt) = PENDING  
         

  s.( s  SITE   sitetransstatus(tt)(s) = precommit ) 
        THEN      transstatus(tt) := COMMIT     
      ||  activetrans := activetrans -{coordinator(tt) tt} 
                    ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)):= commit     
                    ||  freeobject := freeobject  {coordinator(tt)}  transobject(tt) 
                    ||   replica(coordinator(tt))  :=  replica(coordinator(tt))   transeffect(tt)(pdb)  
        END; 
 
 
  AbortWriteTran(tt)       
        WHEN       tt trans  
      

  ran(transeffect(tt)){}   
      

  (coordinator(tt)   tt)  activetrans 
                    

  transstatus(tt)=PENDING   
      

  s. (s SITE  sitetransstatus(tt)(s)= abort) 
        THEN        transstatus(tt) := ABORT        
       ||  activetrans := activetrans -{coordinator(tt) tt} 
            ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)):= abort 
            ||  freeobject := freeobject  {coordinator(tt)}  transobject(tt) 
        END; 
 
 val   ReadTran(tt,ss)    
         WHEN          tt trans   
        transstatus(tt)=PENDING   
        transobject(tt)   freeobject[{ss}] 
                      ss = coordinator(tt)  
        ran(transeffect(tt)) = {}    
        THEN       val := transobject(tt)  replica(ss)   
      ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := commit  
                             ||   transstatus(tt):=COMMIT              
         END; 
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BeginSubTran(tt,ss)  
  WHEN                 tt   trans    
        sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt))  { precommit , abort } 
                   (ss  tt) activetrans    
        ss  coordinator(tt)    
        ran(transeffect(tt)){} 
                   transobject(tt)  freeobject[{ss}]   
        ss 	 dom(sitetransstatus(tt)) 
                   
 tz.(tz  trans  (ss   tz)  activetrans  
           transobject(tt)  transobject(tz) = ) 
THEN          activetrans := activetrans  {ss  tt}               
                      ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := pending 
                ||  freeobject := freeobject - {ss}  transobject(tt) 
END; 
 
 SiteCommitTx(tt,ss)   
   WHEN          (ss  tt)   activetrans    
         sitetransstatus(tt)(ss)= pending 
                      ss  coordinator(tt)     
         ran(transeffect(tt)){}      
     THEN             sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := precommit 
     END; 
 
 SiteAbortTx(tt,ss)  
   WHEN           (ss  tt) activetrans  
        sitetransstatus(tt)(ss)= pending 
                    ss  coordinator(tt)    
        ran(transeffect(tt)){}     
  THEN             sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := abort    
                       ||  freeobject := freeobject  {ss} transobject(tt) 
                ||  activetrans := activetrans -{ss   tt} 
END; 
 
 ExeAbortDecision(ss,tt)   
  WHEN       tt trans   
         (ss  tt)  activetrans    
                   ss  coordinator(tt)  
        ran(transeffect(tt)){} 
 sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) = abort 
 sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) = precommit 
THEN          sitetransstatus(tt)(ss):= abort    
      ||  activetrans := activetrans -{ss   tt} 
              ||  freeobject := freeobject  {ss}  transobject(tt) 
END; 
 
 ExeCommitDecision(ss,tt)     
         ANY              pdb      
  WHERE         tt   trans    
 (ss  tt)  activetrans    
 ss  coordinator(tt)  
 ran(transeffect(tt))  {} 
 pdb =  transobject(tt)  replica(ss)   
 sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) = commit 
 sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) = precommit 
  THEN             activetrans := activetrans -{ss   tt}      
       ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := commit 
                ||  freeobject := freeobject  {ss}  transobject(tt) 
                       ||  replica(ss)  :=  replica(ss)   transeffect(tt)(pdb)  
END; 
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A .4   Third Refinement  
 
REFINEMENT     Replica4   
 
REFINES               Replica3 
 
SETS                     MESSAGE 
 
VARIABLES         trans, transstatus, activetrans, coordinator, sitetransstatus, 
                              transeffect, transobject, freeobject, replica,sender,deliver, 
       update,voteabort,votecommit,globalabort,globalcommit, 
       tranupdate,transvoteabort,tranvotecommit,tranglobalabort, 
       tranglobalcommit,completed 
 
INVARIANT         sender   MESSAGE   SITE    deliver  SITE   MESSAGE 
        update   MESSAGE      update    dom(sender) 
        voteabort    MESSAGE     voteabort    dom(sender) 
   votecommit    MESSAGE     votecommit    dom(sender) 
   globalabort    MESSAGE      globalabort    dom(sender) 
   globalcommit    MESSAGE     globalcommit    dom(sender) 
   tranupdate  update   trans  
         tranvoteabort   voteabort  	  trans 
   tranvotecommit   votecommit  	  trans 
   tranglobalabort   globalabort    trans 
   tranglobalcommit    globacommit    trans 
 completed  trans  
  SITE 

   ( t , s , m ) . (   t  trans     s  SITE    m  update   (m   t)  tranupdate    
          (s   m)  deliver   s  dom(sitetranstatus(t))   s  coordinator(t)                      
           sitetranstatus(t)(coordinator(t))  { precommit,abort}    
 
INITIALISATION     trans :=       || transstatus :=           || activetrans :=    
                            ||  coordinator  :=    || sitetransstatus  :=       ||  transeffect :=    
      ||  transobject  := {}   || freeobject  := SITE   OBJECT 
                            ||    ANY  data  WHERE  data  OBJECT   VALUE                               
       THEN  replica :=  SITE   {data}  END 
      ||  update  :=      || voteabort  :=          ||  votecommit :=     
       ||  globalabort  :=   || globalcommit  :=        ||  tranupdate :=      
      ||  tranvoteabort  :=   || tranvotecommit :=       ||  tranglobalabort :=      
      ||  tranglobalcommit :=      
 
EVENTS  
 
StartTran(tt) ﬀ                                                                                          
    ANY       ss, updates, objects    
    WHERE     ss  SITE  
ﬁ
  tt ﬂ trans  
ﬁ
 updates  UPDATE   
ﬁ
 objects  ﬃ1 (OBJECT) 
ﬁ
 ValidUpdate (updates,objects) 
    THEN        trans := trans  {tt}       
        ||   transstatus(tt) := PENDING   
                         ||    transobject(tt) := objects    
        ||   transeffect(tt) := updates 
                        ||  coordinator(tt) := ss 
                       ||    sitetransstatus(tt)  := {coordinator(tt)   pending} 
    END; 
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  SendUpdate(ss   SITE , mm   MESSAGE ,tt  TRANSACTION)                                                                        
    WHEN      mm  dom(sender)   
                tt   trans  
 sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) = pending    
    ss = coordinator(tt) 
  tt  ran(tranupdate) 
  ran(transeffect(tt)   {} 
    THEN       sender := sender    {mm   ss}     
       ||    update := update    {mm} 
                        ||    transupdate := transupdate    {mm   tt}     
    END; 
 
  Deliver(ss  SITE , mm  MESSAGE) 	  
           WHEN     mm  dom(sender)   
  
  (ss   mm)   deliver    
    THEN      deliver := deliver  {ss   mm}                   
              END; 
 
  IssueWriteTran(tt TRANSACTION )   
    ANY     mm  
          WHERE  mm  update 

   tt  trans   

 (mm    tt)  tranupdate 
   
  (coordinator(tt)   mm)   deliver   
   
  (coordinator(tt)   tt)   activetrans   
   
  sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt))= pending 

  ran(transeffect(tt)) {}   
   
  transobject(tt)  freeobject[{coordinator(tt)}] 

   tz.(tz  trans  (coordinator(tt)   tz)  activetrans  
                            transobject(tt)  transobject(tz) = ﬀ  ) 
    THEN     activetrans := activetrans ﬁ {coordinator(tt)  tt} 
                    ||   sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)):= precommit 
                  ||   freeobject := freeobject - {coordinator(tt)} ﬂ transobject(tt) 
END; 
 
  AbortWriteTran(tt) ﬃ     
         ANY    m1,m2  
    WHERE   m1  voteabort    m1  tt  tranvoteabort    
       

  coordinator(tt)   m1    deliver 

 m2   MESSAGE  m2 ! dom(sender) 
       "   tt  trans  
       #  ran(transeffect(tt))${%}   
       #  (coordinator(tt) &  tt)   activetrans 
                     #  transstatus(tt)=PENDING   
       #  's. (s  SITE # sitetransstatus(tt)(s)= abort) 
          THEN      transstatus(tt) := ABORT        
        ||  activetrans := activetrans -{coordinator(tt)& tt} 
             ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)):= abort 
             ||  freeobject := freeobject ( {coordinator(tt)} ) transobject(tt) 
       ||  globalabort  := globalabort  ( {m2) 
       ||  tranglobalabort  := tranglobalabort  ( {m2& tt} 
       ||  sender  := sender  ( {m2 &  coordinator(tt)} 
                                    ||  completed  := completed  ( {tt &  coordinator(tt)} 
                           END; 
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 CommitWriteTran(tt)      
ANY          pdb ,mm      
         WHERE    mm  MESSAGE    mm  dom(sender) 
         tt trans   
            pdb =  transobject(tt)  replica(coordinator(tt)) 
            ran(transeffect(tt)) {}   
            (coordinator(tt)   tt)  activetrans 
                 transstatus(tt) = PENDING  
            	s.( s  SITE 
  sitetransstatus(tt)(s) = precommit ) 
 	m.( m  votecommit    m   tt  tranvotecommit  
                                                           coordinator(tt)   m   deliver ) 
            THEN      transstatus(tt) := COMMIT     
       ||  activetrans := activetrans -{coordinator(tt) tt} 
                     ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)):= commit     
                     ||  freeobject := freeobject  {coordinator(tt)}  transobject(tt) 
                        || replica(coordinator(tt))  :=  replica(coordinator(tt))   transeffect(tt)(pdb)  
       ||  globalcommit  := globalcommit  {mm) 
       ||  tranglobalcommit  := tranglobalcommit   {mm tt} 
       ||  sender  := sender   {mm   coordinator(tt)} 
       ||  completed  := completed   {tt   coordinator(tt)} 
 
         END;   
 
  val   ReadTran(tt,ss)    
          WHEN          tt trans   
         transstatus(tt)=PENDING   
         transobject(tt)   freeobject[{ss}] 
                       ss = coordinator(tt)  
         ran(transeffect(tt)) = {}    
         THEN       val := transobject(tt) ﬀ  replica(ss)   
       ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := commit  
                  ||  transstatus(tt):=COMMIT       
          ||  completed  := completed  ﬁ {tt ﬂ  ss}    
          END; 
 
 BeginSubTran ( tt TRANSACTION ,ss SITE)ﬃ 
    ANY     mm  
          WHERE  mm  update 

  tt   trans   
 (mm  !  tt)   tranupdate 
       

  (ss !  mm)    deliver  
"
 (ss!  tt)# activetrans    
"
 ss $ dom(sitetransstatus(tt)) 
      
"
  ss % coordinator(tt)    
      
"
  ran(transeffect(tt))%{&} 
                 
"
  transobject(tt) ' freeobject[{ss}]       
                 
"
  ( tz.(tz   trans " (ss !  tz)   activetrans  
                                        )  transobject(tt) * transobject(tz) = & ) 
   THEN          activetrans := activetrans + {ss!  tt}               
                      ||   sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := pending 
                  ||  freeobject := freeobject - {ss} , transobject(tt) 
END; 
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SiteCommitTx(tt TRANSACTION,ss SITE)  
  ANY      mm  
        WHERE   mm  MESSAGE 

mm  dom(sender) 

  tt  trans 
            

   (ss  tt)   activetrans    
        sitetransstatus(tt)(ss)= pending 
                     ss  coordinator(tt)     
        ran(transeffect(tt)){}        
    THEN           sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := precommit 
                       || votecommit := votecommit 	 {mm} 
      || tranvotecommit := tranvotecommit 	 {mm   tt } 
      || sender := sender  	 {mm   ss } 
    END; 
 
SiteAbortTx(tt TRANSACTION,ss SITE) 
  ANY      mm  
        WHERE   mm  MESSAGE 

mm  dom(sender) 

  tt  trans 
            
    (ss  tt) activetrans  
       sitetransstatus(tt)(ss)= pending 
                   ss  coordinator(tt)    
       ran(transeffect(tt)){}   
 THEN             sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := abort    
                      ||  freeobject := freeobject  {ss} transobject(tt) 
                 ||  activetrans := activetrans -{ss   tt} 
      || voteabort := voteabort  {mm} 
      || tranvoteabort := tranvoteabort  {mm   tt } 
     || sender := sender   {mm   ss } 
   || completed := completed   {tt   ss } 
 END; 
 
 ExeAbortDecision(ss,tt)  
  ANY      mm  
        WHERE   mm  globalabort  
   tt  trans   
 (mm    tt)  tranglobalabort 
  (ss    mm)   deliver      
        (ss  tt)  activetrans     
                  ss  coordinator(tt)  
       ran(transeffect(tt)){} 
 sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) = abort 
 sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) = precommit 
     THEN          sitetransstatus(tt)(ss):= abort    
     ||  activetrans := activetrans -{ss   tt} 
             ||  freeobject := freeobject  {ss} ﬀ transobject(tt) 
   || completed := completed   {tt   ss } 
  END; 
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ExeCommitDecision(ss,tt)     
         ANY             pdb , mm      
  WHERE        tt   trans 
         mm  globalcommit 
 (mm    tt)  tranglobalcommit 
  (ss    mm)   deliver    

 (ss  tt)  activetrans    

 ss  coordinator(tt)  

 ran(transeffect(tt))  {} 

 pdb =  transobject(tt)  replica(ss)   

 sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) = commit 

 sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) = precommit 
  THEN            activetrans := activetrans -{ss   tt}      
      ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := commit 
               ||  freeobject := freeobject  {ss} 	 transobject(tt) 
                      ||  replica(ss)  :=  replica(ss) 
  transeffect(tt)(pdb)  
   || completed := completed   {tt   ss } 
 
END; 
 
 
 
 
 
A.5  Fourth Refinement  
 
 
REFINEMENT     Replica5   
 
REFINES               Replica4 
 
SETS                     MESSAGE 
 
VARIABLES         trans, transstatus, activetrans, coordinator, sitetransstatus, 
                              transeffect, transobject, freeobject, replica,sender,deliver, 
       update,voteabort,votecommit,globalabort,globalcommit, 
       tranupdate,transvoteabort,tranvotecommit,tranglobalabort, 
       tranglobalcommit,completed 
       oksite,faiedlsite 
 
INVARIANT         sender  MESSAGE   SITE    deliver  SITE   MESSAGE 
        update   MESSAGE      update    dom(sender) 
        voteabort    MESSAGE     voteabort    dom(sender) 
   votecommit    MESSAGE     votecommit    dom(sender) 
   globalabort    MESSAGE      globalabort    dom(sender) 
   globalcommit    MESSAGE     globalcommit    dom(sender) 
   tranupdate  update   trans  
         tranvoteabort   voteabort    trans 
   tranvotecommit   votecommit    trans 
   tranglobalabort   globalabort    trans 
   tranglobalcommit    globacommit    trans 
 completed  trans    SITE 
        oksite    SITE 
         failedsite    SITE 
   oksite   failedsite =   
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INITIALISATION     trans :=        || transstatus :=            || activetrans :=     
                            ||  coordinator  :=     || sitetransstatus  :=        ||  transeffect :=     
      ||  transobject  :=      || freeobject  := SITE   OBJECT  
                            ||    ANY  data  WHERE  data  OBJECT   VALUE                               
       THEN  replica :=  SITE   {data}  END 
      ||  update  :=       || voteabort  :=           ||  votecommit :=      
       ||  globalabort  :=    || globalcommit  :=         ||  tranupdate :=       
      ||  tranvoteabort  :=    || tranvotecommit :=        ||  tranglobalabort :=       
      ||  tranglobalcommit :=       
      ||  oksite := SITE     || failedsite :=    
EVENTS  
   
  SiteFailure(ss  SITE)                                                                                           
   WHEN       ss  oksite 
   THEN    failedsite := failedsite   {ss}    
       ||  oksite := oksite  - {ss}    
   END; 
 
StartTran(tt)                                                                                           
    ANY       ss, updates, objects    
    WHERE     ss  SITE  

  tt  trans  

 updates  UPDATE   

 objects  	1 (OBJECT) 

 ValidUpdate (updates,objects) 

 ss  oksite 
    THEN        trans := trans  {tt}       
          ||   transstatus(tt) := PENDING   
                           ||    transobject(tt) := objects    
          ||   transeffect(tt) := updates 
                          ||  coordinator(tt) := ss 
                         ||    sitetransstatus(tt)  := {coordinator(tt) 
  pending} 
    END; 
 
  SendUpdate(ss  SITE , mm  MESSAGE ,tt TRANSACTION)                                                                         
    WHEN      mm  dom(sender)   
          tt  trans  
 sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) = pending    
  

 ss = coordinator(tt) 

 tt  ran(tranupdate) 

 ran(transeffect(tt)   {} 
        coordinator(tt)   oksite 
    THEN       sender := sender    {mm   ss}     
       ||    update := update    {mm} 
                        ||    transupdate := transupdate    {mm   tt}     
    END; 
 
 
  Deliver(ss  SITE , mm  MESSAGE)   
           WHEN     mm  dom(sender)   
    (ss   mm)   deliver   
         ss    oksite 
    THEN     deliver := deliver  {ss   mm}                   
              END; 
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IssueWriteTran(tt  TRANSACTION )   
    ANY     mm  
          WHERE  mm   update 

  tt   trans   
 (mm    tt)   tranupdate 
  

  (coordinator(tt)   mm)    deliver   
   

 (coordinator(tt)   tt)   activetrans   
   

 sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt))= pending 
   

 ran(transeffect(tt)) {}   
   

 transobject(tt)  freeobject[{coordinator(tt)}] 
     	 tz.(tz 
 trans  (coordinator(tt)   tz)  activetrans  
                              transobject(tt)  transobject(tz) =   ) 

 coordinator(tt)   oksite 
    THEN      activetrans := activetrans  {coordinator(tt)  tt} 
                    ||   sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)):= precommit 
                  ||   freeobject := freeobject - {coordinator(tt)}  transobject(tt) 
END; 
 
  AbortWriteTran(tt)      
         ANY    m1,m2  
    WHERE   m1  voteabort    m1  tt  tranvoteabort    
          coordinator(tt)   m1    deliver 

 m2 ﬀ MESSAGE  m2 ﬁ dom(sender) 
       ﬂ   ttﬀ trans  
       ﬃ  ran(transeffect(tt)){ }   
       ﬃ  (coordinator(tt) !  tt) ﬀ activetrans 
                     ﬃ  transstatus(tt)=PENDING   
ﬂ   "s. (sﬀ SITE ﬃ sitetransstatus(tt)(s)= abort) 

 coordinator(tt) #  oksite 
   THEN        transstatus(tt) := ABORT        
        ||  activetrans := activetrans -{coordinator(tt)$ tt} 
             ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)):= abort 
             ||  freeobject := freeobject % {coordinator(tt)} & transobject(tt) 
       ||  globalabort  := globalabort  % {m2) 
       ||  tranglobalabort  := tranglobalabort  % {m2$ tt} 
       ||  sender  := sender  % {m2 $  coordinator(tt)} 
      ||  completed  := completed  % {tt $  coordinator(tt)} 
    END; 
 
  CommitWriteTran(tt) '    
         ANY          pdb ,mm      
         WHERE    mm ( MESSAGE  )  mm * dom(sender) 
       )  tt( trans   
          +  pdb =  transobject(tt) , replica(coordinator(tt)) 
          +  ran(transeffect(tt)) -{.}   
          +  (coordinator(tt) $  tt) ( activetrans 
               +  transstatus(tt) = PENDING  
          +  /s.( s ( SITE 0  sitetransstatus(tt)(s) = precommit ) 
) /m.( m ( votecommit 1   m 2  tt 3 tranvotecommit  
                                                         4  coordinator(tt) 2  m 3  deliver ) 
       5 coordinator(tt) 6  oksite 
            THEN     transstatus(tt) := COMMIT     
      ||  activetrans := activetrans -{coordinator(tt) 7tt} 
                    ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)):= commit     
                     ||  freeobject := freeobject 8 {coordinator(tt)} 9 transobject(tt)                  
      ||   replica(coordinator(tt))  :=  replica(coordinator(tt)) :  transeffect(tt)(pdb) 
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      ||  globalcommit  := globalcommit   {mm) 
      ||  tranglobalcommit  := tranglobalcommit    {mm tt} 
      ||  sender  := sender    {mm   coordinator(tt)} 
      ||  completed  := completed    {tt   coordinator(tt)} 
         END; 
 
 val   ReadTran(tt,ss)    
           WHEN      tt trans   
         transstatus(tt)=PENDING   
         transobject(tt)   freeobject[{ss}] 
                       ss = coordinator(tt)  

   ran(transeffect(tt)) = {	}   
       coordinator(tt) 
  oksite  
         THEN     val := transobject(tt)  replica(ss)   
       ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := commit  
                  ||  transstatus(tt):=COMMIT       
          ||  completed  := completed   {tt   ss}    
           END; 
 
 BeginSubTran ( tt
 TRANSACTION ,ss
 SITE) 
  ANY     mm  
        WHERE  mm 
 update 

  tt 
 trans   
 (mm    tt) 
 tranupdate 
     

  (ss   mm) 
  deliver  
 (ss  tt) activetrans    
 ss  dom(sitetransstatus(tt)) 
      ss  coordinator(tt)    
      ran(transeffect(tt)){	} 
                 transobject(tt)  freeobject[{ss}]       
                  tz.(tz 
 trans  (ss   tz)
  activetrans  
                                          transobject(tt)  transobject(tz) = 	 ) 
     ss  
  oksite 
 THEN          activetrans := activetrans  {ss  tt}               
                    ||   sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := pending 
                ||  freeobject := freeobject - {ss}  transobject(tt) 
END; 
 
 SiteCommitTx(ttTRANSACTION,ssSITE)  
  ANY     mm  
        WHERE  mm  MESSAGE 

mm ﬀ dom(sender) 

  tt  trans 
           

   (ssﬁ  tt)   activetrans    
     ﬂ  sitetransstatus(tt)(ss)= pending 
                  ﬂ  ss ﬃ coordinator(tt)     
ﬂ ran(transeffect(tt))ﬃ{} 

  ss    oksite 
 THEN          sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := precommit 
                      || votecommit := votecommit   {mm} 
     || tranvotecommit := tranvotecommit   {mm ﬁ  tt } 
     || sender := sender    {mm ﬁ  ss } 
    END; 
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 SiteAbortTx(tt TRANSACTION,ss SITE) 
  ANY     mm  
        WHERE  mm  MESSAGE 
 mm  dom(sender) 

  tt  trans 
               (ss  tt) activetrans  
      sitetransstatus(tt)(ss)= pending 
                  ss 	 coordinator(tt)    
 ran(transeffect(tt))	{
} 
         ss    oksite 
 THEN           sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := abort    
                     ||  freeobject := freeobject  {ss} transobject(tt) 
                ||  activetrans := activetrans -{ss   tt} 
     || voteabort := voteabort  {mm} 
     || tranvoteabort := tranvoteabort  {mm   tt } 
    || sender := sender   {mm   ss } 
  || completed := completed   {tt   ss } 
 END; 
 ExeAbortDecision(ss,tt)  
  ANY      mm  
        WHERE   mm  globalabort  
   tt  trans   
 (mm    tt)  tranglobalabort 
  (ss    mm)   deliver      
        (ss  tt)  activetrans     
                  ss  coordinator(tt)  
       ran(transeffect(tt)){} 
 sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) = abort 
 sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) = precommit 
   ss    oksite 
THEN         sitetransstatus(tt)(ss):= abort    
     ||  activetrans := activetrans -{ss   tt} 
             ||  freeobject := freeobject  {ss}  transobject(tt) 
   || completed := completed   {tt   ss } 
END; 
 ExeCommitDecision(ss,tt)    
         ANY             pdb , mm      
  WHERE        tt   trans 
         mm  globalcommit 
 (mm    tt)  tranglobalcommit 
  (ss    mm)   deliver    
 (ss  tt)  activetrans    
 ss  coordinator(tt)  
 ran(transeffect(tt))  {} 
 pdb =  transobject(tt)  replica(ss)   
 sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)) = commit 
 sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) = precommit 
 ss   oksite 
  THEN            activetrans := activetrans -{ss   tt}      
      ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(ss) := commit 
               ||  freeobject := freeobject  {ss}  transobject(tt) 
                      ||  replica(ss)  :=  replica(ss)   transeffect(tt)(pdb)  
   || completed := completed   {tt   ss } 
END; 
Appendix B
TimeOut
TimeOut( tt   TRANSACTION)          /*  Abstract Model */ 
         WHEN    tt   trans  

 transstatus(tt) = PENDING  

 ran(transeffect(tt))  {} 
   THEN        transstatus(tt) := ABORT 
    END; 
 
 
TimeOut(tt   TRANSACTION)        /*  First Refinement */ 
 
          WHEN      tt  trans  
       

  ran(transeffect(tt)){}   
       

  (coordinator(tt)   tt)   activetrans 
                     

  transstatus(tt)=PENDING   
     THEN      transstatus(tt) := ABORT        
        ||  activetrans := activetrans -{coordinator(tt) tt} 
             ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)):= abort 
             ||  freeobject := freeobject  {coordinator(tt)}  transobject(tt) 
          END; 
 
TimeOut(tt   TRANSACTION)        /* Second Refinement */ 
 
          WHEN      tt  trans  
       

  ran(transeffect(tt)){}   
       

  (coordinator(tt)   tt)   activetrans 
                     

  transstatus(tt)=PENDING   
     THEN      transstatus(tt) := ABORT        
        ||  activetrans := activetrans -{coordinator(tt) tt} 
             ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)):= abort 
             ||  freeobject := freeobject  {coordinator(tt)}  transobject(tt) 
          END; 
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TimeOut(tt   TRANSACTION)       /* Third Refinement */ 
 
        ANY   mm 
   WHERE  mm  MESSAGE   mm  dom(sender) 
               tt trans  
        ran(transeffect(tt)){}   
        (coordinator(tt)   tt)  activetrans 
                      transstatus(tt)=PENDING   
   THEN         transstatus(tt) := ABORT        
       ||  activetrans := activetrans -{coordinator(tt) tt} 
            ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)):= abort 
            ||  freeobject := freeobject 	 {coordinator(tt)} 
 transobject(tt) 
      || globalabort := globalabort  	 {mm} 
      || tranglobalabort  := tranglobalabort 	 {mm   tt } 
     || sender := sender  	 {mm   coordinator(tt) } 
      || completed := completed  	 {tt   coordinator(tt) } 
        END; 
 
TimeOut(tt   TRANSACTION)       /* Fourth Refinement */ 
        ANY   mm 
   WHERE  mm  MESSAGE   mm  dom(sender) 
               tt trans  
        ran(transeffect(tt)){}   
        (coordinator(tt)   tt)  activetrans 
                      transstatus(tt)=PENDING   
       coordinator(tt)   oksite 
        THEN         transstatus(tt) := ABORT        
       ||  activetrans := activetrans -{coordinator(tt) tt} 
            ||  sitetransstatus(tt)(coordinator(tt)):= abort 
            ||  freeobject := freeobject 	 {coordinator(tt)} 
 transobject(tt) 
      || globalabort := globalabort  	 {mm} 
      || tranglobalabort  := tranglobalabort 	 {mm   tt } 
     || sender := sender  	 {mm   coordinator(tt) } 
      || completed := completed  	 {tt   coordinator(tt) } 
        END; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        . 
 
 
Appendix C
Causal Order Broadcast
C.1  Abstract Model 
 
 
 
MACHINE           C11 
SETS                         PROCESS; MESSAGE 
VARIABLES          sender , cdeliver 
INVARIANT         
         sender    MESSAGE   PROCESS    
               cdeliver   PROCESS   MESSAGE 
              ran(cdeliver)   dom(sender) 
    
INITIALISATION  sender :=   ||  cdeliver :=   
 
EVENTS 
 Broadcast ( pp   PROCESS , mm   MESSAGE )        
                   WHEN  mm  dom(sender) 
                   THEN sender := sender  {mm 	  pp} 
                                                      ||  cdeliver := cdeliver  {pp 	  mm} 
              END; 
 
Deliver ( pp   PROCESS , mm   MESSAGE )   
        WHEN  mm   dom(sender)   
             (pp 	  mm)  cdeliver   
                    THEN      cdeliver := cdeliver  {pp 	  mm} 
                    END ; 
END 
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C.2  First Refinement 
 
    REFINEMENT     C22 
REFINES    C11 
VARIABLES           sender, cdeliver, corder, delorder 
INVARIANT            
    corder   MESSAGE   MESSAGE 

  delorder    PROCESS   (MESSAGE   MESSAGE)   
      

  dom(corder)    dom(sender) 
                        

  ran(corder)      dom(sender) 

  ran(cdeliver)    dom(sender 
 
     (m1,m2,p) . ( m1  MESSAGE   m2 	 MESSAGE   p 	 PROCESS 


 (m1   m2)   corder  (p m2)   cdeliver           
                            (m1   m2)   delorder(p)          
  
 (m1,m2,m3) . ( m1  MESSAGE   m2  MESSAGE   m3  MESSAGE 

 (m1   m2)   corder  (m2 m3)   corder      
                            (m1   m3)   corder 
  
 (m1,m2,p) . ( m1 ﬀ MESSAGE ﬁ  m2 ﬂ MESSAGE ﬁ  p ﬂ PROCESS 
   ﬃ  (m1m2)   corder ! m2   sender -1 [{p}]                
"
 ( m1  sender -1 [{p}] #   m1   cdeliver[{p}] )       
 
$ %
 (m1,m2,p) . ( m1 & MESSAGE '  m2 ( MESSAGE '  p ( PROCESS 
'   (m1)m2) * corder + (p )m2) * cdeliver                          
  ,  (p )m1) *  cdeliver    
 
- .
 (m1,m2,p) . ( m1 / MESSAGE 0  m2 / MESSAGE 0  p / PROCESS 
0   (m11m2) 2 corder   3    m22 sender -1 [{p}] 
4
 m12 sender -1 [{p}] 5  m22  cdeliver[{p}] 
 
6
  7 (m1,m2,p) 8 ( m1 9 MESSAGE : m2 9 MESSAGE : p9PROCESS 
                             ;  (m1<m2) 9 corder  : m2 9  (sender-1[{p}] =  cdeliver[{p}]) 
                                               >  m1 9 (sender-1[{p}] =  cdeliver[{p}] )                                             
 
    INITIALISATION      sender := ?        ||   cdeliver := ?   
                             ||  corder := ?        ||  delorder := ? 
 
    EVENTS 
 
    Broadcast (pp @ PROCESS , mm @ MESSAGE ) A   
       WHEN    mm B dom(sender) 
                    THEN  corder := corder C ( (sender -1[{pp}] D {mm})   
                         C ( cdeliver [{pp}] D {mm})) 
                                  ||   sender := sender C {mm E  pp}   
                                               ||    cdeliver := cdeliver C {pp E  mm} 
                                                   ||    delorder(pp) := delorder(pp)  C ( cdeliver [{pp}] D {mm}) 
                 END; 
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Deliver (pp   PROCESS , mm   MESSAGE)     
       WHEN  mm   dom(sender) 
                      (pp   mm)  cdeliver                
                         

m.( m    MESSAGE   (m   mm)   corder   
                                                                         (pp   m)    cdeliver) 
            THEN  cdeliver :=  cdeliver  {pp   mm} 
                           ||  delorder(pp) := delorder(pp)   ( cdeliver [{pp}]  {mm}) 
            END  
 
 
C.3  Second  Refinement 
 
    REFINEMENT     C33 
REFINES    C22 
VARIABLES           VTP, VTM, sender, cdeliver, 
     INVARIANT     
VTP    PROCESS 	 (PROCESS   	 
 )  

   VTM    MESSAGE 	 (PROCESS   	 
 )  
 
 
 (m,p1,p2) . ( m  MESSAGE   p1  PROCESS   p2  PROCESS 
            m  dom(sender)  VTP(p1)(p2)   VTM(m)(p2)    
            (p1   m)  cdeliver                         
                  
 
 (m1,m2,p) . ( m1  MESSAGE   m2  MESSAGE   p  PROCESS  
            (m1 ﬀ  m2) ﬁ corder             
          ﬂ  VTM (m1)(p) ﬃ VTM(m2)(p)                
  
 (m,p) . ( m ! MESSAGE "  p ! PROCESS 
         #  dom(sender)  $  VTM(m)(p) % VTP(p)(p)   
 & '
 (m,p) . ( m ( MESSAGE )  p ( PROCESS 
                   *  VTM (m) (p) = 0  +  m , ( dom(corder) -  ran(corder) )       
      . /
 (p1,p2) . (p1 0 PROCESS 1  p2 2 PROCESS 
         3  p1 4  p2   5  VTP (p1)(p2)  6  VTP (p2) (p2)                                
7
 8 (m1,m2,p) 9 (m1: MESSAGE ; m2: MESSAGE ; p : PROCESS   
7VTM(m1)(p) < VTM(m2)(p) 
=
 ( (m1>m2) ? ( sender-1[{sender(m1)}] @ {m2})   
 A ( cdeliver[{sender(m2)}] @{m2}))) 
     
   INITIALISATION       sender := B         
           ||  cdeliver := B   
                          ||  VTP  := PROCESS C {PROCESS C {0}} 
                 ||   VTM := MESSAGE C {PROCESS C {0}}  
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EVENTS  
   BroadCast (pp   PROCESS , mm   MESSAGE)      
    WHEN  mm dom(sender)                 
         THEN     LET   nVTP     BE   nVTP = VTP(pp)   { pp   VTP(pp)(pp)+1} 
                            IN    VTM(mm) := nVTP                              
            ||   VTP(pp) := nVTP    
          END 
                       ||  sender := sender  {mm   pp}                                                                                 
                                                          ||  cdeliver := cdeliver  {pp   mm} 
          END ; 
     Deliver(pp   PROCESS , mm   MESSAGE)  
         WHEN         mm   dom(sender)           
          (pp   mm)   cdeliver                   
                           

p.( p   PROCESS     p 	sender(mm) 
  VTP(pp)(p)   VTM(mm)(p)) 
                            VTP(pp)(sender(mm)) = VTM (mm)(sender(mm)) - 1                   
          THEN       cdeliver := cdeliver  {pp   mm} 
                          ||  VTP(pp) := VTP(pp) 
({q | q  PROCESS  VTP(pp)(q) < VTM(mm)(q)}  VTM(mm)) 
                       END; 
   
    
   C.4  Third  Refinement    
 
   REFINEMENT     C44 
   REFINES    C33 
   VARIABLES           VTP, VTM, sender, cdeliver 
   INITIALISATION       sender :=          
           ||  cdeliver :=    
                          ||  VTP  := PROCESS  {PROCESS  {0}} 
                 ||   VTM := MESSAGE  {PROCESS  {0}}  
   EVENTS  
   BroadCast (pp  PROCESS , mm  MESSAGE)      
    WHEN  mm dom(sender)                 
         THEN     LET   nVTP     BE   nVTP = VTP(pp)   { pp   VTP(pp)(pp)+1} 
                         IN    VTM(mm) := nVTP                              
        ||   VTP(pp) := nVTP    
       END 
                    ||  sender := sender  {mm   pp}  
                                    ||  cdeliver := cdeliver  {pp   mm} 
          END ; 
     Deliver(pp  PROCESS , mm  MESSAGE)    
          WHEN     mm  dom(sender)  
   (pp   mm)   cdeliver                   
                            p.( p  PROCESS     p ﬀsender(mm) ﬁ  VTP(pp)(p) ﬂ  VTM(mm)(p)) 
                          ﬃ  VTP(pp)(sender(mm)) = VTM (mm)(sender(mm)) - 1                   
          THEN          cdeliver := cdeliver  {pp   mm} 
                         ||  VTP(pp) := VTP(pp) ! { sender(mm) "  VTM(mm)(sender(mm) } 
           END;  
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   C.5  Fourth  Refinement    
 
 
   REFINEMENT     C55 
   REFINES    C44 
   VARIABLES           VTP, VTM, sender, cdeliver 
   INITIALISATION       sender :=           
           ||  cdeliver :=     
                          ||  VTP  := PROCESS  {PROCESS  {0}} 
                 ||   VTM := MESSAGE  {PROCESS  {0}}  
   EVENTS  
   BroadCast (pp  PROCESS , mm  MESSAGE)      
    WHEN  mm dom(sender)                 
         THEN     LET   nVTP     BE   nVTP = VTP(pp)   { pp   VTP(pp)(pp)+1} 
                            IN    VTM(mm) := nVTP                              
            ||   VTP(pp) := nVTP    
          END 
                       ||  sender := sender  {mm   pp} 
                                                    ||  cdeliver := cdeliver  {pp   mm}           
          END ; 
     Deliver(pp  PROCESS , mm  MESSAGE)    
          WHEN     mm  dom(sender)  

   (pp   mm)   cdeliver                   
                          

  	p.( p  PROCESS  
   p sender(mm)   VTP(pp)(p)   VTM(mm)(p)) 
                            VTP(pp)(sender(mm)) = VTM (mm)(sender(mm)) - 1                   
          THEN          cdeliver := cdeliver  {pp   mm} 
                         ||  VTP(pp) (sender(mm)) := VTM(mm)(sender(mm)) 
           END; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix D
Total Order Broadcast
D.1  Abstract Model  
 
 
MACHINE       TO11 
 
SETS                       PROCESS; MESSAGE 
  
VARIABLES          sender, totalorder, delorder, tdeliver 
 
INVARIANT   sender   MESSAGE   PROCESS  

 totalorder   MESSAGE   MESSAGE 

 delorder    PROCESS   (MESSAGE   MESSAGE) 

 tdeliver   PROCESS   MESSAGE 
 

    ran(tdeliver)  dom(sender)   
 
 
 (m1,m2,p) . ( m1  MESSAGE   m2 	 MESSAGE   p 	 PROCESS 
   
   (m1m2)  delorder(p)       

 (m1 m2)  totalorder ) 
 
 
 (m1,m2,p) . ( m1  MESSAGE   m2  MESSAGE   p  PROCESS  
 (p   m1)  tdeliver   (p m2)   tdeliver     
                              m2  ran(tdeliver)   

 (m1   m2)  totalorder ) 
 
 
 (m1,m2) . ( m1 ﬀ MESSAGE ﬁ  m2 ﬂ MESSAGE  
   ﬃ  m1  ran(tdeliver)    m2  ran(tdeliver)     
     (m2 !  m1) " totalorder  
#
 (m1 !  m2)  totalorder ) 
 
$ %
 (m1,m2,p) . ( m1 & MESSAGE '  m2 ( MESSAGE '  p ( PROCESS 
   )  (p *  m1) + tdeliver  , (p *m2) +  tdeliver     
  , (m2 *  m1) - totalorder  
.
 (m1 *  m2) + totalorder ) 
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  
 (m1,m2,p1,p2) . ( m1  MESSAGE   m2  MESSAGE  
  p1  PROCESS   p2  PROCESS 
   
 
 (p1   m1)  tdeliver   (p1 m2)   tdeliver    
   (p2   m1)  tdeliver   (p2 m2)   tdeliver   

 (m1   m2)  totalorder ) 
	 

 (m) . ( m  MESSAGE     m   m  totalorder )   
  
	 

 (m1,m2) . ( m1  MESSAGE   m2  MESSAGE  

  (m1   m2)  totalorder   (m2 m3)  totalorder    
             (m1   m3)  totalorder ) 
     
 
 (m1,m2) . ( m1  MESSAGE   m2  MESSAGE  
      (m1m2)  totalorder  ﬀ (pm2)  tdeliver    
                          ﬁ    (p m1)  tdeliver  )  
 
 ﬂ ﬃ  (m) . ( m  MESSAGE    ﬂ m  ( dom (totalorder)   ran(totalorder) )    
                                   !  m " ran(tdeliver)  ) 
  
# $
 (m) . ( m % MESSAGE    &  m '  dom(sender)  
(
 m '  dom(totalorder) )
& )  (m) . ( m % MESSAGE    &   m '  dom(sender)  
(
 m '  ran(totalorder) )
 
& )  (m) . ( m % MESSAGE   &  m * ran(tdeliver) 
                    
(
 m * ( dom (totalorder) +  ran(totalorder) )    
 
 INITIALISATION 
         sender := ,                ||    totalorder :=,    
           delorder := PROCESS - {,}   ||  tdeliver := ,    
  
 EVENTS  
 
 Broadcast (pp . PROCESS , mm . MESSAGE ) /   
   WHEN   mm 0 dom(sender) 
        THEN  sender := sender 1 {mm 2  pp}                   
   END; 
 
 Order (pp . PROCESS ,mm . MESSAGE ) /   
      WHEN   mm . dom(sender)              
               3  mm 0 ran(tdeliver)           
               3  ran(tdeliver) 4   tdeliver[{pp}]                  
     THEN   tdeliver := tdeliver 1 {pp 2  mm}                
                     ||  totalorder := totalorder 1 ( ran(tdeliver)  - {mm})  
                 ||  delorder(pp) := delorder(pp) 1 ( tdeliver[{pp}]  - {mm})       
END; 
 
  TODeliver (pp . PROCESS , mm . MESSAGE) /  
      WHEN   mm . dom(sender)  
              3   mm . ran ( tdeliver ) 
     3    pp 2  mm  0  tdeliver             
              3   5m.( m . MESSAGE 3 (m2  mm) . totalorder   
        6  (pp 2  m) . tdeliver) 
       THEN       tdeliver := tdeliver 1 {pp 2  mm}              
            ||   delorder(pp) := delorder(pp) 1 ( tdeliver[{pp}]  - {mm})           
END  
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D.2  First Refinement  
 
 
 
 
REFINEMENT       TO22 
REFINES    TO11 
 
CONSTANTS                sequencer 
PROPERTIES   sequencer   PROCESS  
  
VARIABLES           sender, totalorder, tdeliver 
 
INVARIANT   

 (m) . ( m  MESSAGE       (sequencer   m)  tdeliver   

  m  ran(tdeliver)  )             
 


 (m) . ( m  MESSAGE     m   dom(totalorder)  

 (sequencer   m)   tdeliver  )   
 


 (m) . ( m  MESSAGE    m   ran(totalorder) 
 

 (sequencer   m)   tdeliver )        
  
INITIALISATION 
 
         sender :=       ||    totalorder :=    ||  tdeliver :=   
 
EVENTS  
 
 Broadcast (pp   PROCESS , mm   MESSAGE )    
   WHEN   mm  dom(sender) 
        THEN  sender := sender 	 {mm   pp} 
        END; 
 
Order (pp   PROCESS ,mm   MESSAGE )    
      WHEN   pp = sequencer  


   mm  dom(sender)              

 (sequencer    mm)    tdeliver                
  THEN   tdeliver := tdeliver  {pp   mm}                
                  ||  totalorder := totalorder  ( ran(tdeliver)   {mm})    
        END; 
 
 TODeliver (pp  PROCESS , mm  MESSAGE)   
      WHEN   pp   sequencer 
      mm  dom(sender)  
                 mm  ran ( tdeliver ) 
        pp   mm    tdeliver             
                m.( m  MESSAGE  (m  mm)  totalorder    
                          (pp   m)  tdeliver) 
       THEN      tdeliver := tdeliver  {pp   mm}              
   END  
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     D.3  Second Refinement  
 
 
REFINEMENT       TO33 
REFINES    TO22 
  
VARIABLES           sender, totalorder, tdeliver 
 
INVARIANT   ran(tdeliver)     tdeliver[{sequencer}] 
 
INITIALISATION   sender :=       ||    totalorder :=    ||  tdeliver :=    
 
EVENTS  
 
 Broadcast (pp  PROCESS , mm  MESSAGE )    
   WHEN   mm  dom(sender) 
        THEN  sender := sender  {mm   pp} 
        END; 
 
Order (pp  PROCESS ,mm  MESSAGE )    
      WHEN   pp = sequencer  

  mm  dom(sender)           
	
  (sequencer  
  mm)    tdeliver                
  THEN   tdeliver := tdeliver  {pp 
  mm}                
                  ||  totalorder := totalorder  ( tdeliver[{sequencer}]   {mm})    
        END; 
 
 TODeliver (pp  PROCESS , mm  MESSAGE)   
      WHEN   pp   sequencer 
      mm  dom(sender)  
                 mm  ran ( tdeliver ) 
        pp   mm    tdeliver             
                m.( m  MESSAGE  (m  mm)  totalorder    
                          (pp   m)  tdeliver) 
       THEN      tdeliver := tdeliver  {pp   mm}              
  END  
 
D.4  Third Refinement  
 
 
REFINEMENT       TO44 
REFINES    TO33 
  
VARIABLES           sender, totalorder, tdeliver, 
       computation, seqno, counter 
 
INVARIANT     computation   MESSAGE  
 seqno  computation   ﬀ

counter   ﬀ
 
 ﬁ
 (m1,m2) . ( m1  MESSAGE ﬂ  m2  MESSAGE  

 m1ﬃ  m2  totalorder  

seqno(m1)  <   seqno(m2) ) 
 
 ﬁ
 (m1,m2) . ( m1  MESSAGE ﬂ  m2  MESSAGE  
ﬂ  m  computation ﬂ  m  dom(seqno) 

 sequencer ﬃ m   tdeliver 
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INITIALISATION 
         sender :=             ||    totalorder :=     
       ||  tdeliver :=                ||    computation :=   
         ||  seqno :=                ||    counter := 0 
 
EVENTS  
 
 Broadcast (pp  PROCESS , mm  MESSAGE )    
  WHEN   mm  dom(sender) 
       THEN  sender := sender  {mm   pp}   
        || computation := computation   {mm}       
       END; 
 
Order (pp  PROCESS ,mm  MESSAGE  )    
     WHEN   pp = sequencer  

 mm  dom(sender)  

 mm  computation 

  (sequencer    mm)    tdeliver                 
 THEN   totalorder := totalorder  ( tdeliver[{sequencer}]  {mm})  
     ||  tdeliver := tdeliver  {pp   mm}                  
      || seqno := seqno   {mm   counter}  
      || counter:= counter + 1  
        END; 
 
 TODeliver (pp  PROCESS , mm  MESSAGE)   
     WHEN   pp   sequencer 
    

 mm  dom(sender)  
             

   mm  ran ( tdeliver ) 
    

   pp   mm    tdeliver             
             

  	m.( m  computation   ( seqno(m) < seqno(mm) )  
                        
  (pp   m)  tdeliver) 
      THEN      tdeliver := tdeliver  {pp   mm}              
 END  
 
 
D.5  Fourth Refinement  
 
 
REFINEMENT       TO55 
REFINES    TO44 
  
VARIABLES           sender, totalorder, tdeliver, 
       computation, seqno, counter 
       messcontrol, control 
 
INVARIANT     control   MESSAGE  
 messcontrol   control    computation  
            

     ran(messcontrol)   ran(tdeliver)  
                          

     ran(messcontrol)   computation  
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INITIALISATION 
         sender :=             ||    totalorder :=     
       ||  tdeliver :=                ||    computation :=   
         ||  seqno :=                ||    counter := 0 
         ||  messcontrol :=            ||    control :=    
 
       EVENTS  
  
 Broadcast (pp  PROCESS , mm  MESSAGE )    
  WHEN   mm  dom(sender) 
       THEN  sender := sender  {mm   pp}   
        || computation   := computation  {mm}            
       END; 
 
Order (pp  PROCESS ,mm  MESSAGE,mc  MESSAGE  )    
     WHEN   pp = sequencer  

 mm  dom(sender)  

 mm  computation 

  (sequencer    mm)    tdeliver  

 mc  dom(messcontrol) 

 mm  ran(messcontrol)                 
 THEN   totalorder := totalorder  ( tdeliver[{sequencer}]  {mm})  
     ||  tdeliver := tdeliver  {pp   mm}      
                  ||   control  := control  {mc}          
                              ||   messcontrol := messcontrol  {mc   mm}  
      || seqno := seqno   {mm   counter}                                
      || counter:= counter + 1  
        END; 
 
 TODeliver (pp  PROCESS , mm  MESSAGE)   
     WHEN   pp   sequencer 

 mm  dom(sender)  

   mm  ran ( messcontrol ) 
    

   pp   mm    tdeliver             
             

  	m.( m  computation  ( seqno(m) < seqno(mm) )  
                        
  (pp   m)  tdeliver) 
      THEN      tdeliver := tdeliver  {pp   mm}              
  END  
 
 
 
D.6  Fifth Refinement  
 
 
REFINEMENT       TO66 
REFINES    TO55 
  
VARIABLES           sender, totalorder, tdeliver, 
       computation, seqno, counter 
       messcontrol, control, 
        receive 
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INVARIANT   receive   PROCESS  control  
 
 
 (m) . ( m   MESSAGE      m  computation  

 messcomtrol-1(m)   receive       
                           m   ran(messcontrol)  ) 
 
INITIALISATION 
         sender :=            ||    totalorder :=    
       ||  tdeliver :=               ||    computation :=  
         ||  seqno :=               ||    counter := 0 
         ||  messcontrol :=           ||    control :=   
      ||   receive :=   
 
EVENTS  
 
 Broadcast (pp  PROCESS , mm  MESSAGE )    
  WHEN   mm 	 dom(sender) 
       THEN  sender := sender 
 {mm   pp}   
        || computation := computation  
 {mm}   
       END; 
 
Order (pp  PROCESS ,mm  MESSAGE,mc MESSAGE  )    
     WHEN   pp = sequencer  

 mm  dom(sender)   

 mm  computation 

 mm 	 ran(messcontrol)    

 mc 	 dom(messcontrol)         

 (sequencer    mm)  	  tdeliver                
 THEN   totalorder := totalorder 
 ( tdeliver[{pp}]   {mm})  
     ||  tdeliver := tdeliver 
 {pp   mm}   
               ||   messcontrol  := messcontrol  
 {mc   mm}   
      || control := control  
 {mc}        
      || seqno := seqno  
 {mm   counter}  
      || counter:= counter + 1  
        END; 
 
 ReceiveControl (pp  PROCESS , mc  MESSAGE )    
 WHEN  mc  control 

  (pp    mc)  	  receive 
 THEN receive := receive 
 {pp   mc}   
 END 
 
 TODeliver (pp  PROCESS , mm  MESSAGE)   
     WHEN  pp   sequencer 

 mm  computation 

 (pp   mm)  	  tdeliver     

 (pp   messcontrol-1 (mm))   receive    

 

m.( m  computation      (seqno(m)    seqno(mm) 
                          (pp   m)  tdeliver) 
      THEN     tdeliver := tdeliver 
 {pp   mm}              
 END  
Appendix E
Total Causal Order Broadcast
E.1 Abstract Model 
 
MACHINE       tco11 
CONSTANTS          sequencer 
PROPERTIES         sequencer   PROCESS 
SETS                       PROCESS; MESSAGE;       
VARIABLES          sender , cdeliver , tdeliver ,  computation , 
                                 control , messcontrol , causalorder , 
                                  totalorder, cdelorder, tdelorder 
 
INVARIANT  sender   MESSAGE   PROCESS 

  cdeliver    PROCESS   MESSAGE      tdeliver   PROCESS   MESSAGE 
        computation   MESSAGE              control   MESSAGE 
      

  messcontrol   control   computation    causalorder   MESSAGE   MESSAGE 
      

  totalorder   MESSAGE   MESSAGE        
          cdelorder   PROCESS  (MESSAGE   MESSAGE) 
         tdelorder   PROCESS  (MESSAGE   MESSAGE)   
      

 dom(causalorder)    dom(sender) 
      

  ran(causalorder)      dom(sender)               ran(cdeliver)    dom(sender) 
             dom(messcontrol)   dom(sender)     ran(messcontrol)   dom(sender) 
 
  (m1,m2,) . ( m1 	 MESSAGE 
  m2  MESSAGE     m1  ran(messcontrol)   

 m2  ran(messcontrol)   (m1   m2 )  causalorder    
                             (m1   m2 )  totalorder 
 
 (m,p) . ( m  MESSAGE   p  PROCESS    (p   m)   tdeliver    
                            (p   m )  cdeliver    
  
 (m1,m2) . ( m1 ﬀ MESSAGE ﬁ  m2 ﬂ MESSAGE  ﬁ      m1ﬃ computation   

  m2  computation     (m1 !  m2 )   causalorder    

  m2   ran(messcontrol)  
                                          "  m1   ran(messcontrol)   
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  
 (m) . ( m  MESSAGE    m  ran(messcontrol)    
                             (sequencer m) cdeliver   
  
 (m1,m2,p) . ( m1 	 MESSAGE 
  m2  MESSAGE 
  p  PROCESS       
                        
    (m1   m2)   causalorder      (p   m2 )  cdeliver  
                           (m1   m2 ) cdeloder(p)  
 
   (m1,m2) . ( m1  MESSAGE   m2  MESSAGE  
                              (m1   m2)   tdelorder(p)    
                              (m1   m2 ) totalorder    
 
 (m1,m2,m3) . ( m1  MESSAGE ﬀ  m2 ﬁ MESSAGE ﬀ  m3 ﬁ MESSAGE       
                                                 ﬂ(m1 ﬃ  m2)   causalorder       (m2 ﬃ  m3)   causalorder    
                                                 !  (m1 ﬃ  m3 ) causalorder 
 
 "  (m1,m2,p) . ( m1 # MESSAGE $  m2 % MESSAGE $  p % PROCESS       
                                                 &  (m1 '  m2)  ( causalorder   )   (p '  m2)  ( cdeliver         
                                                 *  (p '  m1)  ( cdeliver                                                             
 
) +  (m1,m2,m3) . ( m1 , MESSAGE -  m2 . MESSAGE -  m3 . MESSAGE       
                                                /  (m1 0  m2)  1 totalorder   2   (m2 0  m3)  1 totalorder                                                 
                                                3  (m1 0  m3 )1 totalorder   
 
2 4  (m1,m2,p) . ( m1 5 MESSAGE 6  m2 7 MESSAGE 6  p 7 PROCESS       
                                               8(m1 9  m2)  : totalorder   ;   (p 9  m2)  : tdeliver           
                                                <  (p 9  m1)  : tdeliver    
 
; =  (m1,m2,p) . ( m1 > MESSAGE ?  m2 @ MESSAGE ?  p @ PROCESS  
A (p B  m1) C tdeliver  D (p Bm2) E  tdeliver     
                                D m2 C ran(tdeliver)   
F
 (m1 B  m2) C totalorder ) 
 
G H
 (m1,m2) . ( m1 I MESSAGE J  m2 K MESSAGE  
   L  m1 M ran(tdeliver)  N m2 M ran(tdeliver)     
   N (m2 O  m1) P totalorder  
Q
 (m1 O  m2) M totalorder ) 
 
R S
 (m1,m2,p) . ( m1 T MESSAGE U  m2 V MESSAGE U  p V PROCESS 
   W  (p X  m1) Y tdeliver  Z (p Xm2) Y  tdeliver     
  Z (m2 X  m1) [ totalorder  
\
 (m1 X  m2) Y totalorder ) 
 ] ^
 (m1,m2,p1,p2) . ( m1 _ MESSAGE `  m2 a MESSAGE  
`  p1 a PROCESS `  p2 a PROCESS 
   b  (p1 c  m1) d tdeliver  e (p1 cm2) f  tdeliver    
  e (p2 c  m1) d tdeliver  e (p2 cm2) d  tdeliver   
g
 (m1 c  m2) d totalorder ) 
h i
 (m) . ( m j MESSAGE   g  m c  m f totalorder )   
 
 
h i
 (m) . ( m j MESSAGE    h m d ( dom (totalorder) k  ran(totalorder) )    
                                   l  m m ran(tdeliver)  ) 
  
n o
 (m1,m2,p) . ( m1 p MESSAGE q  m2 p MESSAGE q  p p PROCESS 
r
 (m1 s  m2) t  causalorder u (p sm2) t  cdeliver           
                         v  (m1 s  m2) t  cdelorder(p) 
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  
 (m1,m2,p) . ( m1  MESSAGE   m2  MESSAGE   p  PROCESS 
  
 
 (m1m2)  causalorder  m2  sender -1 [{p}]                

 ( m1 sender -1 [{p}]    m1  cdeliver[{p}] )       
 
	 

 (m1,m2,p) . ( m1  MESSAGE   m2  MESSAGE   p  PROCESS 
   (m1m2)  causalorder       m2 sender -1 [{p}] 
                                             m1 sender -1 [{p}]   m2  cdeliver[{p}] 
 
                (m1,m2,p)  ( m1  MESSAGE  m2  MESSAGE  pPROCESS 
                               (m1m2)  causalorder    m2   (sender-1[{p}]   cdeliver[{p}]) 
                                                 m1  (sender-1[{p}]   cdeliver[{p}] )      
   INITIALISATION 
                             sender := ﬀ     ||  cdeliver := ﬀ    ||  tdeliver := ﬀ   ||  
                          computation := ﬀ   || control := ﬀ   ||  messcontrol := ﬀ   || 
        causalorder :=ﬀ   ||   totalorder :=ﬀ   ||  
       cdelorder := PROCESS ﬁ {ﬀ}   ||   
       tdelorder := PROCESS ﬁ {ﬀ}  
 
BroadCast (pp  PROCESS , mm  MESSAGE ) ﬂ    
   WHEN  mm ﬃ dom(sender) 
        THEN      sender := sender  {mm   pp} 
                            ||    cdeliver := cdeliver  {pp   mm}  
     ||  cdelorder(pp) :=cdeloder(pp)    (cdeliver[{pp}] ! {mm})              
           ||  computation   := computation    {mm}    
                            ||  causalorder := causalorder  ( (sender -1[{pp}] ! {mm}) 
                                               ( cdeliver[{pp}] ! {mm}))             
        END; 
 
CausalDeliver(pp " PROCESS , mm " MESSAGE) #    
   WHEN  mm " dom(sender) 
          $  (pp   mm ) ﬃ cdeliver 
               $  %m.( m " MESSAGE $ (m   mm) " causalorder  
                           &  (pp   m) " cdeliver) 
        THEN cdeliver := cdeliver  {pp   mm}  
     ||  cdelorder(pp) :=cdeloder(pp)    (cdeliver[{pp}] ! {mm})              
        END; 
 
SendControl (pp " PROCESS ,mm " MESSAGE, mc " MESSAGE ) #   
        WHEN   pp = sequencer 
                $  mc ﬃ dom(sender)              
               $  mm ﬃ ran(messcontrol)            
               $  mm " computation 
               $  (pp   mm) " cdeliver  
               $  %m. ( m " MESSAGE  $  m " computation  
                                 $ (m   mm) " causalorder  &   m " ran (messcontrol))  
       THEN    causalorder := causalorder   ( (sender -1[{sequencer}] ! {mc}) 
                                                          ( cdeliver[{sequencer}] ! {mc}))  
                ||  sender := sender  {mc   sequencer} 
                ||  control := control   {mc} 
                ||  messcontrol := messcontrol  {mc   mm} 
                ||   LET m BE m = ran(messcontrol) 
                    IN totalorder := totalorder  ( m ! {mm})  END        
        END;  
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TODeliver (pp   PROCESS ,mc   MESSAGE)   
      WHEN    mc   dom(sender)  
                mc   control 
       (pp   mc)   cdeliver 
       (pp   messcontrol(mc))   cdeliver 
                (pp   messcontrol(mc))  tdeliver 
                     

m.( m   MESSAGE  m   computation  
                               ( m   messcontrol(mc)   totalorder)    (pp   m)   tdeliver ) 
       THEN        tdeliver := tdeliver   {pp   messcontrol(mc)} 
                    ||   tdelorder(pp) := tdeloder(pp)  (tdeliver[{pp}] {messcontrol(mc)})              
       END  
 
 
E.2     First  Refinement  
 
 
REFINEMENT      tco22 
REFINES    tco11 
       
VARIABLES          sender , cdeliver , tdeliver ,  computation , 
                                 control , messcontrol,VTP,VTM,seqno,counter 
 
INVARIANT  VTP     PROCESS 	  ( PROCESS 	  N ) 


  VTM   MESSAGE    ( PROCESS   N) 

 seqno   computation   N   

 counter   N  
 
 (m,p1,p2) . ( m  MESSAGE   p1  PROCESS   p2  PROCESS 
            m  dom(sender)  VTP(p1)(p2)   VTM(m)(p2)    
            (p1   m)  cdeliver                         
                  
 ﬀ
 (m1,m2,p) . ( m1 ﬁ MESSAGE ﬂ  m2 ﬁ MESSAGE ﬂ  p ﬁ PROCESS  
          ﬃ  (m1   m2)   causalorder             
          !  VTM (m1)(p) " VTM(m2)(p)                
# $
 (m,p) . ( m % MESSAGE &  p % PROCESS 
         '  dom(sender)  (  VTM(m)(p) ) VTP(p)(p)   
 * +
 (m,p) . ( m , MESSAGE -  p , PROCESS 
                   .  VTM (m) (p) = 0  /  m 0 ( dom(causalorder) 1  ran(causalorder) )       
      2 3
 (p1,p2) . (p1 4 PROCESS 5  p2 6 PROCESS 
         7  p1 8  p2   9  VTP (p1)(p2)  :  VTP (p2) (p2)                                
     ; <(m1,m2,p) = (m1> MESSAGE ? m2> MESSAGE ? p > PROCESS   
;VTM(m1)(p) @ VTM(m2)(p) 
A
 ( (m1Bm2) C ( sender-1[{sender(m1)}] D {m2})   
 E ( cdeliver[{sender(m2)}] D{m2}))) 
F G
 (m1,m2) . ( m1 H MESSAGE I  m2 J MESSAGE  
K
 m1L  m2 J totalorder  
M
seqno(m1)  <   seqno(m2) ) 
 
K N
 (m1,m2) . ( m1 J MESSAGE I  m2 J MESSAGE  
I  m J computation I  m J dom(seqno) 
M
 sequencer L m J  tdeliver 
  INITIALISATION 
                             sender := O            ||  cdeliver := O    ||  tdeliver := O   ||  
                          computation := O   || control := O      ||  messcontrol := O   || 
        VTP :=O   ||   VTM :=O   ||  seqno :=  O   ||  counter := 0  
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Broadcast(pp   PROCESS , mm   MESSAGE)  
 WHEN    mm dom(sender)   
      THEN    LET  nVTP   
    BE   nVTP = VTP(pp)   { pp   VTP(pp)(pp)+1} 
                      IN    VTM(mm) := nVTP    
        ||  VTP(pp) := nVTP   END 
               || sender := sender  {mm   pp} 
                 ||  cdeliver := cdeliver  {pp   mm} 
               || computation := computation  {mm} 
      END ; 
 
CausalDeliver (pp   PROCESS , mm   MESSAGE)    
       WHEN   mm   dom(sender)              
              (pp   mm)  cdeliver                  
              p.( p   PROCESS   p 	  sender(mm)  
  VTP(pp)(p)   VTM(mm)(p)) 
              VTP(pp)(sender(mm)) = VTM (mm)(sender(mm))-1                   
       THEN 
                   cdeliver := cdeliver  {pp   mm} 
               ||   VTP(pp) := VTP(pp) 
                  ({q | q  PROCESS   VTP(pp)(q) < VTM(mm)(q)}  VTM(mm)) 
       END; 
   
SendControl (pp  PROCESS , mm  MESSAGE, mc  MESSAGE )    
   WHEN   pp = sequencer 
                mc  dom(sender)            
                mm  ran(messcontrol)            
                  mm  computation 
                pp   mm   cdeliver 
      (m,p)  ( p  PROCESS  m  MESSAGE  m  computation 
       VTM (m)(p)  VTM(mm)(p)  ﬀ   m ﬁ ran(messcontrol))  
            THEN   control := control  ﬂ {mc} 
           ||  messcontrol := messcontrol ﬂ {mc ﬃ  mm} 
           ||  LET  nVTP  BE  nVTP = VTP(pp) + { pp ﬃ  VTP(pp)(pp)+1} 
          IN     VTM(mc) := nVTP  
      ||  VTP(pp) := nVTP   
    END 
           ||  sender := sender ﬂ {mc ﬃ  pp} 
           ||   LET  ncount  BE  ncount =  counter +1 
           IN     counter := ncount   
      ||  seqno(mm) := ncount   
    END 
   END; 
 
TODeliver (pp ﬁ PROCESS ,  mc ﬁ MESSAGE)  
     WHEN  mc ﬁ dom(sender)  
           mc ﬁ control 
     (pp ﬃ  mc) ﬁ cdeliver 
     (pp ﬃ  messcontrol(mc)) ﬁ cdeliver 
              (pp ﬃ  messcontrol(mc)) ! tdeliver 
     "m.( mﬁ MESSAGE   m ﬁ computation  
       ( seqno(m) < seqno (messcontrol(mc) )  ﬀ  (pp ﬃ  m) ﬁ tdeliver ) 
     THEN     tdeliver := tdeliver ﬂ  {pp ﬃ  messcontrol(mc)} 
     END 
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E.3     Second  Refinement  
 
 
 
REFINEMENT      tco33 
REFINES    tco22       
VARIABLES           sender , cdeliver , tdeliver ,  computation , 
                                  control , messcontrol,VTP,VTM 
INVARIANT  
                    (m)  (m MESSAGE   m   control  
                              (m   sequencer)  sender          
                        seqno(messcontrol -1(m)) = VTM(m)(sequencer))  
  
    (m1,m2,p)  (m1 MESSAGE  m2 MESSAGE  p  PROCESS   
         m1   control  m2  control              
             VTM(m1)(p) 	 VTM(m2)(p)                                      
              
  seqno (messcontrol -1(m1)) 	 seqno (messcontrol -1(m2))   
 

 (m1,m2,p)  (m1 MESSAGE  m2 MESSAGE  p  PROCESS   
                         m1   computation  m2  computation       
                seqno (m1)  seqno (m2)                                            
              VTM(messcontrol(m1))(p)  VTM(messcontrol(m2))(p) 
   
 INITIALISATION 
                             sender :=             ||  cdeliver :=     ||  tdeliver :=    ||  
                          computation :=    || control :=       ||  messcontrol :=    || 
        VTP :=   ||   VTM :=    
Broadcast(pp  PROCESS , mm  MESSAGE)  
 WHEN    mm dom(sender)   
      THEN    LET  nVTP   
    BE   nVTP = VTP(pp)   { pp   VTP(pp)(pp)+1} 
                      IN    VTM(mm) := nVTP    
        ||  VTP(pp) := nVTP   END 
               || sender := sender  {mm   pp} 
                 || cdeliver := cdeliver  {pp   mm} 
               || computation := computation  {mm} 
      END ; 
 
  CausalDeliver (pp ﬀ PROCESS , mm ﬀ MESSAGE) ﬁ   
       WHEN   mm ﬀ dom(sender)              
             ﬂ  (pp   mm) ﬃ cdeliver                  
             ﬂ  p.( p ﬀ PROCESS  ﬂ p   sender(mm)  !  VTP(pp)(p) "  VTM(mm)(p)) 
             #  VTP(pp)(sender(mm)) = VTM (mm)(sender(mm))-1                   
       THEN 
                    cdeliver := cdeliver $ {pp %  mm} 
                ||   VTP(pp) := VTP(pp) & ({q | q ' PROCESS (  VTP(pp)(q) < VTM(mm)(q)} )  VTM(mm)) 
       END; 
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SendControl (pp   PROCESS , mm   MESSAGE, mc   MESSAGE )    
    WHEN   pp = sequencer 
                mc  dom(sender)            
                mm  ran(messcontrol)            
                  mm   computation 
                pp   mm    cdeliver 
            
 (m,p)  ( p   PROCESS  m   MESSAGE  m   computation 
                 VTM (m)(p)  VTM(mm)(p)     m   ran(messcontrol))  
            THEN   control := control  	 {mc} 
           ||  messcontrol := messcontrol 	 {mc   mm} 
           ||  LET  nVTP  BE  nVTP = VTP(pp) + { pp   VTP(pp)(pp)+1} 
          IN     VTM(mc) := nVTP   ||  VTP(pp) := nVTP   END 
           ||  sender := sender 	 {mc   pp} 
           END; 
 
TODeliver (pp   PROCESS ,  mc   MESSAGE)  
     WHEN       mc   dom(sender)  
               mc   control 
         (pp   mc)   cdeliver 
         (pp   messcontrol(mc))   cdeliver 
                    (pp   messcontrol(mc))  tdeliver 
          

m.( m  MESSAGE  m   computation   
             
   ( VTM(messcontrol-1(m))(sequencer)  <  VTM(mc)(sequencer) ) 
                                                                                    (pp   m)  tdeliver )     
  THEN     tdeliver := tdeliver   {pp   messcontrol(mc)} 
  END 
 
E.4  Third  Refinement  
 
REFINEMENT      tco44 
REFINES    tco33       
VARIABLES          sender , cdeliver , tdeliver ,  computation , 
                                 control , messcontrol,VTP,VTM   
 INITIALISATION 
                             sender :=             ||  cdeliver :=     ||  tdeliver :=    ||  
                          computation :=    || control :=       ||  messcontrol :=    || 
        VTP :=   ||   VTM :=    
Broadcast(pp  PROCESS , mm  MESSAGE)  
 WHEN    mm dom(sender)   
      THEN    LET  nVTP   
    BE   nVTP = VTP(pp)   { pp   VTP(pp)(pp)+1} 
                      IN    VTM(mm) := nVTP    
        ||  VTP(pp) := nVTP   END 
               || sender := sender  {mm   pp} 
                 || cdeliver := cdeliver  {pp   mm} 
               || computation := computation  {mm} 
      END ; 
  CausalDeliver (pp  PROCESS , mm  MESSAGE)    
       WHEN   mm  dom(sender)              
              (pp   mm)  cdeliver                  
              p.( p  PROCESS   p ﬀ  sender(mm)  ﬁ  VTP(pp)(p) ﬂ  VTM(mm)(p)) 
              VTP(pp)(sender(mm)) = VTM (mm)(sender(mm))-1                   
       THEN 
                   cdeliver := cdeliver  {pp   mm} 
               ||   VTP(pp) := VTP(pp) ﬃ { sender(mm)    VTM(mm)(sender(mm)) } 
        END; 
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SendControl (pp   PROCESS , mm   MESSAGE, mc   MESSAGE )    
   WHEN   pp = sequencer 
                mc  dom(sender)            
                mm  ran(messcontrol)            
                  mm   computation 
                pp   mm    cdeliver 
            
 (m,p)  ( p   PROCESS  m   MESSAGE  m   computation 
                 VTM (m)(p)  VTM(mm)(p)     m   ran(messcontrol))  
            THEN   control := control  	 {mc} 
           ||  messcontrol := messcontrol 	 {mc   mm} 
           ||  LET  nVTP  BE  nVTP = VTP(pp) + { pp   VTP(pp)(pp)+1} 
          IN     VTM(mc) := nVTP   ||  VTP(pp) := nVTP   END 
           ||  sender := sender 	 {mc   pp} 
           END; 
 
TODeliver (pp   PROCESS ,  mc   MESSAGE)  
     WHEN       mc   dom(sender)  
               mc   control 
         (pp   mc)   cdeliver 
         (pp   messcontrol(mc))   cdeliver 
                    (pp   messcontrol(mc))  tdeliver 
          

m.( m  MESSAGE  m   computation   
             
   ( VTM(messcontrol-1(m))(sequencer)  <  VTM(mc)(sequencer) ) 
                                                                                    (pp   m)  tdeliver )     
  THEN     tdeliver := tdeliver   {pp   messcontrol(mc)} 
  END 
 
 
E.4  Fourth   Refinement  
 
REFINEMENT      tco55 
REFINES    tco44 
       
VARIABLES          sender , cdeliver , tdeliver ,  computation , 
                                 control , messcontrol,VTP,VTM 
   
 INITIALISATION 
                             sender :=             ||  cdeliver :=     ||  tdeliver :=    ||  
                          computation :=    || control :=       ||  messcontrol :=    || 
        VTP :=   ||   VTM :=    
 
Broadcast(pp  PROCESS , mm  MESSAGE)  
 WHEN    mm dom(sender)   
      THEN    LET  nVTP   
    BE   nVTP = VTP(pp)   { pp   VTP(pp)(pp)+1} 
                      IN    VTM(mm) := nVTP    
        ||  VTP(pp) := nVTP   END 
               || sender := sender  {mm   pp} 
                 || cdeliver := cdeliver  {pp   mm} 
               || computation := computation  {mm} 
      END ; 
 
Appendix E Total Causal Order Broadcast 196
 
  CausalDeliver (pp   PROCESS , mm   MESSAGE)    
       WHEN   mm   dom(sender)              
              (pp   mm)  cdeliver                  
              

p.( p   PROCESS   p   sender(mm)    VTP(pp)(p)   VTM(mm)(p)) 
              VTP(pp)(sender(mm)) = VTM (mm)(sender(mm))-1                   
       THEN 
                   cdeliver := cdeliver 	 {pp   mm} 
               ||   VTP(pp)(sender(mm)) := VTM(mm)(sender(mm)) 
        END; 
 
SendControl (pp   PROCESS , mm   MESSAGE, mc   MESSAGE )    
   WHEN   pp = sequencer 
                mc  dom(sender)            
                mm  ran(messcontrol)            
                  mm   computation 
                pp   mm    cdeliver 
            
 (m,p) 
 ( p   PROCESS  m   MESSAGE  m   computation 
                 VTM (m)(p)  VTM(mm)(p)     m   ran(messcontrol))  
            THEN   control := control  	 {mc} 
           ||  messcontrol := messcontrol 	 {mc   mm} 
           ||  LET  nVTP  BE  nVTP = VTP(pp) + { pp   VTP(pp)(pp)+1} 
          IN     VTM(mc) := nVTP   ||  VTP(pp) := nVTP   END 
           ||  sender := sender 	 {mc   pp} 
           END; 
 
TODeliver (pp   PROCESS ,  mc   MESSAGE)  
     WHEN       mc   dom(sender)  
               mc   control 
         (pp   mc)   cdeliver 
         (pp   messcontrol(mc))   cdeliver 
                    (pp   messcontrol(mc))  tdeliver 
          

m.( m  MESSAGE  m   computation   
                ( VTM(messcontrol-1(m))(sequencer)  <  VTM(mc)(sequencer) ) 
                                                                                    (pp   m)  tdeliver )     
  THEN     tdeliver := tdeliver   {pp   messcontrol(mc)} 
  END 
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